Taliban strategy: what is different?

The Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) interviewed the Taliban spokesperson for the first time in 20 years (posted on July 8, 2021). He spoke in fluent English. This was the sequel to his first exposure in a Pakistani media-sponsored webinar in Urdu. Mr Suhail Shaheen reiterated the Taliban’s aim of “completely ending the foreign occupation of Afghanistan, hence ending this chapter of Afghan history in totality” and “forming an inclusive Islamic government” in the country.

He reiterated that the US/NATO had agreed to end military and advisory training and contractors’ presence by May 1 (unilaterally changed by the US to September 11, 2021), and that the US/NATO would be welcomed subsequently in civilian roles for reconstruction after signing agreements/protocols with the future Islamic government. Therefore, the residual US military forces (650 or so) to protect embassies and the Turkish military staying put to protect the Kabul airport are not acceptable, as the Taliban are willing and capable of protecting embassies, consulates and NGOs.

Regarding power-sharing and elections, he was categoric that these are items on the agenda for the restarted Doha parleys and that the much-hyped Taliban peace plan (attributed to Mr Mujahid) has no credence. Negotiated settlement would be sought in Doha’s intra-Afghan talks, the progress of which — he conceded — was slow. “Dialogue and peaceful outcomes” remain the Taliban’s stated and ‘unchanged’ policy preferences.

On the military success, he attributed the Taliban control of over 250 out of 421 Afghan districts and 85% of Afghan territory to the Taliban’s successful tasleem (surrender) strategy, emphasising peace and Afghan and Islamic amity. These surrenders also demonstrate the mistrust that people and troops repose in the Afghan government.

He restated the Taliban’s field directives towards keeping schools, offices, markets and even media outlets open in the captured areas. He clarified the Taliban position supporting “civil liberties, and women’s right to education and work in hijab and in accordance with Islamic/Afghan values.” He defended the hijab being followed in many Islamic countries. In the new chapter of Afghan independence, Mr Shaheen reiterated the Taliban’s position to seek friendly relations with all countries, especially neighbouring nations and Muslim countries, welcoming their assistance in reconstruction.

The above iterations are significant policy preferences from potential victors, who have internally fought a long and hard war of liberation successfully. And who are reaching out to the world, mindful (almost obligated) of the US/western support for international acceptance and inclusivity and the need for economic assistance for post-conflict Afghanistan.

The above conceptual framework is clearly at play, as the Taliban’s political, diplomatic and military strategies are in sync. They have reiterated to “not take” any city (read Kabul) by force, preferring a negotiated tasleem. They are ensuring life goes on uninterrupted in the captured areas, particularly attending to resumption of utilities and civic services.

Militarily, they are attending to the north first, that was the bastion of anti-Taliban uprising in the late 1990s. In doing so, they are capturing border crossings aiming at double advantages of: a) tapping into potential revenues from international trade; and b) cutting likely non-Pashtun challengers to their authority from their Central Asian support and funding, if any.

Most Afghan borders are tri-points mainly along Amu Darya (and its tributaries) linking Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Kunduz province bordering Tajikistan is in Taliban hands including Sher Khan Bandar on the Panj River, linking Kabul to Dushanbe. The entire province of Badghis bordering Turkmenistan is controlled by the Taliban. Control of Kunduz city and Qala-e-Naw (Badghis) is contested, and so is control of Balkh province bordering Uzbekistan.

The Taliban offensive in the week ending on July 4, 2021, overran areas bordering five countries — Pakistan, China, Iran, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The Islam Qala border crossing with Iran, in Herat province, has fallen to the Taliban. And the Taliban have swept through the northeastern Badakhshan province, to reach the mountainous border with China’s Xinjiang region. Torghundi, a northern town on the border with Turkmenistan, is also in Taliban hands.

In the hinterland and countryside, while consolidating their hold through the tasleem strategy, they have encircled most urban centres by occupying the surrounding districts in a sort of ‘soft siege’, giving no option other than surrender. For Kabul, they are expected to patiently wait out Ashraf Ghani and his cabal till he is ousted by his mentors in a diplomatic putsch. In a time-bound inevitability, his escape routes are likely to be blocked and president Najeebullah’s fate seems to be haunting him and his coterie.

In a diplomatic/external manoeuvre, the Taliban have sent delegations to Iran, Russia and other countries explaining their position; particularly reassuring China about non-interference in Xinjiang’s Uyghur problem. The Taliban’s silence on the Indian-perpetrated atrocities in IIOJK and the ‘reported’ plight of Uyghur Muslims, demonstrates their pragmatism and preference for hikmat in decision making, rather than pure ideology.

This brings us to crystal-gazing. The situational constants describe the US predicament as a “military defeat” and their psychological captivity to the Saigon moment etched in their military memory… hence the rush to the exits at night from Bagram. This was the over-riding consideration for “negotiating with the enemy” in Doha. After cutting loose, their “over the horizon support” to a besieged Afghan government is just a bloated solace for a helpless ally. However, in policy pragmatism, the US establishment ‘should’ stay engaged constructively — offering reconstruction and budgetary support, otherwise the dragon of the Belt and Road Initiative will gulp down US regional influence for good. And that is Biden’s enduring dilemma.

Meanwhile, India strategically displaced (for the second time) alongside the US, after licking her wounds, ‘may’ go anti-status quo over CPEC and Gilgit Baltistan… that is unlikely. Indian officials did reach out to the Taliban’s Doha office using video link.

The Taliban may concede a political settlement in Doha, using their innate pragmatism, paving the way for the traditional Loya Jirga. Peace, power-sharing, a new constitution (form of government), and elections remain likely moot points. Ordinary Afghans, meanwhile would repose their trust in the Taliban irrespective of the pro-West op-eds by the liberal brigade of Kabul. Localised violence is possible alongside displacement of the mainly non-Pashtun population from urban centres to their rural highlands.

In an ironic turn of events, the Taliban are back after Time magazine, in its December 2001 cover blared, “The Last Days of the Taliban”. Predictions about Afghans without understanding their social anthropology is bad business. Afghan Baqi, Kuhsar Baqi. Meanwhile, Pakistan needs to know, what it does.

Published in The Express Tribune, July 15^th, 2021.

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