NSG membership: consensus rule in decision-making

As India and Pakistan continue to seek the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), initially referred to as the London Club, lack of a consensus-based decision has led to a stalemate. The 48-nation body which aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by controlling the export of nuclear material is yet to decide on South Asian nuclear rivals’ formal bids to join the elite club.

The NSG membership procedure for new countries functions on the principle of consensus which reflects a unified sense of purpose to ensure transparency in decision-making and also to restrict the monopoly of powerful states.

The consensus rule has been the corner stone of NSG’s decision-making process — a mutually agreed principle practised since the inception of the cartel. In the past, participating governments have reiterated their strong support for consensus-based decision-making when powerful states, multiple times, attempted to abandon such a rule. Member states have also warned that abandoning the consensus rule for decision-making would undermine the credibility of the group. It would further allow powerful states to play with the rules on their own terms.

Despite being non-signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), both India and Pakistan have formally submitted their bids to join NSG. India’s case is unique given the 2008 NSG waiver by former US administration. In a major blow to the international non-proliferation regime, the United States led the drive to create a “special status” for India within the global nuclear regulatory regime.

Several experts in Washington, DC have denounced the US efforts to mainstream India into global nuclear order without meeting the benchmark. In a letter to the nuclear cartel, a group of 18 leading nuclear nonproliferation experts called not to bend the rules. The experts warned, “It is our assessment that any further country-specific exemptions from NSG guidelines for trade and/or membership without compensating steps to strengthen nonproliferation and disarmament would increase nuclear dangers in South Asia, and weaken the NSG and the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime.”

Not only within policy circles but the US also faced considerable opposition from European allies on India’s inclusion in NSG. Despite the Obama administration’s coercive diplomacy to bring India into the nuclear mainstream, several states consistently raised concerns over India’s nuclear proliferation record and its non-NPT status which are prerequisites for the group’s membership. The international community, particularly the NSG member states, are well aware of the fact that the nuclear cartel was born out of Indian nuclear test in 1974.

The US made wrong assessment regarding its overwhelming support for Indian NSG membership. The United States undermined the concerns of smaller powers which strongly rejected the idea of granting membership to a non-NPT state that doesn’t meet the criteria. These smaller states, which include New Zealand, Ireland, Turkey, South Africa and Austria, repeatedly opposed India’s bid in later plenary sessions on the same premise.

Pakistan which has also submitted its bid to join NSG has legitimate concerns to fear about an India-in Pakistan-out scenario, as such a situation will permanently block Pakistan’s entry into NSG. Pakistan’s diplomatic hue and cry, in this regard, shouldn’t be seen as unusual.

Western powers seldom take care of regional repercussions of country-specific exemptions which can further push South Asia towards a nuclear arms race. On the one hand, the US aims to reduce regional tensions between India and Pakistan and on the other its India-centric policies fuel regional anxieties. Even policy experts fear that, in pursuit of its China containment policy, the US’ increasing reliance on India may limit the former’s leverage over Pakistan’s strategic calculus.

Pakistan, like India, considers it sovereign right to become part of the global nuclear club. Although Pakistan has not been offered incentives like NSG waiver, it has harmonised its peaceful nuclear programme with the International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) guidelines. It has placed its civil nuclear generation facilities under IAEA safeguards.

Pakistan has long advocated for a criteria-based approach, that a country must meet the benchmark to qualify for the membership. It is evident that awarding membership to a non-NPT signatory will put NSG member states, which are NPT signatories, in an awkward position. Therefore, granting India NSG membership would not only violate the group’s core principles but also undermine its credibility and effectiveness.

Since India wants its share in NSG’s high table, member states must encourage the former to play by the rules and meet basic prerequisites. Similarly, Pakistan is also committed to uplifting its nonproliferation credentials. Its robust command and control structure and safety and security mechanism of nuclear material complement to international norms and practices.

India and Pakistan’s bids to join NSG are hyphenated by their non-NPT status. Like India, Pakistan also sees NSG membership crucial for its socio-economic development. Under nuclear energy vision 2050, Pakistan plans to generate 40,000MW of electricity and increase the share of nuclear energy to 25% in coming years. To meet such a promising plan, it requires international collaboration in peaceful nuclear technology and entry into NSG can bring Pakistan closer to its vision 2050. Therefore, to meet its growing energy needs, Pakistan seeks international cooperation in peaceful applications of nuclear technology through the platform of NSG membership.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 29^th, 2018.

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