Sino-Russian partnership: depth and fault lines

The future of the Sino-Russian partnership is uncertain post-Putin and Xi.

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From an antagonistic relationship for more than three decades, Moscow and Beijing embarked on mending of fences following the historic visit of the then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to China in May 1989. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 further transformed relations between the two erstwhile neighbours to an extent that they have now entered a strategic partnership, responding to a common threat perception emanating from the US-led Western world order.

Will the Sino-Russian partnership continue in the decades to come or it will rupture like in the past? Does this partnership have a future once Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping are out of power? Will the leadership after Putin and Xi be committed to sustain this partnership? These are the questions raised by those skeptical about the future of the Sino-Russian partnership.

One needs to examine Putin's meaningful statement on the Sino-Russian partnership during the BRICS summit held in Kazan Russia on October 22-23. Putin said: "At present, the world is going through changes unseen in hundred years. The international situation is intertwined with chaos but I firmly believe that the friendship between China and Russia will continue for generations and that great countries' responsibility to their people will not change". Calling Xi his dear friend, Putin insisted the partnership with China is in force for stability in the world. "We intend to further enhance cooperation on all multilateral platforms in order to ensure global security and just world order," he said. Echoing Putin's optimism for a multipolar world, Xi said during the BRICS summit: "Cooperation in the BRICS groups is the most important platform for solidarity and cooperation along with a mainstay force in promoting the realization of equal and orderly global multipolarity as well as inclusive and tolerant economic globalization."

During late 1950s, Communist China was perceived as a junior partner of the then Soviet Union and was dependent on Moscow for military and economic assistance. Now, 60 years down the road, it seems Russia is far behind China in economy, trade and infrastructure building. If Russia – grappling with the issues emanating from the demise of the USSR – had to use hard power in Ukraine and elsewhere, China focused on social and human development which enabled it to become the world's second largest economy. Unlike Russia which got itself involved in the Ukraine war and its ambitions to regain influence in former Soviet republics, China concentrated on augmenting its economy and using soft power like cultural diplomacy, trade, aid and investments. The last war which China fought was against Vietnam in January 1979. Since then Beijing has been following a strict policy of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of its neighbourhood and elsewhere. Consequently, China which was impoverished and backward in the 1950s now excels in modernisation, exports, GDP, foreign exchange reserves and economic growth rate. Yet, the Chinese leadership has drawn four red lines which, if crossed by the US or any other power, will cause massive retaliation. These red lines are: Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Besides, China warns that it will also react vehemently if so-called pro-democracy elements are instigated against the one-party rule in China under the Communist Party.

One can gauge difference between Chinese and Russian strategy to deal with internal dissent. If China follows an economic approach to tame dissent, Russia under Putin tries to suppress political opposition by using stick, unlike China which pursues a policy of both stick and carrot.

The depth and fault lines in the Sino-Russian partnership can be analysed from three angles.

First, the possibility of sustaining their friendship, cooperation and collaboration once Putin and Xi are out of power. There is no guarantee that in the post-Putin and Xi era, the Sino-Russian partnership would remain in intact. At a time when Russia is suffering from severe Western sanctions and President Putin is declared as a war criminal by the International Criminal Court, it is not possible for China, like North Korea, to overtly support Moscow in its war with Ukraine. Yet, during the long rule of Putin and Xi, the Sino-Russian relations are on a strong footing. Both need each other for strategic, security, political and economic reasons. China's dependence on oil from Russia and its land route for trade with Europe means even if Putin is not in power, one can expect Moscow and Beijing to sustain their age old ties.

Second, China and Russia are core members of SCO and their strategic partnership can play a pivotal role in maintaining stability in Eurasian landmass along with Central, South and West Asia. As long as China and Russia share common threat perception of the US-led 'containment policy' in Europe and in the Asia-Pacific region, one can expect the depth and sustenance of the Sino-Russian partnership to continue. Additionally, for various middle powers like Iran, South Africa and Brazil, it is in their interest to support the role of China and Russia in transforming the world order to a multipolar world. An alternate world order ensures BRICS and SCO win-win situation which can save them from sanctions and strategic containment policy led by the US in the form of an enlarged NATO.

Finally, if the depth in Sino-Russian relations is a reality, fault lines in their age old ties is also true. The first fault line is frozen territorial disputes between China and Russia which was also a major cause of their border war in 1969. Following fence-mending in the Sino-Russia ties after the collapse of the USSR, the two countries decided to freeze their territorial disputes and focus on promoting strategic partnership. Historically, China has claims over the land along its border areas with Russia as it blames that the Czarist Empire had occupied huge Chinese territories during its expansion in Siberia. If the Putin, Xi leadership is changed and those succeeding the two towering personalities are not that committed to keep the momentum in their ties going, one can expect the resurgence of territorial disputes. Furthermore, the Russian concern over Chinese influence in Central Asia and in former Soviet Republics can also cause friction and polarisation in the Sino-Russian ties. China may not either side with Russia in its growing armed conflict with Ukraine because it would contradict with Beijing's policy of disengagement with wars and focusing on economy, trade and other pillars of soft powers.

Coming few years will determine whether the status quo in the Sino-Russian partnership will persist or there will be fragility in the bilateral ties. Both powers are also mindful of not giving space to the US-led Western world in exploiting any potential sign of discord between them.