Pak-Saudi defence pact: necessary elaboration

My recent article in the Tribune Sunday magazine titled "Pak-Saudi defence pact: and old brotherhood for a dangerous age" evokes important questions by readers, concerning nature of the agreement, nuclear-sharing and security guarantees, likelihood of both countries getting entangled in each other's wars, possible reaction by the US and Europe, deterrent value of the agreement, etc. This article discusses these queries in an 'opinion mode' without being privy to the exact details, or without speaking for any state institution.

First, the nature of the guarantees. As mentioned, the Saudi focus is in securing non-conventional guarantees ('nuclear umbrella') under the concept of nuclear-sharing, for which a tacit understanding 'reportedly' existed as far back as 2010. The Kingdom just formalised it. Riyadh sought similar protection from the US, which ostensibly made it conditional to the Kingdom joining the Abraham Accords to recognise Israel. However, Tel Aviv's resistance to the Two-State solution and boundaries thereof and prosecution of genocide/atrocities in Gaza literally buried any hopes of the expected Saudi-Israeli rapprochement. Therefore, the Saudi push for mutual defence arrangements with Muslim Pakistan, as an available alternative. Riyadh has a longstanding, deep-rooted and multi-domain defence cooperation, collaboration and production ties with Pakistan.

On September 22, Ali Shihabi, an analyst closer to the Saudi royal court, was quizzed if the deal meant Pakistan offering nukes to defend Saudi Arabia. He replied to AFP: "Yes, it does," explaining "Nuclear is integral to this deal and Pakistan remembers that the kingdom effectively financed their nuclear programme and supported them when they were sanctioned." Shihabi, a Princeton University and Harvard Business School alumni, also reiterated that he hoped "India will understand the security needs of Saudi Arabia." So, there are no two opinions on the nature of security umbrella. Nuclear-sharing or nuclear basing is an established arrangement among NATO countries.

Second, some in the Pakistani old school over-emphasise ambiguity in nuclear strategy etc, therefore, recommending maintaining ambiguity in guarantees and deployment of nuclear safeguards to the Kingdom. However, this cabal misreads current regional and global security environment, especially the unambiguous Pak-Saudi threat perception. Israel's ultra-right coalition under Netanyahu makes unambiguous and threatening statements about their divine right to strike any country anywhere, that does not fall in line. Gone are the days of maintaining ambiguity for plausibility and deniability. It is time to draw red lines, make these known and defend them tooth and nail to instil caution on rogue states like Israel, and fortify deterrence against budding rogue states like Modi's India, shredding to pieces notions like the 'new normal'.

Three, doubters and naysayers influenced by the Indian information maneuver question Pakistan's resolve to use nukes, if push comes to shove. The fact that Pakistan under its present military leadership did not blink against a much larger, overconfident and arrogant India, in May this year, is enough to demonstrate Islamabad's resolve, that should never be put to test by Indian or Israeli miscalculations. It is backed by a credible, fail-safe, multiplatform triad involving air, land and sea-based capability available to both nations, designed specifically for defensive purposes. The civil-military leadership resolves to not live in a world, where there is no Pakistan or its co-joined twin, Saudi Arabia.

Fourth, many cite the complexity of undertaking and fulfilling agreement obligations in each other's war like Pakistan's response to a Saudi-Iran conflict or Saudi response to Pakistan's conflict with India. Although partial answer was carried in the cited article, the geostrategic alignment in the Middle East drastically changed after Israel's rogue behaviour and hostile intent. Tehran, already a victim of Israeli aggression, now values the utility of Ummah's unity, the duplicity of India and the value of friendly ties with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This greatly reduces the likelihood of Tehran-Riyadh-Islamabad conflict.

As far as India is concerned; Pakistan may not need ground forces to fight India, both in conventional and non-conventional modes. It would, however, need Saudi material assistance in many ways, that would now be assured without interruptions, under the Agreement. And Saudi defence takes priority over Indian sensitivities.

Fifth, there is no possibility of either side entangling in a broader war with the US since the agreement is defensive in nature; also protects the US interest by cementing deterrence; and applies brakes to Israel's rogue behaviour, much to the delight of 'some' in the US miltablishment. Netanyahu is dragging down America along, turning it into another pariah state, much to the dislike of many saner heads in the US, the World Jewry and the American Government. Many would want to put the brakes on Israel's rogue adventurism, a threat to global peace. And the agreement does exactly that. This truism also addresses the question of any perceived West Plus's pressure on both countries, and the complexity of handling it. NATO, itself undertaking nuclear-sharing, has no valid grounds to criticise this pact

Sixth, many question the safety and security of nuclear weapons in transit and under different basing options, once mutually decided. Although deterrence can be maintained from existing placements, diversification would augment deterrence through employment flexibility and robustness of defence in both countries. The mode and manner of such arrangement is best left to the experts.

Seventh, many commentators ask if the agreement needs parliamentary approval. In a country with politicians of all shades, eager to brag about their breaking news, discussing this very classified agreement publicly would not be fitting. Even in the US, classified intelligence matters are discussed exclusively in the appropriate committees. And there too, not all matters of national security are brought under discussion. The raid on Osama, America's recent submarine incursions against North Korea, and a host of other decisions are the exclusive purview of the Executive/president.

Naysayers should not be allowed to pollute the air of unprecedented brotherly amity between Islamabad and Riyadh. Doubters need to avoid undue criticism, side-stepping national interest or falling preys to interest lobbies. It is heartening to see the PTI coming clean in support of the Agreement, irrespective of political differences.

So, again it is time to celebrate without being unnecessarily apologetic. Nations do what they do in their selfish national interest, without fear and appeasement!