Dear Chief...

Sir! As promised in my conceptual note printed here on Dec 1, here are some specifics. COAS Pakistan Army is his own man. He is not beholden to anyone but Allah, his hard work and the Institution. Elevation to COAS is a sacred trust and a daunting and exhausting responsibility. Sitting in the glass house of your tenure, your word, action and impression counts and matters. Your decision-making (DM) should be inclusive, institutional and without impulse. The COAS is not ‘me/my’, but ‘we/us’.

Fortunately, you inherit the most robust, tested and a matured DM system. Let it never be hijacked by egos, impulses and desires...as it appeared during the recent period of aberration. As a huge pitfall of extension, a COAS on extension tends to bypass this system. Since he has obvious seniority gaps with other general officers, diluting the nature and quality of their advice and counsel, the Chief succumbs frequently to hubris, arrogance and undue fits of ‘wisdom’. A DM process that is system-based; inclusive of even veterans’ pulse, in particular the Four-Star Club; and is sensitive to people’s aspirations (as is traditionally the case with Pakistan Army) never fails and fails the COAS.

The tinkering with the ‘System’ and its unwarranted personalisation should be undone. Kith and kin should never influence you, and be the beneficiaries of your office. For you, legacy is more important than fortune, and you have plenty of examples in front. We all believe in the day of reckoning. Let me repeat, ‘extension is cursed’.

Sir! Your foremost challenge is‘securing’ Pakistan. Directly in the military domain, in geography, in perceptions and in ideology and indirectly economically and by fostering stability. Challenging the previous approach of dealing with TTP, let me dare say that State and Army never negotiate with terrorists. It deals with them through low-ranking officials to listen to their implorations and requests only; not at the level of DG ISI. We must not glorify and sanctify TTP/terrorism. They have blood on their hands and still touch a raw nerve. There are mechanisms, people and precedents to deal with TTP.

Expecting Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) to be our interlocutor is never going to work, as IEA is internally divided over TTP. IEA and TTP were bedfellows in jihad. The northern pragmatists Khostwal Haqqanis do not see eye to eye on this issue with the more dominant southern ideologues, the Qandaharis. Let TTP assimilate and live in Afghanistan.

Foreseeably unstable Afghanistan will struggle to extend its writ all over its territory challenging the TTP enclave and the ISIS; Afghan economy would be Pakistan- dependent through trade and smuggling (largely). ‘Fence’ would always be seen as an artificial line drawn by Pakistan in cahoots with the US/NATO...to the dislike of border tribes, Afghans and smugglers alike. Border flare ups always have a financial motive.

The existing relative strategic underpinning of Afghanistan frees you of your two-front worry to the great chagrin of India. And, this reality should not be obscured by odd border skirmishes (IEA rank and file and chain of command still has gaps) and our retaliatory closings of borders under influence of anti-Afghan forces within and around us. These local incidents should stay local. Even if TTA and TTP are the two sides of the same coin (as these elements keep repeating), it is in Pakistan’s interest to deal with them as ‘different sides of different coins’.

For internal security, NACTA recommendations be implemented, greater security coordination ensured among all stakeholders and coercive power of the state fully deployed against detractors of law and order. IBOs to continue unabated. In perceptual domain, we must never allow people to sit over the fence like in Swat...earlier.

Sir! Some functional aspects. First, the ‘legacy syndrome’. If you can run the system efficiently, and forget about legacies, you would do a great service to the Army. It is bad to quote a recent example, but Gen Kayani did comparatively more than anyone to revamp, reorganise and re-orient Pakistan Army. My interaction with junior offices leaves me aghast as they are unaware of his contributions. But that is how things work. Operations, training, sports and administration go side by side in a well-oiled military machine.

Undertake changes your deem fit like emphasis on simplicity (not the Spartan simplicity of 1950s and 60s obviously), but avoiding ostentatious behaviour unfitting for times, like extended motorcades, opulence in all forms and compromise on the teeth. Simplicity is getting back to the core military values.

Promotions and appointments should not be an itwar bazar. Like promotion to two-star, you need to institutionalise promotion to three-star in particular. There are studies on the subject to benefit from. Likewise, re-employment of retired officers needs to follow some system and merit.

Aggressive ‘military diplomacy’ with KSA, China, Turkey, USA, Middle East especially the Gulf was the hallmark of our times. Military diplomacy helps and complements the Foreign Office. Your priority should now include areas like Russia, Central Asia, Europe, especially NATO. The buzzword till Pakistan becomes an economic power in its own right is ‘relevance’ in the international military system, and by extension the international system.

COAS’s unbridled powers are blessing and liability. These are blessing if exercised under a system and under principles; and liability if put to work for self, family and friends in an unscrupulous manner. Let your conscious be your judge, and the principle of‘greater good for the greater numbers in a sustained manner for a longer time’ be your guide.

Dealing with politics and politicians would always be tricky. A political culture that is sadly addicted to patronage will take time to find its footings. So, while the lofty ideals of ‘neutrality’ and ‘being apolitical’ are appreciated and needed, these are not practicable. But let me give an example. My course mate from the Australian Command and Staff Course in 1996, Gen Angus Campbell, the current Australian Chief of Defence Staff, was in a press conference with his Generals and Admirals. The moment the Defence Minister came and started interacting with him, he asked his Generals and Admirals to leave before proceeding further with the Defence Minister, a politician. It is only your level to interact with the Government. Let the Corps Commanders in provincial corps restrict to military affairs, and leave politics to your office and Secretariat, ISI and MI. You know the implications.

Media exposure has its pitfalls and better avoided for some time. Our good work is never for earning brownie points and there should be no rush for taking credit.

Lastly Sir! You are a continuum, play your part and move on.