Since the time the new Trump administration has taken over, many questions are being raised on the issues of foreign policies, diplomacy, geopolitics and the overall future environment under which international relations will be conducted. One big assumption is that the era of Trump administration will bring a new turning point in European history.
Trump is sidelining Europe and almost blindsiding it as he proceeds forward to find a reasonable agreement to end the Ukrainian war. Europe is being asked to do more for its security and in doing so the Trump administration is driving a wedge in the future Transatlantic alliance.
Countries within the EU are worried whether they should spend more on the social welfare programmes to ensure their political survival or spend more on defence which means not only their increased defence spending (of about 3% of their GDP) towards NATO in line with the American demand but also their continued support for the war in Ukraine.
President Trump in the meantime is looking to reduce his risks and the excessive cost that America pays for fighting a European war. In the coming days, the EU may face a cut-down on American forces on the continent and if the US walks out of NATO altogether which is a possibility then the European countries will be forced to view this as an existential threat. How will Europe respond to this threat?
Will Europe go alone to support the war in Ukraine? If it does so, the Americans will have no security guarantees to offer to the rest of the members of NATO under Article 5 – essentially meaning the death of NATO. Europe will then be forced to replace all the strategic capabilities in which it is in alliance with the Americans and it will also have to put the European economy on a war footing. New defence industries will have to be set up to bear the burden of the strategy of unilateralism, and the EU member countries may not be able to afford all this coming at the cost of essential social services.
NATO is then likely to degenerate into a security organisation of lesser stature only to conduct multinational operations under the banner of the coalition of the willing. Under an enabled security environment dominated by a weakened NATO, one doesn't know what will be the collective European response if President Putin chooses to test Article 5 by showing his willingness to reclaim Russia's sphere of influence by asking NATO forces to roll back from Eastern Europe. Will then Europe choose to go to war with Russia?
President Zelensky would do anything to jump into the European lap. However, with transatlantic partnership and NATO facing an existential threat it would be an unwise move on the part of not only Zelensky but any Ukrainian President who might replace him. Ukraine's best option under the changing international environment would be to revert to the Russian sphere of influence.
Doing that it may retain its territorial integrity and the status of a client or clan Russian state. To do this, Ukraine must correctly read the geographical component of the future geopolitics it faces.
From Russia's perspective, the end game strategy of the Ukrainian war should not be just the end of this war but achieving greater foreign policy goals. President Trump has already shown his willingness to accept two key parameters that Russia has set forth for the resolution of this conflict – Ukraine will not be part of NATO, its future neutrality will be ensured; and Russia will keep Crimea and its four oblasts.
Russia must bring under discussion the overall security architecture in Europe. Russia's concern at this point should be to seek greater security guarantees from the Trump administration that should suggest that such flashpoints as Baltic, Arctic and Black Sea will not be turned hot nor will Russia be provoked to fight another war.
Considering President Trump's commitment to end the Ukraine war and also considering the fast-changing geopolitical trends, one can make a sound assumption that two out of the five main actors of the war in Ukraine will be sufficiently degraded in future.
Western Europe and Ukraine as well as the third actor, Eastern Europe, will be confronted with a security dilemma whether to remain part of a weakened EU and NATO or revert to the Russian sphere of influence. The real question that this assumption throws up is whether the other two main actors – Russia and the US – can sufficiently trust each other with a deal.
President Trump's previous history of managing diplomatic deals is not encouraging. He reversed JCPOA with Iran for which Russia also acted as a guarantor. His direct dealing with Taliban's sidestepping from Doha Peace Process resulted in a sudden and ill-coordinated end to NATO mission and in an utterly poor withdrawal of American forces under the Biden administration. His idea of having Summit meetings with Kim Jong Un in his previous term was also counterproductive and created no geopolitical headways.
Even his attempts to buy over the Palestinians in his previous term by promising them aid in accepting a new Middle Eastern plan didn't work. His maximum pressure campaign against the Iranians also backfired as instead of turning the Iranian regime weak, the circumstances dictated that it further got emboldened. So, Russia will have to be cautious and calculative before it submits to any incentives or concessions being offered by the Americans.
Lastly, a fundamental question still raises its head for the Americans – who is the enemy? By bringing Russia out of international isolation, President Trump may consider President Putin inclined at least to stay neutral if not take the American side against China. Surely, the Americans will be pivoting towards Asia after settling matters in the other two theatres of war – Ukraine and the Middle East.
If Americans back off from NATO and pull back from the European security guarantees, a likely scenario may develop where the Europeans may step up and continue to support President Zelensky to not only offset President Trump's plans but also to keep Russia's alleged imperialist designs under check. China and not the US under such circumstances will be Russia's best bet to defend against the military threat developing because of America's Asia pivot policy and also European re-commitment to Ukrainian defence.
Russia's best strategy in coming days should be to utilise President Trump's office to end war in Ukraine, reclaim its sphere of influence, continue its unlimited partnership with China and play an active role in events that are leading to a change in how the world may operate in future – under a changed world order in which Russia may emerge as a prominent stakeholder.
COMMENTS
Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.
For more information, please see our Comments FAQ