Karachi attack: watershed in Sino-Pak relations?

The deadly October 6 strike on the Chinese convoy near the Karachi airport should serve as a wake-up call for the Pakistani authorities for multiple reasons. As many as 21 Chinese nationals – engineers, technical workers and teachers – have been killed in Pakistan since 2017. Even more worrying is the precisely targeted attack, which smacks of an "insider job" i.e. somebody familiar with the movement of a special Chinese delegation passed on the information to insurgents. Investigators, too, are underlining the same possibility.

The loss of two precious Chinese lives came within 24 hours of the martyrdom of 16 Pakistan army officials, including a colonel – an evident intensification of the proxy war on Pakistan. Be it the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) or the TTP, the instruments of destabilisation and agents of fear are active from Kurram, Waziristan and Khyber in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa to Khuzdar and Gwadar in Balochistan and to Karachi in Sindh – inflicting sustained pricks on security forces at will, it appears.

Understandably, China is getting increasingly upset and desperate after direct attacks on its citizens. The situation has also fired up Beijing's desire for possible joint security mechanisms to deal with the threat of terrorism. The situation demands it, officials in Beijing believe. The Chinese Foreign Ministry disclosed on Friday that its "inter-agency" Chinese team visiting Islamabad asked their hosts "to properly handle ensuing matters… conduct thorough investigations, bring all the perpetrators to justice, and step up security measures to ensure the safety and security of Chinese personnel, institutions, and projects in Pakistan".

Wary Chinese officials privately fume about Pakistani leaders' penchant for lofty and, at times, irresponsible talk. The latest came from the Finance Minister, Mohammad Aurangzeb, in the form of a recorded message in which he stated that the Chinese engineers killed in the Monday's BLA-claimed suicide car bombing were part of the negotiations for restructuring an IPP loan.

However, the Finance Division clarified the following day that the deceased engineers were not involved in IPP talks. Hence, any impression created to this effect by media reports is misleading. Instead of conceding the minister's irresponsible statement in a pre-recorded message, the ministry put the onus of erroneous "impression" on the media. That is why Pakistani leaders are not being taken seriously anymore. They are now expected to deliver on their tall promises of bringing to justice BLA's so-called Majeed Brigade of suicide bombers, among others.

Similarly, a few days earlier, the ministry gave the impression that debt reprofiling talks with the Chinese IPPs were underway. However, on October 9, the minister ruled that out, saying the re-profiling agreement could not be signed because it was a long-drawn process and would require the consent of lenders and sponsors.

Pakistan owes nearly $16 billion to Chinese financial institutions, and it wants to re-profile not only the government-to-government debt but also extend the repayment period for commercial loans. So far, though, Beijing has not given a green signal.

Meanwhile, serious concerns about the possible infiltration of official ranks by insurgents have stemmed from the high-profile Karachi attack, raising multiple questions that require urgent answers.

How would the BLA know that a Chinese IPP team and its engineers were arriving in Karachi? Isn't it a matter of grave anxiety that BLA and the likes have allegedly infiltrated official ranks and released critical information as and when needed? Officials in Balochistan have experienced this phenomenon, and suffered too, more than often at the hands of infiltrators - mostly enrolled as government officials - who act as informers for the militants.

China seems to have run out of patience with the casual "cowboy style" pronouncements by Pakistani leaders following attacks on Chinese nationals rather than delivering on their pledges and guarantees for the Chinese workforce in the country. Chinese officials in private discussions point to the two major incidents in Dasu within two years resulting in the loss of 14 Chinese lives when expressing dissatisfaction over the arrangements.

Based on their experience of the past nine years, Chinese authorities project legitimate reasons for being unhappy not only with the security protocols but also with the decision-making and implementation processes within the Pakistani government. Default or substantial delays in payments to the Chinese IPPs is another major obstacle to CPEC-II.

Is Pakistan likely to request that China extend the repayment of all Chinese debt and investment, totaling about $26 billion? Or at least waive the IPP-power sector circular debt the country owes to Chinese companies?

Equally important is: will the Karachi tragedy act as a catalyst for closer Sino-Pak security collaboration?

Beijing has repeatedly proposed a "comprehensive security cooperation" to jointly manage the security challenges facing CPEC and other Chinese investments. So far, Pakistani officials have been reluctant – if not expressly averse – to the idea for unknown reasons.

No foreign boots on the ground is the argument. But the problems that Iran, China, Uzbekistan and Pakistan are facing seem to be rooted in proxy terrorism with tentacles in Afghanistan as well as in various Pakistani border regions stretching from the north in Chitral to the Indian Ocean coastline, predominantly inhabited by the Baloch.

It is difficult to imagine life going on as usual after so many incidents. If Pakistan genuinely wants to comfort the Chinese leadership and minimise its apprehensions, it will have to devise an effective counterterrorism strategy involving not only China but also Iran and other regional nations. Proxy terrorism is transboundary in nature and hence requires a transboundary, collaborative mechanism with the synergy of thought and action.