2025 - Mideast, extremism and Pakistan

Syrian conflict could inspire militant groups in Pakistan, intensifying sectarian violence and extremism.

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The violence in Gaza is a powder keg, with extremist groups poised to exploit the narrative of 'us against them' perhaps like never before. Once, or rather if, the dust in Gaza starts settling down, the extremist narrative would be: "We were right, and the Muslim world or ummah just sat by and let this happen - they had no answer to this." This narrative has already tremendously empowered indigenous extremists in Muslim-majority nations. They will be able to emphasise how their governments just 'sat by' and let the Gaza 'genocide' happen, which would become an enduring recruitment poster for years to come.

Global antisemitism has heightened, which has blurred the lines between anti-Israel sentiment and animosity towards Jewish communities. This produced unlikely allies, such as when certain American far-right groups superimposed swastikas on Palestinian flags, and started equating Hamas with the Waffen-SS. This does not mean in any way that these far-right groups identified with Hamas, since it is debatable who they hate most vehemently- Muslims or Jews. This was more of a propaganda windfall for these groups than anything else, but it did demonstrate the polarising effect of the Gaza conflict, far beyond the Middle East. It will be felt in Pakistan, strongly.

This opportunism is a key factor in the recruitment of extremist groups globally, and 2024 has given plenty of hate material to them for dissemination. The current geopolitical positioning in the Middle East would also enable extremist factions to exploit this situation, to gain ground. Anti-Semitism would foreseeably become even more attractive as a recruitment driver.

Syria would be key, as much so as it was during the Islamic State's ascension in Raqqa. An assortment of militant leadership, many previously designated as terrorists are now taking over as the de facto government of Syria. For instance, Abu Mohammad al-Jawlani, who heads HTS, had a ten-million-dollar bounty placed on his head by the USA. HTS is posturing as a more moderate Islamist assortment of militant entities; this may be sincere or merely a temporary ruse to divert international attention. However, even if they try to distance themselves from a Taliban style of Government in Afghanistan, their track record of governance in Idlib was undeniably, a hardline Sharia Statehood. Even if HTS leadership start now wearing blazers for posing in pictures with women for international media, how will this play out in the long run? Keeping this in context, a vast majority of their cadres and commanders, in fact almost all of them, are hardline Islamists, who might not reconcile smoothly with this transition.

It also remains to be seen if attrition wars will start between the long-oppressed Sunni majority of Syria and the Shias, as they did after the US invasion of neighboring Iraq, albeit in the opposite manner. This can have a serious polarising effect on the sectarian landscape in Pakistan as well. What is almost certain is that major powers will start aligning themselves around newly emerging proxy powers in Syria. This will empower new groups or splinter groups in the country, while also emboldening local jihadists around the world.

Videos have already emerged in Syria of Pakistani militants helping to take over Syria, much as they did when the IS 'occupied' Iraq and Syria. At that time, there were several copycat groups that emerged in Pakistan and pledged allegiance to IS, and this is foreseeably set to happen again, in the aftermath of the recent 'great victory' in Syria.

Victory for some groups in Syria has meant defeat, or at least temporary setbacks. Some groups might strategically retreat from Syria, such as the Iranian proxy Zainabiyoun Brigade. This group has a significant number of militants from Kurram in Pakistan, which is already a hotbed of sectarian conflict, often disguised as land feuds. Many, or at least a significant number of these militants, mostly from Parachinar, may return to Pakistan. This may escalate the sectarian conflict not only in Kurram, but perhaps in the entire country. It needs to be remembered that the Shiite Zainabiyoun Brigade has been a significant contributor to Pakistan's sectarian landscape in recent years.

As for proxy wars, Iran is down, but far from out. Confrontation between the US and Hezbollah is set to open up a diverse range of terrorist activities in theaters as far away as Asia, South America and Eastern Europe, as demonstrated by recent arrests in Brazil of Hezbollah operatives.

Syria will invigorate several other conflicts, extending far beyond the region. The Sahel, for instance, might see Boko Haram's insurgency spurred on by the Syrian victory. Boko Haram was one of the first groups in the Sahel to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, then leader of IS, at the height of the Islamic State's ascendancy in Iraq and Syria. While the Syrian HTS leadership broke away from IS, one needs to keep in mind they were, essentially, the core of IS.

What effects may the Syrian scenario produce in Pakistan?

It seems logical that HTS 'copycat clones' may arise in Pakistan, either directly pledging allegiance to HTS, or associating with it in some respect. This great victory may also embolden experimentation with addressing social justice issues, which is a common tactic employed by almost all Islamist groups. For instance, TTP, Lashkar-e-Islam, and in fact almost all major anti-state groups in Pakistan, tried to implement Sharia law in their areas of interest by setting up Qazi courts, ostensibly to dispense swift justice. We might see similar efforts again, albeit on a smaller scale than the TTP.

At the height of the TTP's ascendancy, when there was news that it was 'nearing' Islamabad, 'lone-wolf' vigilantes started emerging. For instance, there were reported incidents of persons verbally or physically assaulting women, ostensibly for not dressing modestly. Law enforcement crackdowns crushed these incidents, as did the Pakistan Army's anti-terrorism campaign. However, extremist ideologies will try coupling the genocide in Gaza to the great victory in Syria, in efforts to gain more traction - this might be difficult to counter.

As we speak, almost undeniably, the Syrian victory is producing role models for Pakistani extremists. It might not be a bad idea to take stock of this now, rather than later, as we tend to do.