Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has been plagued with insurgencies and terrorism in one form or the other with new variants emerging. The first Prime Minister of Pakistan was assassinated in Rawalpindi. In the late 60s, there was an attempt to murder Field Marshall Ayub Khan who was the President of Pakistan at the time. Before independence, the Baloch dissidents and Faqir of Ipi in North Waziristan were a regular source of discomfort for the British administration and after the creation of Pakistan, they have continuously troubled the Pakistan Army. While the Baloch insurgency continued with regular intervals, insurgency in East Pakistan resulted in the emergence of Bangladesh. Terrorism orchestrated by Al-Zulfiqar was another manifestation of unrest in the country. Militant wings of Sindu Desh also carried out acts of terror from time to time.
Pakistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in particular, suffered acts of terror soon after jihad was declared in Afghanistan by organising jihadist organisations against the communist government in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. As a counter-reaction to our involvement, regular bomb blasts took place in K-P. This phenomenon continued till the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan.
The society was infested with sectarianism as General Zia ul Haq employed jihadism and Islamisation to fragment the democratic forces and consolidate his illegitimate power. Madrassas were used as a state policy for the recruitment of jihadists, with funds funnelled from all sources. Fighters of all kinds with their own brand of Islam from all over the world flocked to Pakistan. Soon, the strategic and ideological direction of those violent non-state actors was taken over by people like Abdullah Azam and later by Osama Bin Laden. The situation was further compounded by intensifying ethnic divide in Karachi in the form of the Muhajir Qoumi Movement (MQM) during the same period.
These entities armed with money and weapons gave rise to the war economy. They not only gained economic fortunes and political power but also provided identity to foot soldiers. Also, these elements had been kept as reserves to fight irregular wars to keep the enemy bleeding and to use for future eventualities.
The state took a backseat which emboldened such organisations and led to their growth in numbers, in the form of seminaries, trusts, and religio-political parties, producing a particular mindset, with holy jihad as their motto. They never took this established principle seriously that the declaration of jihad was the sole prerogative of the state and not of any individual or group. This tendency continued, with organisations having offices in every nook and corner, making appeals to the congregations in mosques to join their jihad. They had access to recruitment, training and finances. Soon they also started meddling in social affairs by resolving disputes. Thus, gaining more social space during the process.
Once again Pakistan fell into the ravine of martial law. The 9/11 attacks provided General Pervez Musharraf with the much-needed opportunity to get legitimacy for his regime by joining the war on terror with the US and NATO against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The 9/11 incident redefined the world order, and the international community suddenly woke up to the reality of dealing with international jihadism. By then we had failed to readjust to the changed realities of the new world. Our strategic alignment was disarrayed, and various organs of the state were blamed for speaking different discourses and pursuing contradictory policies. At this point, we began noticing a clear schism developing at the societal level. Due to earlier policies, the extremist elements in the society seized the opportunity and grew more organised and powerful. On the other hand, the human rights and local nationalist groups failed to galvanise their support base. Various radical groups gradually got closer where Al-Qaeda leadership provided strategic planning and finances while the home-grown radical groups provided manpower. The state’s control of these jihadist organisations began to weaken as they derived their ideological inspiration from Mullah Omar. While jihadist outfits were getting strengthened with every passing day, the country had no coherent policy at the state level.
Analysts argue that country’s policymakers have failed to develop a unanimous comprehensive strategy. It is often felt that the state’s policies are devised and implemented by institutions having no representative character. Therefore, there is no strategic and comprehensive national security policy.
The aforementioned discussion manifests that the fault lies in our chemistry — certain chemicals are inimical to our bodies. These chemicals are tendencies of extremism based on hate and extermination of others or their complete subjugation. For this jihad is used as a tool.
We have arrived at a juncture where we must seriously ponder over whether the state must pursue a religious agenda, or should the state be neutral in matters of religion and confined to mundane affairs. Until and unless we correct this “chemical imbalance”, it will be difficult to get rid of religious fundamentalism and violent extremism in any form.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 10th, 2022.
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