The sociology of intra-Afghan peace talks

Last week, in this space, some ‘constants’ from Afghan sociology were distilled following an inter-disciplinary approach. This column would discuss the sociology of the intra-Afghan dialogue that is underway in Doha.

Following on from the Taliban/Pashtun sociology, peace talks with the United States took almost a year’s painstaking efforts to iron-out the February 29, 2020 peace agreement. Contrary to belief, the Afghan is a tough negotiator; and had there been no Afghans like Zalmay Khalilzad on the US side, this process would have faltered. The Afghan government was cleverly side-stepped. Now expecting a degraded Afghan conflict resolution mechanism (CRM) to take on and resolve the nagging issues amongst the Afghans is wishful. Since at least one party — the Afghan government — is looking over their shoulder to their foreign backers — the US. The Taliban willingness to share the table with them stems from the compromise, wherein they see the Afghan government as an extension of the US.

The intra-Afghan dialogue is actually an Afghan Jirga. The Taliban, the dominant party, would have clear talking points and positions, conceding only marginally to negotiate the bigger issues. And the bigger issues are the nature of the Afghan state, power-sharing between the stakeholders, a ceasefire, sustenance of the future of Afghanistan’s government, and other minor issues like the status of women/minorities, freedoms and the Afghan Constitution, etc.

First, the nature of the Afghan state. The Taliban movement has Islam as its stated ideology and Sharia as the operative framework to run the affairs of the state. It is well-nigh impossible for them to agree to any other form or format of government. It is interesting to note that the almost month-long dialogue is stuck on issues such as the Taliban calling their fight against the Amreeki forces a jihad — holy war. And the Afghan government seems to be at a loss to give this war a name. Agreeing it to be a jihad would render those opposing it culpable. It would be interesting to see how this issue is resolved.

The Taliban subscribe predominantly to the Hanafi School of Islamic theology. However, Hanafi jurisprudence to be the basis of their governance would be challenging in a multi-faith Afghan society. Countries like Saudi Arabia stick to one fiqah as state theology. The possibility of separate fiqahs side by side, like Fiqah-e-Jafferia for populations like the Hazara Shias, remains a possible way out.

Second, power-sharing by far remains the most complex issue. For Taliban interlocutors agreeing to a power-sharing arrangement without a lion’s share for the Taliban is an extremely low probability. As in that case, their rank and file, who gave their sweat, blood, life and limbs for two decades fighting the occupation forces and their local backers, would be up in arms.

Sociologically, almost two Afghan generations came of age during the endemic violence, knowing nothing else. The Taliban movement has internalised violence and has learned to live with it. For the Taliban field cadre to accept anything other than a complete victory or its appearance thereof, would be a very tough call. Any perceived appeasement would split the Taliban movement. And their Doha interlocutors know it very well. The miniscule Kabul elite is a non-representative, directionless and Westernised microcosm in a vast ocean of rural, pro-Taliban and battle-hardened Afghans.

Third, the future sustenance of the Afghan government. The rough annual financial outlay for the Afghan government including the cost of the war and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), including police, is close to $10 billion. Most of this is provided for by the international community, as agreed to in the Bonn Agreement in 2001. The Taliban are likely to claim this continued support as reparations for the death and destruction wrought in by more than 50 countries over the last 20 years.

Fourth, as far as the ceasefire goes, it is not in the Taliban’s priority list, hence the fighting and talking. However, they commit to a future ceasefire hoping for an end to war. It was emphasised in this space that any ceasefire — without the Taliban “actually controlling the levers of power,” and their rank and file absorbed in the power structure is risky for the movement. Such a ceasefire is being strongly opposed by their field commanders, therefore not expected. A partial ceasefire is practicable and may be offered as a confidence building measure. A Taliban negotiating team member told NBC News in Doha, “If we stop fighting, then what does there remain to talk about?” Khalilzad considers the current negotiations as the best way of reducing the violence.

Fifth, as far as the auxiliary issues like the Afghan Constitution, minority/women’s rights and freedoms are concerned, the two sides would be poles apart in their aspirations for the country. Whereas the Afghan government team is trying to safeguard the Constitution and all the rights that women, minorities, and others have gained in the last 20 years; the Taliban want to define all rights according to the Sharia. This, for them, makes the Constitution and all the cited aspects superfluous.

The Taliban are hostile to an imposed value system, in particular a Western one. Agreeing to a value system they fought for so many years, is not knowing sociology of the movement, which is rural and Pakhtun. The Taliban, however, would concede some aspects like women’s education and employment, as a departure from their hardline policies of the 1990s. As the younger generation of Taliban leaders is more flexible, thanks to the global influences of social media.

And the Taliban have repeatedly shown that they can be both ideological and pragmatic, in line with their social underpinning. As previously mentioned, in any conflict with riwaj (tradition) and Islam; riwaj generally wins. Likewise, if presented with sufficiently compelling reasons, the Taliban can interpret even the religious injunctions in accordance with the ground realities. However, such deviation is short-term, transient and religiously sanctioned.

Surprisingly, the biggest challenge to the intra-Afghan talks is from the internal divisions among the Afghan political factions. The composition of the High Council for National Reconciliation, the body overseeing the negotiations with the Taliban, is not yet final. Most Ashraf Ghani appointees were rejected by his political rival and the council’s head, Abdullah Abdullah. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (former warlord-politician) is openly calling for separate, divided negotiations with the Taliban, representing a trend wherein a much larger number of Afghan leaders are quietly interacting with the Taliban in a typical Afghan hedging game.

So the Kabul team is pitted against a well-organised and united Taliban negotiating team. The Afghan government would further erode its leverage after the withdrawal of all US forces. Both President Donald Trump and his election rival former vice-president Joe Biden want to see the US forces leave Afghanistan.

The February 29 peace deal enabled the start of the peace talks; the Taliban would conclude these.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 1^st, 2020.

Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.