Is Iran shifting its Capital?

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There has been news that Iran is planning to shift its capital from Tehran in the north to another, yet to be decided location, in the southern coastal region of Makran. The move is under active consideration 'apparently' for geo-economic and environmental reasons, as Tehran has no port hence no maritime trade potential being away from the Arabia Sea. Plus, an overpopulated Tehran, four times larger than the next city Mashhad, faces water and power shortages. Tehran is home to around 20% of Iran's population, reportedly consuming 25% of Iran's drinking water. Industrial pollution and heavy traffic threaten Tehran's sustainability especially in winters. Moreover, the city, generating some 30% of Iran's GDP, is perilously vulnerable to earthquakes, as it sits atop two major seismic fault lines.

Tehran was established as capital by Agha Mohammad Khan Qajar (1742-1797), the first ruler of Qajar dynasty in the 18th Century. Iran, since 1989 in at least six studies, has considered relocating its capital to cities like Esfahan, Hamedan, Kashan, Pardis (new city), Semnan, Shiraz and Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf. The idea was also pursued during the presidency of Iran's 6th President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013). But it was shelved because of financial constraints and political considerations. Iranian Parliament (Majlis) in 2014 again mandated to explore relocation, and in May 2015, Majlis sanctioned feasibility studies under the Ministry of Roads and Urban Development, which remain inconclusive and incomplete.

The incumbent president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has now revived the proposal as an antidote to Tehran's cited problems. He reckons that lack of seaport at Tehran compels Iran to transport raw material from ports in the south towards north, for manufacturing in Tehran's industrial belt and then ship finished product back to the southern ports using costly land transportation. And this does not make economic sense.

Iran's spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani emphasised this January that the new capital is to be 'definitely be in the south, in the Makran region' and that the matter was under active consideration, exploration and feasibility. However, on 8th January, the President's Executive Deputy, Jafar Ghaempanah, toned down the proposal dubbing it 'only an idea', clarifying that no timeline was set for such relocation. Public reaction through social media is one of deep scepticism as Makran region is arid, necessitating potential reliance on costly desalinated sea water to sustain a large city.

Makran's 1,000-kilometer coastal belt extends from southeastern Iran along the Gulf of Oman to southwestern Pakistan along the Arabian Sea. Iran's Makran is roughly one-fourth of the historical region ensconced in Iran's Sistan and Baluchistan province, Iran's largest but sparsely populated and least developed province. Iran's Makran coastline (around 280 km) has several small ports, including Gwatar, Jask and Sirik. Chabahar, the largest port is in one of Iran's nine Free Trade-Industrial Zones. Chahbahar lies around 180 km west of Gwadar, providing the much-touted direct transit link to the markets of Afghanistan and Central Asia. Chabahar Free Economic Zone comprises two separate old ports, namely the Shahid Beheshti and Shahid Kalantari. Chabahar has substantial cargo handling capacity. We discuss Chahbahar next week in more detail.

The roughly 720 km Pakistani Makran coast in Balochistan province has Gwadar deep seaport, Jewni, Ormara and Pasni naval bases and fish harbours, besides other maritime infrastructure. Ports along the Pakistani coast are deeper and more feasible from a maritime standpoint.

A new capital along Makran coast provides Iran potential advantages like availability of abundant water (from desalination), direct access to the Indian Ocean through the Persian Gulf, as well as the Strait of Hormuz through the Gulf of Oman. It provides Iran with better market access overseas, making Iranian exports more competitive. The new port city potentially enables Iran, India, Afghanistan and other countries to bypass Pakistan's CPEC and Gwadar Port.

India had pledged an investment of $2 billion in 2013 to link Chabahar to Central Asia and Afghanistan by rail. Most of that infrastructure is complete along this trade corridor connecting Chahbahar-Dilaram-Zaranj and Kabul. The 'Dilaram Highway' connects with Afghanistan's 'garland road' famously called the 'ring road' that links Herat, Qandahar, Kabul and Mazar-e-Shareef. Some reports claim (not very precisely) that some 70% of the Afghan transit trade, initially routed through Karachi, has switched to this corridor. This rail/road corridor enables direct access to India's Fakhor and Ayni airbases in Tajikistan. New coastal city also complements India's geostrategic advantage via-a-vis Pakistan and China, by emerging as a serious player in the regional politics.

Despite sanctions against Iran, the US, in November 2018, exempted certain activities through Chahbahar that supported Afghanistan's reconstruction and comprised humanitarian aid.

However, a new Iranian capital on the coast would likely be on a 'geostrategic limb', open to seaborne interdiction and Pakistan's proximity. By the same analogy, a closely located capital of an ideologically-driven Iran may complicate Pakistan's sectarian landscape, enhancing Tehran's already pervasive influence. Continuing Indo-Persian bonhomie and intelligence collaboration, and the new Indo-Iran-Afghanistan nexus might have significant implications for Islamabad from geostrategic, geoeconomics and sociocultural standpoints.

However, at present, relocating capital to an underdeveloped Makran region seems next to impossible, given Iran's current economic situation, the West Plus's sanctions and the effort, time and resources needed for such an undertaking. A new city needs substantial investment in infrastructure and public services. It also entails shifting Iran's cultural identity in a significant manner as Tehran has been Iran's capital for more than 200 years. Moving the 'first city' would entail significant cultural and historical shifts.

However, if the cited difficulties could be controlled, a capital city on Makran coast would enhance Iran's influence in the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia. Iran has immense experience in raising, mentoring and using proxies successfully. Its bruised Middle East junket might re-surface in Central/South Asian variants.

In the larger scheme of things, Iran remains a competitor to Pakistan, and an unsettling regional and global player, imbued with a sense of self-righteousness, cultural imperialism and religious dominance, in a manner akin to, and in conformity with the local version of 'manifest destiny'!