Mission Divyastra

On 11 March 2024, India demonstrated the long-anticipated Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle (MIRV) capability by testing the existing Agni-V in MIRVed configuration under mission name “Divyastra” which means “divine weapon”. This particular technology allows a single missile to carry multiple warheads. The number of warheads, that this Agni-V variant can carry, has not been made public yet; however, some unnamed Indian defence sources claim that the missile would carry three warheads. At least since 2013, Indian scientific community — no less than the then Indian DRDO Chief — was discussing the intent of MIRVing the existing Agni-V and ostensibly underdevelopment Agni-VI missiles.

The development is being viewed in India as a part of its technological competition vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. Even though Pakistan had demonstrated this capability back in 2017, most of the Indian commentary excludes Pakistan as they celebrate India joining an elite group of countries possessing MIRV technology. However, this development goes beyond demonstration of technological prowess as there are underlined repercussions for nuclear non-proliferation and regional stability. Introduction of MIRVs is likely to increase fissile material demands, augment Indian counter-force and first-strike capabilities, and display a greater orientation towards nuclear warfighting. Indian demonstration of this capability does not appear to be driven by the operational requirements of deterrence as China has demonstrated a limited Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability — against which MIRVs are considered a potent countermeasure — while Pakistan has made a conscious decision not to pursue one.

Before being tested with this MIRV capability, previously Agni-V has been tested in canisterised configuration on multiple occasions. If a nuclear capable missile is deployed in canisterised form, it implies that the nuclear warhead(s) has already been mated with the missile system and the ‘package’ is ready to carry out a nuclear strike mission. Generally, the MIRV capable missiles with intercontinental ranges constitute a counter-value and retaliatory component of the nuclear forces. But if India is considering deployment of MIRVed Agni-V in canister form, it opens up the possibility and prospects of it being used as a potential first-strike weapon. In a first-strike role, this capability can complement India’s comprehensive first strike ambitions.

Land-based MIRVs present themselves as a lucrative target for pre-emption to the adversary, thereby dramatically reducing crisis stability. However, Agni-V’s is road-mobile and huge Indian geographic expanse makes pre-empting the platform a less likely and a difficult scenario. Given that the land-based MIRVed missiles are inherently vulnerable to pre-emption and potentially destabilising, it is likely that MIRVs will see a future adaptation in India’s sea-based nuclear forces. Unlike land-based and canisterised MIRVs, sea-based MIRVs signal a retaliatory rather than first-strike capability and can be potentially stabilizing.

MIRVs propel vertical proliferation more than any other technological advancement and development concerning nuclear delivery systems. More warheads means that India will have a greater demand for military usable fissile materials. However, this is unlikely to strain Indian development and deployment options given the availability of huge weapon-usable fissile material stockpiles outside IAEA safeguards. Weaponisation of these so-called ‘civilian un-safeguarded’ fissile materials is likely to instigate a regional arms race and further circumvent the prospects for a multilateral treaty governing unsafeguarded fissile materials. States opposing just a ban on further production of fissile material — notably Pakistan — argue that existing fissile material stockpiles (outside IAEA safeguards) also need to be factored in for negotiating and finalising a more just and meaningful arrangement governing fissile material stocks.

MIRVs also demand miniaturisation of nuclear warheads. With its limited experience of nuclear testing and a significant evolution in Indian missile systems, since its last nuclear tests in 1998, there will be pressure on India to resume nuclear testing in order to establish credibility of its nuclear forces which now include missiles from 150-5,500km ranges, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles apart from the newly introduced MIRVs. India has for long voted against the early entry into force, universalisation and strict observance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that can be a viable way forward for not just nuclear non-proliferation but also nuclear disarmament. This reflects Indian desire to keep its option of nuclear testing open. Recently, Ashley Tellis also hinted towards the same and said that “India may be compelled to test again.” Ashley’s comments and consistent pattern of voting against CTBT resolutions in CD and UNGA First Committee may be seen as general Indian practice of testing the waters before making any significant strategic decision. Furthermore, Russian de-ratification of CTBT and the recent reports of the increased activities on the US, Russian and Chinese test sites, point in the direction of an international environment where these nuclear weapon states seem to be posturing themselves to exploit the first available opportunity to resume nuclear testing. India seems to be informed by this environment and readying itself accordingly.

Led by India, the South Asian region would be eager to exploit a deteriorating international arms control and non-proliferation architecture that is currently relying solely on US-Russia bilateral NEW START. An additional factor is the growing Sino-US rivalry where India is assuming a lead role regionally. Even this MIRV test is being viewed in the context of its (de)stabilising effects on the Indo-Pacific region. However, if this imminent nuclear arms racing negatively affects multilateral arrangements like the CTBT and a prospective treaty on fissile materials (FMCT), the consequences can be far reaching. It would be pragmatic for the South Asian antagonists to learn and adopt the Cold War behaviour and shun certain destabilising technologies in the interest of regional stability rather than mimicking the contemporary approach of hostility and breaking free of all limitations on armament.

Published in The Express Tribune, March 27^th, 2024.

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