Ever since I landed at Beijing airport, on a yearlong journey of discovery years ago, my infatuation with the Middle Kingdom has resulted into numerous visits and interactions. One feels that in most cases the Chinese perspective gets clouded amidst the cacophony of anti-China noise. For better comprehension of the hydra-headed dragon, this column deals with Chinese Grand Strategy.
Great powers have grand strategies focused on the long term, and framed in broad terms. Grand strategy is “the process by which a state relates [its] long-term ends to means under the rubric of an overarching and enduring vision to advance the national interest(s).” A nation’s interests can be classified as core/vital, important and peripheral. A state generally goes to war in order to protect its vital or core interests.
Grand strategy results from a holistic assessment of a country’s strengths and vulnerabilities; its security environments and major threat(s) emanating from the environment in near to long-term. In the strategic construct, nations respond to threats through a developmental strategy (near to long-term) involving acquisitions for and reorganisations of forces. Threat(s) dictates whether a nation’s grand strategy is predominantly land-based (continental), maritime or air-based or a combination thereof.
The grand strategy of the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) is discerned from a wide range of literature. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Peoples Liberation Army (PLA also includes PLA Air Force, Navy and 2nd Artillery) have decades of experience — as a revolutionary politico-military movement — in formulating, articulating, and implementing strategies ever since the revolution. Today the Chinese behemoth is a party-army-state.
It was the re-evaluation of China’s security environment in the early 1970s under Mao Zedong and other senior PRC leaders that Beijing turned away from an erstwhile friendly Soviet Union. Chinese leadership had assessed the USSR to be a greater threat to China than the United States. Later, the honeymoon with the US ended with the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989. Today’s environment makes China and the US hostile powers, although both continue to cooperate on a wide array of issues.
Beijing accuses the US for being duplicitous about “one China policy” undermining PRC’s claim over Taiwan; its tacit support for Hong Kong protesters; undermining Chinese economic interests (particularly the Huawei episode); the US muscular policy in dealing with Chinese claims in South and East China Seas; encouraging “splittism”in Tibet (Chinese call it Xidan) and elsewhere; and the bogey of human rights violations, etc. However, maintaining cordial and cooperative relations with the US — mainly to access technology and markets — remain a top PRC interest.
China considers America’s Sino-specific policy objectives comprising political evolution, economic engagement and military containment; to which China responds with its own strategy of “prevention and utilisation”. Preventing conflict with the US, preventing American cultural and economic domination, and preventing US military containment. China prefers utilising US technology, market and management experience. Strategically, China considers peace and stability in Asia-Pacific and the Korean Peninsula; the War on Terror (and its evolution towards peace); WMD proliferation; and economic relations as bedrock of its US policy.
For the US, rapid expansion of Chinese economic power, enhanced market share and global dependence on Chinese manufacturing; PRC’s growing military might; strategic initiatives like OBOR (and its flagship CPEC); China’s increasing footprint in Asia (especially South Asia and Afghanistan), Africa and even the Middle East; China’s greater convergence with Russia; Beijing’s response to Covid-19 and its global support to countries, etc., are disconcerting strategic developments.
China’s core national interests remain its territorial integrity, protection of the system (called socialism with Chinese characteristics and rule by CCP) and uninterrupted economic and social development (labeled China’s peaceful rise). During Sino-US Strategic and Economic Dialogue (2009), the then state councillor, Dai Bingguo, outlined China’s three core interests as: maintaining basic system and national system; national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and continuous, stable economic and social development. President Xi Jinping while meeting PLA’s delegates to the National Peoples’ Congress (NPC) in 2014, highlighted China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests. These can be grouped as ideological, territorial, political and economic interests.
Ideological and/or security interests (maintaining a basic political system, and CCP rule) can be challenged by increasing social unrest, serious natural disasters and accidents including public health incidents like Covid this year. This warrants monitoring and censoring internet and social media platforms and any subversive role by foreign governments.
The second core interest — national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity and stability — is undermined by “splittism” in Tibet, East Turkistan, Taiwan and now Hong Kong; and Chinese claims in South and East China seas (Senkaku Islands). Any violation of this interest generates a robust response from China.
The third category, i.e, development interests concern a sustained growth of Chinese economy, including uninterrupted supply of raw materials, access to markets, open sea lines of communication, and protection of other resources critical to the nation’s sustained development. A 2013 defense white paper takes account of certain additional aspects, like China’s overseas interests including energy resources, strategic maritime routes and its citizenry.
China, particularly the PLA, assesses the US threat through American hard power — US military might and economic clout; and US soft power — subversive ideas and concepts regarding individual liberties and Western style democratic political institutions, which — China argues — be culturally relevant and appropriate for Chinese conditions. Beijing believes that the superior US high technology remains a key advantage for Washington in both areas; hence it is narrowing the gap.
The evolution of China’s grand strategies since 1949 are sometimes bracketed as 4R; the revolution (1949–1977), recovery (1978–1989), rising (1990–2003), and rejuvenation (2004–present). However, certain enduring strategic objectives can be discernible across decades.
The evolving Chinese strategic construct, therefore, includes (1) restoring and maintaining China’s territorial integrity; (2) preventing Asia-Pacific domination by another power; (3) creating a favourable international environment for China’s economic development; (4) asserting in shaping the evolving global order; (5) political control and social stability at home; and (6) advancing science and technology. Some Chinese academics consider world peace and regional stability also forming part of “important” national interests, requiring strengthening and modernising national defense.
Cultural and traditional influences under the percepts of Kong Fu (Confucius) also provide grounding to Chinese strategic framework. The wise Middle Kingdom has so far defended non-interference as a principle. However, it cannot remain the erstwhile ‘hesitant power’ in the evolving international order, if it is to protect the cited interests. China under President Xi seems destined to resolve this paradox, as the dragon has woken up.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 3rd, 2020.
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