A verifiable voters list without inclusion and exclusion errors is the foundation block of free and fair elections
An error-free and up-to-date voters list is vital for combating electoral rigging to ensure the integrity of upcoming general elections in Pakistan. A verifiable voters list without inclusion and exclusion errors is the foundation block of free and fair elections and is key to “responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels,” as expressed by the UN Sustainable Goal (SDG, target 16.7). But is this enough to ensure the sanctity of votes? Experience of previous elections suggests that the administration of polling is of paramount importance. In this milieu, vote casting has unfortunately become a more critical process in Pakistan elections than voter registration. Casting of bogus votes became the key issue in casting doubts over the last electoral exercise administered under returning officers.
Expensive but allegedly faulty magnetic ink was procured for the 2013 elections. The idea was to take thumb impressions of voters at the time of casting ballots to help post-election audit of votes in case of an electoral dispute. But when thumb impressions taken by faulty ink were scanned and read, only around 50 per cent of these were read by the system. The reason was faulty or sub-standard ink. The option of purchasing magnetic ink was a stopgap measure. My first proposal was to use biometric verification of the voter before he/she casts their ballot. Sadly, it was shot down by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) under the pretext of lack of time. Instead magnetic ink solution was presented with the logic that the ECP had used it in all the previous elections, although it was never meant to be scanned before the 2013 elections.
With the difficulties involved in the use of magnetic ink, the ECP is reportedly considering a proposal using CNICs to combat the perennial issues of fake voting and ballot stuffing. According to the reported proposal, the ECP will not publish the last three numbers of the 13-digit identity card number in the final voters list. The voter will produce his/her ID card at the time of polling and the polling staff will manually write the last three digits from his/her ID card on the voter list and counterfoil of the ballot paper. As a result, the polling staff or others won’t be able to fill out the missing three digits until the voter presents his/her CNIC.
The administration of voting on Election Day is the most complex issue, and the proposed solution is based on an oversimplified approach. Many anomalies can arise in this process. Consider the following.
First, one can see that the issue of non-readability of magnetic thumb print is replaced with handwritten CNIC numbers which may also be non-readable. Rigging complaints of election 2018 reaching election tribunals would be hard to investigate as CNIC on counterfoil would be handwritten and susceptible to human error.
Second, withholding the last digits of CNIC on the voters list can increase voting time resulting in a considerable amount of voters leaving the polling station without casting ballots. Voters lists are typically used for mobilisation of the electorate by contesting candidates before and on the Election Day. Prior experience suggests that CNIC number helps in tracking the individual voter for his/her polling booth. Political parties set up stalls outside polling stations to help voters find out their votes. Party agents also guide the voter (and their family members) by printing out what is known as parchi (receipt) with sequence number of the voter and his/her immediate family members’ particulars on voters list along with polling booth information. This helps the voting staff inside polling station to identify voters’ particulars quickly resulting in speedy polling process. There are two digital numbers available on voters list to identify the voter — that are: CNIC number and family (gharana) number. If the complete CNIC number is available, then there is no need to print the family number on voters list. Now, if the CNIC number is printed in partial digits, the family number is left as the only digital number to find a voter in the list. But note that the family ID on the ID card that voter shows as evidence of being an eligible voter is not the same as the family ID on voters list! Family ID on voters list originates from census gharana number, reflecting the household number given by census staff while recording the structure of the house during census. But family number on the ID card reflects the unique family number to identify a family (husband, wife with unmarried children). Many female voters are verified through this unique family number. Hence, complete CNIC is the only viable tool to link a voter with his/her corresponding particulars printed on the voters list. Political parties should take note that, if the new scheme were to be implemented, they would not be able to guide their voter due to lack of complete information.
Third, the idea that this proposed solution will reduce ballot stuffing is only a mirage as political parties and other entities would already have entire voter lists (in print form) from local body elections held a couple of years ago. These voter lists have complete CNIC numbers for each voter. To rig the election: get access to previous voters list, note down the ID card numbers in bulk for each constituency, stuff the ballots with the connivance of returning officer by recording missing digits of CNICs and leave no trail for a post-election audit by recording votes in all election result forms.
Fourth, the timing of introducing such schemes is quite odd. The magnetic ink controversy came to the fore five years ago right after the 2013 elections. The latest solution pitched to be tried for the first time in the upcoming general elections should raise the eyebrows of all political parties. One might ask why was this solution not pre-tested in various by-elections conducted during the last five years?
NADRA managed to assist investigating courts in resolving post-election complaints of rigging even with faulty ink. Important political power brokers were exposed when the NADRA database was used to reconcile counterfoils of ballot papers. In some cases, the evidence of rigging was so glaring that it had put many political power brokers to shame. In one constituency, one person voted 310 times at a women-only polling station. Elections were cancelled in that particular constituency. Five precious years have been wasted and no viable solution can be found to combat the issue of electoral fraud. If one is looking for any glaring evidence of rigging, one need to look no further than the continuing refusal of Pakistan’s established elite stakeholders to institute genuine and meaningful reforms.
Making elections verifiable is not just about electoral transparency; it is also about empowering voters and making elections more contestable. Biometric verification of voters before the vote casting and recording the same on the counterfoil for post-election cross-reference holds the key in any such discussion on electoral reform. But it is likely to be resisted, given that it will undercut the ability of local power brokers to manipulate elections. Unfortunately, electoral democracy may be spreading in Pakistan but the integrity of elections is for sure declining!
Published in The Express Tribune, May 25th, 2018.
Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.
