Expanding Karachi police: a challenge and an opportunity

Karachi police must consist of local residents and reflect the ethnic makeup of the permanent residents of the city

An icon of Sufi music, Amjad Ali Sabri was assassinated in broad daylight, while son of the sitting chief justice of the Sindh High Court was kidnapped in Karachi within the same time frame, attracting intense media attention. The inevitable meeting of the top government functionaries was held in Karachi, who expressed their resolve to apprehend the culprits and deliver swift justice.

It goes without saying that the military assault on terrorist strongholds and networks in the shape of operation Zarb-e-Azb has produced extraordinary results, destroying the logistic and command structure of terrorists and improving the national security situation.

However, instead of benefiting from this window of opportunity and building on it to finish the job, the federal and provincial governments hastened to claim credit for a job well done by the army, even though there was a resurgence of terrorism targeting law enforcers over the last three months. The deaths of these men were routine news for the media, but these ominous signs were noted by security agencies, which stepped up their efforts and recovered heavy arms and explosives in Karachi and elsewhere. Cornered, the terrorists struck back by claiming the spotlight once again with attacks on the symbols of our culture and authority.

The meeting resulted in a decision to take the much-delayed step of inducting 20,000 police personnel. Amidst this number, the recruitment of 2,000 ex-servicemen was proposed. No further detail on the proposal was given in the statement.

It is unfortunate that only after these two high-profile cases came to national attention, did it dawn upon the government that Karachi lacked law-enforcement manpower. Despite more than a hundred per cent increase in the population of Karachi, there has been no corresponding increase in the police force for two decades.

The sheer volume and complexity of crime and security challenges have made it impossible for the existing force to even deal with petty crime in the metropolis. Resultantly, the Rangers — requisitioned in the mid-90s for a short period — have become a permanent part of the law-enforcement machinery in Karachi. The deployment of Rangers to perform policing duties has not served the intended purpose, despite some remarkably good work in law enforcement.

It is undoubtedly a major step in the right direction to address the security challenges in Karachi. Raising a force of 20,000 policemen is a complex task that needs meticulous professional planning. It needs to be planned and executed by a team of experienced and professional police officers familiar with the city. A mere increase in numbers is not the answer. Rather, the new force should be able to deliver. While doing so, the pressing requirement is to beef up the existing strength. If a holistic and professional approach is not adopted to raise and integrate this additional manpower within the Karachi police, the entire exercise will give rise to management problems and lead to failed objectives.

The recruitment of police by the army alone is unsound as it is bound to have a negative long-term impact on the morale of the entire police force. Granted that the earlier experience of recruitment in Karachi was not transparent, but the solution is to insulate the police from political interference. The force must be recruited through an improved system led by the Inspector General of Police (IG). Within the selection board, officers from the army may be nominated to prevent any external pressure.

In order to benefit from this decision, a committee under the IG, along with representatives of the finance and home departments, should prepare a plan to raise this force. The additional force should include an integral supervisory/command structure with at least 40 per cent of the posts of officers in the rank of ASI and above. These supervisory posts should be filled in through promotion of the police officers of the province with requisite experience and qualifications. The resulting vacancies at the base and the direct recruitment of the prescribed percentage of Assistant Sub Inspectors should be conducted by a high-powered board under the IG, with police and army officers as members.



All direct recruitment must be carried out from among the local residents of Karachi and should reflect the ethnic makeup of the permanent residents of the city. A higher percentage of officers will also bring qualitative change in the Karachi police.

To deal with the immediate requirement, two thousand ex-servicemen may be selected by the army who should be absorbed in the police after an orientation training of three months. For further enhancement of the capacity of the Karachi police, a force of 8,000 personnel from rest of the province should be transferred on deputation to the Karachi police for a fixed period of up to three years. They may then be repatriated upon completion of the training of the new entrants through a phased programme. In order to ensure that the police in the rest of the province are not faced with long-term shortage of manpower, no ban should be applied to filling police vacancies in the entire province of Sindh for the next five years.

The Sindh police have the infrastructure to train up to 12,000 officers at a time. Training should be conducted by the police training institutes. The training courses of this force must be designed by a team of professional police officers with focus on specific problems of urban policing so that the new force also modifies the existing structures based on rural policing models. Only additional training staff will be required, and these trainers may be borrowed from the other provinces for a period of three years. For field craft, army instructors may be inducted into the training cadre of the Karachi police.

The entire exercise is a package and can turn around the security situation in Karachi only if the government allows it to be implemented professionally and without any political interference.

The police leadership must assert itself in raising an efficient police force. Any shortcuts are likely to be counter-productive and represent a wasted opportunity. 

Published in The Express Tribune, July 16^th, 2016.

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