Bangladesh at the cusp of revolution?

It was on July 1 when students from the Dhaka University, and later other universities in Bangladesh, took to streets to demonstrate against 'government job allocation quota system' that disproportionately favoured wards of veterans of military and paramilitary Mukti-Bahni Force, and civilians who fought in the 1971 war of independence against Pakistan. This old quota system, reinstated by courts, reserves over 50% jobs for these groups. This unfair privilege led to deprivation among educated but jobless youth in substantial numbers. When the protests turned violent after the student wing of the ruling Awami League (AL) began attacking protesters, the Government of Sheikh Hasina Wajid employed Police's Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), paramilitary Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) and Army.

During the tense stand-off, the country's supreme court ordered reduction of the quota to less than 10 per cent. However, by then the 'Movement' was demanding accountability for over 200 deaths by the security forces, freedom of over 10,000 arrested students, and other civil liberties. Continued crackdown and Hasina inciting party cadre "to curb anarchists with iron hands" resulted in broader public anger and violence.

On 3 August, protestors at a massive rally demanded Hasina's resignation, and threatened marching over her residence. The re-ignited violence led to over 100 deaths on 4 August alone. The breakdown in public order resulted in widespread disruptions and agitation with the situation spiralling out of control. On Monday, after Army's intercession, Sheikh Hasina resigned and fled to India. The Parliament was dissolved, and an interim Government headed by noble laureate Muhammad Younus was announced.

General Waker-Uz-Zaman was appointed the new Chief of Army Staff. Addressing the nation on Monday, he denied imposition of emergency, appeared conciliatory and expressed determination to "prosecute all murders and injustices". He forbade Army and Police from firing on protesters anymore. Within Army, he assigned Lt Gen Saiful Alam to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, appointed Lt Gen Mizanur Shamim as the new Chief of General Staff (CGS), and relieved a Maj Gen heading Telecommunication Centre, according to Bangladesh's ISPR. Gen Zaman called on President Mohammed Shahabuddin and held meetings with politicians and other leaders. The evolving situation leads to some conclusions.

First, the chain of events in Bangladesh, facilitated through the ubiquitous social media, brought down the 'iron lady' entrenched in power since 2009. Her government was perceived as extremely pro-India, authoritarian and corrupt, with Bangladesh backsliding in democracy. The discontent had been simmering for quite some time due to diminishing job opportunities for the educated youth, the cited quota system and the victimisation of religious right. The mishandling of protests, in the end, led to the unravelling.

Second, quite unexpectedly the popular discontent exploded at a time when the Bangladesh economy was posting impressive progress, and an assertive government under AL was 'reportedly' showing independence from the foreign diktat, as per Bangla English press. Like in other developing countries, there are the usual theories of foreign interference, and even ISI orchestrating the protests. UK's refusal of asylum to Hasina, and generally muted Western response is cited as complicit silence.

Some Bengali analysts are linking the situation to foreign hands, unhappy with Dhaka's leanings to China, hence determined to cutting AL to size, just like BJP in India's June elections. They cite persistent Western criticism of BD's human rights violations. According to this cohort, Sheikh Hasina was trapped through enforced errors.

Third, I asked a Bengali friend, a retired Army Brigadier, his assessment of the situation. His analysis about the unfolding of domestic situation was spot on. And he opined that this was indeed a 'revolution' akin to 1971 and 1975 (the coup d'etat by ranking Army officers to assassinate Sheikh Mujib). However, academically speaking, a revolution replaces a power dispensation with one of its own; and revolutions generally ferment longer to develop an ideology, a cadre and a process besides a committed following. The Bangla youth movement and the ensuing uprising have no ideological underpinning, other than local grievances. There is also no revolutionary cadre like in 1971, etc. Although, Bangladesh's homogenous demography, as an essential ingredient, supports 'revolution', this particular event characterises as a 'public uprising'…spontaneous, unplanned and 'from below'.

Fourth, revolutionaries do not yield power or allow revolution to be 'hijacked' by counter revolutionaries, the Army or any other force. Although Bangladesh Army has decided to stay out of active politics, it would – just like in Pakistan – continue to influence and guide the nation and the country, as the cited turn of events substantiates.

Junior officers in BD security forces, especially the Army, reportedly exhibited anger, restraint and disappointment against High Command's decision to violently suppress their young compatriots. And they had been vocally sharing their concerns and objections with their chain of command. Reluctance and refusal by young officers and troops to fire on student protesters put the Military and AL Government under tremendous pressure, hence the changes at politico-military levels.

Fifth, aside from the unsubstantiated reports on social media, showing pro-Pakistan sentiment; removal of the statue of Sheikh Mujeeb ur Rehman, father of Sheikh Hasina (Bangabandhu – Father of the Nation); showing of Pakistani flag, etc, Dhaka would remain firmly entrenched in the Indo-Bangla bilateralism for obvious geostrategic, political and economic reasons. However, removal of Bangabandhu photographs and statue demonstrate youth's disenfranchisement with Hasina/AL, that now permeates to the country's foundations.

For Pakistan's Foreign Office, greetings to the new political dispensation, as it evolves, alongside expression of goodwill and solidarity would be a better reading of the situation. 'Sympathetic detonation' is not likely. And return to the bonhomie enjoyed under the governments of Gen Ziaur Rahman, Gen Ershad Hussain and Khaleda Zia is now a thing of the past. There is public resentment over Indian role in BD affairs under AL, but it is not widespread.

Sixth, post-Hasina government will endure in power, release political prisoners, initiate investigations under UN supervision into the killings/corruption and try the perpetrators, besides constitutional changes, overhauling Bangladesh's security sector including BGB, RAB, Police and intelligence organisations. The military will undertake its own soul-searching.

In the future political scene, Awami League is not done and out. Though battered and bruised, it still enjoys massive support outside Generation Y and Z, where it will have to burnish its credentials anew, especially shedding its fascist perception. Bangladesh Army is divided between loyalists and anti-AL camps, with most veterans supporting AL.

The uprising seems a failure of Indian intelligence, temporarily diminishing Indian clout!