America-Pakistan ties — where are they headed?

Although history may not always repeat itself, it does provide some clues about the future. Pakistan’s relations with the United States have taken a nosedive in the last few weeks. How sharp the descent has been, has surprised many — if not most — observers. It would be instructive to go back to history to remind ourselves why Pakistan became such a close American ally more than half a century ago.

When the British left two parts of their Indian domain that had with Muslim majorities, in the hands of a Muslim elite, they helped found a state that proved not to be viable. It was also a state that was not welcomed by the much larger part of the British Indian colony — the India of today. This bred a sense of deep anxiety among those who governed Pakistan during its formative years. There were two outcomes: A deep suspicion about India’s intentions towards it Pakistan, and a deep yeaning to find friends outside the borders that could produce a feeling of security.

There were four states in the new country’s immediate neighbourhood. India, China, Afghanistan and Iran. Modern China was still not born when Pakistan achieved independence. It was only on October 1, 1948 that the communist party led by Chairman Mao Zedong marched into Beijing and took over the reins of a vast country in total disarray. For the new government in Beijing, the first task was to stabilise the country, not to form alliances with its many neighbours.

Afghanistan was deeply hostile to the creation of an independent state that had a large proportion of Pakhtuns in its population. There were, at the time perhaps five million Pakhtuns residing on the other side of the border drawn by the British and forced upon Kabul. The rulers of Kabul wanted to redraw the Durand Line — the border left by the British between Afghanistan and Pakistan — and push it, as far as possible, towards the western bank of the Indus River. In those circumstances, Afghanistan could not be a friend of Pakistan. Finally, there was Iran. This was the only predominantly Shia state in the Muslim world. It had an uneasy relationship with its Sunni neighbours. There were, thus, good reasons why Tehran did not immediately open its arms to receive a new Muslim state. Pakistan, in other words, was cast into an uncomfortable geopolitical environment.

Anxiety about perceived Indian intentions was one reason why the first generation of Pakistani leaders felt the need to cultivate foreign states as friends. The other was economics. Pakistan had been founded on the basis of a promise to provide better economic conditions for the Muslims of British India. This meant accelerating the rate of economic growth in what was once the poorest part of the subcontinent. The rate of domestic savings was low; certainly not high enough to produce a rate of GDP growth that would help to alleviate poverty. The only way option was to augment domestic savings with foreign flows. At that time, the world had as yet to organise itself to provide cheap development finance to poor countries — for instance, the establishment of the International Development Association was still a decade and a half away. Approaching some rich countries as benefactors was one way of dealing with the situation. The US appeared to be a good candidate to play the role of a rich uncle.

Washington, too, had begun to develop an anxiety of its own. It was deeply suspicious of the intentions of the Soviet Union, its erstwhile ally in the Second World War. The defeat of Germany had opened an opportunity for the government in Moscow that, led by President Joseph Stalin, was able to fully exploit. While London and Washington watched helplessly, the Soviet Union expanded and consolidated its hold over Eastern Europe. In a way, the Soviet Union emerged geographically stronger compared to its former allies. The US made no territorial gains and the UK lost a good part of its empire in 1947, only two years after the collapse of Germany in Europe. Accompanying these changes was the communist advance in East Asia. Mao Zedong’s forces were advancing in China while Ho Chi Minh had begun to threaten France’s hold over Vietnam and the rest of Indo-China. The only option Washington felt it had to deal with this developing situation was to throw a set of chains around the countries that had fallen to what it saw as the communist menace.

John Foster Dulles, secretary of state in the administration headed by President Dwight Eisenhower, built three chains around the Communist world: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (Nato), for Western Europe; the Baghdad Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty Organization, (Cento) for the Middle East and West Asia; and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, (Seato) for East Asia. Pakistan joined the last two, thus becoming an important link in the chains to contain the spread of communism.

Pakistan’s entry into these alliances was not motivated by ideology or any fear about the advance of communism into its territory. The first generation of country’s leaders had other worries. They were busy creating a new central authority where none existed. They had to settle eight million Muslim refugees who had arrived as total destitutes from India. Economic stability and territorial integrity thus were the main concerns of the fledgling government. A close alliance with the US promised help in both areas.

The situation has not changed since then. More than six decades later, as the world around it is being rapidly reshaped, Pakistan still remains deeply concerned about these two elements pertaining to statecraft. It remains nervous about the intentions of most of its neighbours. And it is still woefully short of resources with which it can build a strong economy. Half a century ago, the US was the only country that could provide some comfort in both these areas. But that seems unlikely now. Given this, what are the options available to Pakistan today? This is a question I will take up in this space next week.

Published in The Express Tribune, July 18^th, 2011.