Can India contain Chinese influence in South Asia?

Listen to article

The Indian subcontinent is a populous, complex and geo-strategically challenging part of the world. This region is beset by multiple challenges ranging from governance deficiencies to widespread deprivation, and growing climate stresses, as well as lingering intra-state rivalries.

In addition to border disputes at play since the colonial era, mutual suspicions concerning rival nations stoking cross-border restiveness remain a major bone of contention, especially between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Intensifying great power competition between the US and China in South Asia has added another layer of complexity to the evolving strategic dynamics between the two largest states of this region.

Pakistan has a long history of cooperation with China, enabled in part by latter's desire to keep India in check after the Sino-Indian war of 1962. However, Pakistan has also invested heavily in its strategic alliance with the US.

Soon after independence, Pakistan was quick to join US-led Cold War alliances, while India chose a more non-aligned path. American military and economic support to Pakistan spiked after the country began supporting the insurgency against the Soviets occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, and then during the US-led occupation of Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks on the US.

During the Clinton administration, however, the US decided to begin developing closer bilateral ties with India, enticed by the size of its market, and its potential to counterbalance growing Chinese influence. Pakistan also managed to boost its ties with China during this same time, which culminated in the formation of CPEC in 2015, linked to the ambitious BRI. Meanwhile, the serious intra-state rivalry between India and Pakistan did not dissipate. Instead, this rivalry has worsened.

Pakistan may remain keen to avert overdependence on China by balancing its relationship with China and the US. Yet, doing so in effect is proving difficult given Pakistan's turbulent relation with the US during its two decades of intervention in Afghanistan, and the increasing American apathy towards Pakistan now that it no longer offers enough strategic utility for the US.

Yet, America's bet on India to act as a strategic counterweight to China is not playing out either, as planned. Despite his bromance with President Trump, Prime Minister Modi has recently announced his desire to improve relations with China. Although India wants to continue strengthening military and economic ties with the US, it did not relinquish ties with Russia.

There is a growing realisation in the US that India is unlikely to join the US in the advent of an outright Sino-US confrontation within the Indo-Pacific arena, lest its own interests are directly threatened.

Moreover, despite portraying itself as a rising power that can stand up to China, India has in fact become increasingly dependent on China. PM Modi put forth a 'Made in India' strategy aiming to replace China as the factory of the world over a decade ago. Yet, India's industrial sector remains beset by problems, and its economy has not been able to ensure equitable growth, or to even attract sufficient foreign investments. Despite recent skirmishes along their disputed border, China remains India's largest trading partner. Whether India will be able to capitalise on the Trump administration's new bout of tariffs on China remains to be seen.

While India's economic and political clout has grown in recent years, its democratic credentials under a Hindu nationalist government have become increasingly tarnished. On the other hand, China has succeeded in strengthening its ties with smaller South Asian states including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.

The US needs a more nuanced strategy to manage China's growing footprint in South Asia, instead of merely trying to strengthen India to contain China. America needs to look for emergent opportunities to coexist, and even to cooperate with China, especially in regional states which are still trying to maintain ties with both global superpowers. Yet, the myopic, maximalist and transactional foreign policy postures of the new American administration seem ill-suited to realise this goal.