Does Gulzar Imam’s arrest mean much?

Pakistani authorities recently announced the arrest of Gulzar Imam, the mastermind of the separatist militant organisation Baloch National Army (BNA). His “arrest” came about through a sting operation that was, according to official claims, spread over several geographical locations. Authorities did not name the countries but we can assume the arrest happened somewhere in Turkiye. BNA sources had claimed Imam went missing in November last year.

Does this mean anything at all in the multi-pronged insurgency that various Baloch insurgent groups, including BNA, are currently engaged in? Baloch Raji Ajoi Sangar (BRAS) is the other alliance comprising the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Army (Bashirzeb Baloch faction), Balochistan Liberation Front, and Baloch Republican Guards.

On July 25, 2020 BRAS had stitched up an operational alliance with Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA), a Sindhi ethno-nationalist militant group, followed by similar cooperation with TTP and ISKP in 2021-2022. No surprise that Baloch groups now deploy suicide attacks as one of the tools to inflict loss on the security apparatus in particular. Who Is Gulzar Imam ? Gulzar Imam alias (Shambay), 45, belongs to the Panjgur-Parom area of Balochistan.

He started his political career with the Baloch Students Organization (BSO) in 2003. After a few years with BSO as one of its leading activists, Imam joined BSO (Azad) in 2006. In 2009, Imam switched to the banned BRA, headed by Nawabzada Brahamdagh Bugti, the grandson of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. He served as the commander of several regions, including Makran, and a large number of youths were under his influence. Since Brahamdagh was not present in the country, Gulzar Imam had assumed all the leadership responsibilities until he developed differences with Brahamdagh in 2018 that he admitted in an interview. He went on to establish BNA with the support of the United Baloch Army (UBA). BNA made headlines when it claimed responsibility for an explosion in Lahore on 25th January 2022 and this was its first operation. The BNA since then claimed responsibilities for several attacks on security forces. Gulzar Imam was the lynchpin of all organisational affairs and that is why his arrest is being described as a serious blow to BNA and a major success for the government of Pakistan. Reports of Gulzar Imam’s arrest are conflicting though.

Some Baloch sources say he was captured in Turkey in May last year. He had apparently gone there to meet an Indian friend who had promised funding support. Other sources say he was caught in November. But the basic fact remains the same. Pakistani intelligence managed to bait Gulzar Imam into a meeting with a purported Indian friend for potential financial support, presumably in Istanbul, where the authorities handed him over – sometime in September 2022 – only after Pakistan provided travel documents with evidence on his Pakistani origin. Gulzar Imam’s arrest appears to have – at least for time being – severely dented BNA because he was caught alive and kept under wraps for several months.

Making his custody public several months after his arrest means lots of valuable “conversations” with him. Gulzar Imam’s arrest is likely to impact BNA’s militant activities as this is the serious most blow yet to the nascent BNA. The support (indirect though) of Afghanistan and, especially, of India to the Baloch resistance/militancy in Balochistan (via the network that Kulbhshan Jadhav had spun) cannot be ignored. Balochistan shares a near 1,000 km long border with Iran, where Sunni militants of BLF (Allah Nazar group) and other outfits usually shelter. These insurgents are not safe in Iran any more after ever increasing Sino-Iran political and economic cooperation. However, with China’s efforts to restore diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, there may also be progress in securing Iran’s border (upon China’s request) to stem cross-border terrorism against Pakistani security forces, including an ambush of a convoy of the Frontier Force.

Almost all of the aforementioned groups currently consult and coordinate on operations centred on a major commonality i.e. the proxy nature of their existence. The common objective of creating a united front against Pakistan is to ‘liberate’ Balochistan and Sindh. Publicly avowed opposition to CPEC and a narrative of victimhood, anchored in ethno-nationalist grievances, are other factors that leave little doubt about their proxy nature – a threat that remains alive in view of the omnipresent public grievances. These threats live off popular support as evidence in the rousing endorsement of Maulana Hidyatur Rehman Baloch’s Haq Do Tehreek.

It also implies that even if another dozen Baloch insurgents are captured, the narrative they deploy for justifying their violence will live on as long as the grievances of the Baloch people are not effectively addressed. External drivers will keep stoking this sentiment as long as the simmering fires at home are not doused through better governance and empowerment.