Pakistan’s to-do list on ties with Afghanistan

Continuing from last week, Pakistan is also in quandary to manage its relations with Afghanistan that follows an anti-Pakistan course despite friendly expectations, cajoling and persuasions. Pak-Afghan bilateralism is negatively affected, most of all, by the sticking variable of TTP-generated, Afghan-based, anti-Pakistan terrorism, and IEA’s recalcitrance to do something about it; besides growing anti-Pakistan sentiment among Afghans and vice versa.

Some rare, good news include a welcome trade initiative recently, the Islamic hamiyyat (camaraderie), the Pashtunwali bonds and the continued people-to-people contacts. The March 24-27 visit by Commerce Secretary Mohammad Khurram Agha, who met his Afghan counterpart Nooruddin Azizi, was a low-key indirect de-escalation sought by both sides. Acknowledging the untenability of hostility, some suggested policy pointers.

Terrorism first. Pakistan should continue with its policy of carrot and stick, cis and trans-frontier. One is aware that there are ‘lobbies’ at work that ‘scare’ decision-makers, painting the TTP ten-foot tall, warn of the ensuing violence getting out of control, and losing Afghan goodwill forever. None of this will happen. Pakistani State is strong with immense coercive power at its disposal. Nobody should learn wrong lessons from IEA ascendency against the USSR first, and most recently against the West Plus. One; USSR and Coalition were foreign occupation powers, and IEA forces were fighting a war of liberation on its soil, with facilities to rest, recuperate, get treatment and lodge families safely in next-door Pakistan. Without Pakistan’s unflinching military, moral and material support, Afghanistan would be a USSR dominion now. Two, TTP knows it cannot overcome the state of Pakistan, hence its desperate attacks to force negotiations. Three, Afghan goodwill and our ‘strategic dividend’ for now stands ‘temporarily’ suspended, yet this is transient. Given the array of forces, a large-scale military conflict — as pundits fear — is simply not possible. And the anti-Pakistan noise mostly emanates from Afghanistan’s West-based diaspora, with some takers in IEA. The common Afghan still relies on KP and Balochistan for health care, education and a respectable livelihood. This humane dependence is blissful for both sides and shall continue.

TTP hosting on Afghan soil is also a matter of time, as repeatedly argued. Because: a) it is a force-in-being on Afghan soil, restricting IEA’s full territorial control; b) saner voices within IEA are worried and keen to get rid of this legacy issue, as it can spoil their relations with Pakistan, their only indispensable interlocutor; c) TTP logistic requirement in a resource-starved Afghanistan is burdensome; d) its prolonged stay causes possible chasm between TTP and the local Afghans over unavoidable petty issues typical in such situations; e) Afghans cannot indefinitely sustain such massive hospitality (Osama was rich); f) IEA has other pressing issues to focus on like governance, economy and IS-K, etc; and, g) the proud tribal (Mahsud, Wazir, Yousafzai) TTP rank and file despise living indefinitely in a subservient hamsaya status on Afghan soil, dependent upon IEA largesse. Therefore, cracks, abandonment, punitive reprisals and infighting are the inevitable calling. TTP remains a bone stuck in Kabul’s neck, if it is not absorbed into the Afghan Army, or moved away from the border areas, and restrained in its collision course with Pakistan.

So, for Pakistan, firm, patient, resolute policy, and its ruthless pursuit are the way to go. Those clamouring for negotiations need to study the Sri Lankan model. Policy to comprise border control, relentless IBOs and re-invigorating NAP. A state in retreat never yields advantage. KP Police needs better and repeated re-training, better pay and better equipment. Thermal Imagery night sights and sniper rifles are available for the resourceful. Raising a 5^th Frontier Corps (FC) Command or re-tasking one of the existing FCs for internal security like Rangers to back up KP Police, for limited time, would be an idea worth considering.

Second, while the security sector talks tough and acts tough, the Foreign Office should stick to diplomacy and keep the channels of communications open with all and sundry on the Afghan side. IEA is a not a monolith and its policy does not have full endorsement on many levels. There are lobbies opposed to its many iterations. However, to keep IEA movers and shakers of puritanical Qandahar in good humour, religious diplomacy — suggested earlier — be pursued vigorously; diplomatic noise be avoided; and undue pressers and statements by everybody on anything be punitively forbidden. States need to do what they need to do. Some lessons from Chinese pursuit of diplomacy are instructive.

Three, Afghan Refugees (AR). Undue harassment be avoided. Illegals should be registered or pushed back. International community be reminded about its obligations under the 2013 SSAR (Strategy Solution for Afghan Refugees) Agreement. Afghans staying legally or acquiring Pakistani citizenship be facilitated. They constitute indispensable humanitarian leverage.

Four, trade and commerce. Trade be regulated and not restrained. Corruption on Pakistani side be ruthlessly eliminated by frequent turnover of forces and border officials. More and more trade processes be digitised to prevent corruption. Afghan drivers be encouraged to obtain visas and rahdari documents within a year, as agreed.

Transit trade under APTTA be facilitated; however, its reverse flow through smuggling be effectively prevented. Dollar flight from Pakistan is a worry, hence forex dealers and banks be made to enforce anti-flight mechanisms, preventing currency manipulation. Smuggling of commodities like grain (all types), and other edibles from KP and Balochistan, instead be regularised as trade to enhance state revenue.

Five, Durand Line. While is a done deal, its contested demarcation be settled mutually. Fence, erected to stop cross-border terrorist movement, be guarded, repaired and monitored. However, movement of some 17 divided tribes, heretofore allowed under ‘Easement Rights’, be facilitated under agreed mechanisms. This also solidifies Pakistan’s leverages.

Six, there is an entrenched belief among some Afghan watchers and analysts that force never works with Afghans/IEA. This presumption is faulty. IEA is a rationale actor and realises the limits of its policy. It knows that losing Pakistani goodwill will… a) tighten West Plus’s noose on cited issues of human rights, women education, inclusivity, etc; b) not help its formal recognition, keeping IEA out of the badly needed international financial system; c) discourage Chinese investment and CPEC expansion to Afghanistan; and d) harm Afghans and Afghanistan comparatively more in the process. They also realise that Afghan recalcitrance helps Pakistan drift towards the West Plus, especially the American Camp, and away from residual empathy towards Kabul.

So, hold the nerve, demonstrate resolve, and stay the course!

Published in The Express Tribune, April 4^th, 2024.

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