Convergence of interests deters war

I remember giving an interview for a think tank dealing with strategic studies. The panel interviewing was headed by one of our most accomplished experts on nuclear matters in the country. When asked what was my opinion about the nuclear weapons, I replied that these are weapons to be kept and not to be used. My answer generated a debate that gave me an impression as if the panel was not satisfied with what I said. In reality, what I said was a universal opinion as nuclear weapons have not been used since the last time they were used in the Second World War in Japan. Simply put, if the result of any act is inconceivable then the act itself should be inconceivable.

The current nuclear powers of the world can be categorised in many ways but I look at them from the point of their positioning and placement in the world – powers that are part of the core of the world (i.e. the US, the UK, France, China, Russia and Israel) and those that reside in the gap (i.e. India, Pakistan and North Korea). I would like to include Iran in the gap countries as well basing on my assumption that if Israel strikes Iran, it will give Iran the much-needed excuse and incentive to join the nuclear club.

When the countries in the gap become nuclear powers, the nuclear weapons they possess act like skeletons in the closets of these countries. We know that when skeletons are brought out of the cupboards what do they do? They damage the reputes. The gap countries – with the exception of India which is a beneficiary of a civil nuclear deal with the US – have borne the brunt of Western condemnation and sanctions for doing something that they did which it seems as if they were not entitled. Considered rouge, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran continue to be pushed back and subjected to West's maximum pressure campaigns to ensure they undo what they have done. The great powers and the countries in the core can have nuclear bombs but those in the gap cannot; and if they have them, they must be made to suffer. This sounds more like a colonial mindset and nuclear racism but that's the reality on ground.

In the gap countries, the nuclear debate has never been about the weapons but more about the politics. Had Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto had formed a strong political connection and managed economic liberalism then both India and Pakistan may have showcased truckloads of trade instead of bombs. When that opportunity was lost, the path leading to nuclear India and Pakistan became very easy to travel. Indians view their nuclear programme as a shield against China, and Pakistan sees it programme as a shield against India. But as long as states continue to take actions to increase their own security, they will continue to cause reactions from the other states – something that we know from the time of Thucydides. So, given the right conditions Afghanistan may also one day have a nuclear weapon blaming its insecurity on the neighbouring nations. That's like all others getting caught in the Thucydide's Trap.

There are nine nuclear powers today, there will be ten if Iran carries out a nuclear test. When fear is instilled in the mind of Saudis, will they be far behind? Competing for being a hegemon in the Middle East, will Turkey also not consider having a bomb? Ironically, the nuclear countries in the gap get the maximum global pushback and beatings but it is the countries in the core that become the real reason for tensions – nuclear tensions. None was talking about the real possibility of a nuclear war until the strategic relationship between Russia and the US nosedived and hit rock bottom. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the likelihood of a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO, use of nuclear weapons by Russia has once again emerged as a critical issue of debate in public life. Nuclear pressure cooker of the core countries is again cooking nuclear anxiety, and the discussions on nuclear matters that dominated the Cold War era are once again resurfacing. With millions spent on the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the world continues to face the same critical question about them today that it faced earlier – do these weapons have a war-deterring role or a war-fighting role?

Many scholars on the subject may not agree but there seems to be no war-fighting role of nuclear weapons given that nuclear war can never be justified as well as the devastation and destruction it entails. The war-deterring role of nuclear weapons was also put to test when India and Pakistan briefly fought a war over Kargil heights. This brief war in the past burnt the myth that no two countries with nuclear weapons will directly fight a war with each other. That myth is now buried under the ground.

Yet two other theories in international relations still hold ground. Spencer R Weart in his 1998 book, Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight Each other, theorises that two democracies will never fight each other. Every time Pakistan fought a war with India, there was a dictatorship in the country. There was dictatorship even in Argentina when Britain entered into the war with it over Falkland Islands. The other theory is an interesting one and it comes from Thomas L Friedman who in his 1999 book, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, states that, "no two countries that both had McDonald's had fought a war against each other since each got its MacDonald's."

Lastly, what prevents a nuclear war is not the faith in nuclear weapons but the faith in deterrence. Given this reality, I am compelled to ask a question. Can the nuclear countries in the gap continue to meet indefinitely the requirements of deterrence? If they do so, then at what social, economic and political cost? Is keeping nuclear weapons in line with the formation of a liberal society? Nuclear countries in the core achieved their liberties first before they achieved their nuclear weapons. What countries in the gap have today is not their liberties but their nuclear weapons? Where do they strike a balance? That's the million-dollar question. By having their McDonald's or their bombs?