Once again China stepped forward to bail Pakistan out. It underscored its time-tested friendship by providing a near interest free loan worth $2.3 billion to Pakistan for its balance-of-payments support, well ahead of the grueling, demand-loaded deal with the IMF.
To underscore the “all-weather partnership”, General Zhang Youxia, Deputy Chairman of China’s Military Commission, received Pakistan’s Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa in Tianjing for exclusive bilateral consultations.
But continued political theatrics, selfish power games and an absence of sincere commitment among Pakistan’s key stakeholder appear to have partially shaken the Chinese trust.
The latest “snub” was the exclusion from the “High-level Dialogue on Global Development” held recently on the sidelines of the BRICS summit. Pakistan was conspicuous by its absence in a dialogue to which leaders of a number of developing emerging economies had been invited.
Even though the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained the reasons behind Pakistan’s exclusion, the extremely dubious circumstances around the vote of no-confidence against former prime minister Imran Khan gradually tipped the balance, and the Chinese apparently discerned a gap in walk and talk, with the apparent inclination to the US and its allies.
But driven by a culture of consideration and empathy for friends, Beijing once again reached out to Pakistan in view of its precarious foreign exchange situation, and eventually green-signalled the funds through a consortium of three banks.
This also demonstrated that unlike the West, which tends to use IMF as a strategic warfare tool, China deals with friends like Pakistan with compassion and not vengeance for geopolitical bargains. IMF programmes are primarily a tool to subjugate economies, kill investment and growth and thus proliferate economic despair — so do the Chinese believe. And they see what has happened in Pakistan.
Below I would like to list down some bitter messages out of China — an extrapolation of discussions with some influential thinkers/officials in Beijing and Shanghai.
First, Pakistan remains an all-weather friend for China but that friendship has its limitations too. China desires political stability in Pakistan that is the prerequisite for economic development. But how can Pakistan achieve economic growth in a vindictive, divisive climate of protests and long marches? This is a point addressed to all key stakeholders who have been using politics of agitation against one another every now and then.
Second, unless Pakistan tries to walk the talk made under CPEC — i.e. accelerating decision-making and honouring contracts — it cannot stand on its feet. And in that case, it cannot industrialise, meaning thereby no escape from the begging bowl.
Third, post-pandemic global recession has changed China’s circumstances too. The feeling, it appears, is that we have earned political stability and achieved high economic growth on the back of four decades of hard work centred on internal political and radical structural reforms. We cannot dish out dividends of that hard work to a country that is constantly embroiled in domestic political wars and lacks the real focus on economic development.
Economic growth, it is pointed out, requires business-friendly environment, ease of doing business and integrity of those on top. How can foreign investors deal with a corrupt institution such as the Federal Board of Revenue and officials in other aligned ministries, as they all act as predators and extractors without the long-term interest of the country in mind?
Does Pakistan boast such “strongmen/women” of integrity like Chairman Mao, Deng Xiaoping or Xi Jinping — leaders of unblemished character?
Fourth, for putting Pakistan on a real growth path and getting rid of external straws such as IMF loans or handouts from China and other friends, top military and civilian leaders will have to divorce the 19th century elitist model of governance. Unless they give up the expensive top-heavy governance regime, they can’t expect to take the country out of woods.
China certainly cannot finance the obscene cost of the luxurious style of governance of the Pakistani elites, is a very clear message that Beijing has drawn in the last decade or so.
Fifth, (relates to the over-commissioning of the power projects), if you didn’t have the vision on how you will be able to utilise and pay the additional 12000 MW electricity sought under CPEC, then why did you push our banks into financing?
The much-touted ML-1 Railway project has also apparently stalled because “your” politicians and bureaucrats never really came prepared with practical solutions. Financial situation has now changed.
That is true as well. I had been told that providing $7-8 billion is peanuts for Beijing. But the international economic conditions have now prompted Beijing to step back and preserve its resources accumulated through sheer focus and hard work. So much for ML-1 — as of now.
Sixth, fighting the evil of corruption is unavoidable but President Xi launched that crusade nearly a decade ago after economic consolidation of over three decades.
This, too, is a strong rebuke to all those who have harped the anti-corruption agenda — Imran Khan and the establishment. Chinese officials also realised that NAB — instead of curbing real corruption — only stymied decision-making. It also generated the perception of being extremely partisan.
Countries don’t work like that. First develop and then pursue graft, is the message.
Lastly, if Pakistan’s civil and military elites — the real power brokers — are on a suicide mission for short-term tactical gains, even the best of support from China won’t help.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 30th, 2022.
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