The high seas' next power centre

Why Xiamen’s bid for the BBNJ secretariat could rebalance power and representation in global ocean governance

The struggle over where to put the secretariat of the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement is about more than a building and a flag. It comes down to who gets to write the rules for the world's shared oceans, and whether developing countries will have a real seat at the table. Xiamen, China's candidate city, offers a chance to correct a long-standing imbalance. A secretariat in Asia would sit closer to many developing countries, make it easier for them to take part in decisions, and give practical meaning to the principle of equitable geographical representation.

The dispute sharpened on November 6, when Chile and Belgium announced they would merge their bids. Under their plan, the main secretariat would sit in Valparaíso, while the physical and technical infrastructure of the information exchange mechanism, the Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM), would be in Brussels. Brussels would also seek to host meetings of the agreement's subsidiary bodies.

Six days later, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning set out six objections. According to her, the arrangement conflicts with the agreement's provisions, procedural fairness, international practice, regional balance, fair competition and the spirit of States Parties’ commitments. Beijing’s view is that these questions should be settled through consultation among States Parties, within the established multilateral process.

The treaty text backs up the procedural point. Article 50 gives the first Conference of the Parties (COP) the authority to decide the secretariat’s operational arrangements, including its location. Article 51 does the same for the information exchange mechanism, which the secretariat will manage. So the real question is whether bundling separate institutional decisions into one package limits the ability of States Parties to weigh each on its own merits.

The strongest case for Xiamen, though, is representation. The institutions that oversee international maritime affairs cluster in Europe and North America: the International Maritime Organisation in London, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission in Paris, and the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea in New York. The International Seabed Authority in Kingston, Jamaica, is a notable exception. Asia, despite its weight in global trade, marine biodiversity and economic growth, hosts very few.

That is more than symbolism. Where an institution sits shapes who can walk through its doors, join its everyday exchanges and influence its policy debates. Writing in The Conversation in March 2026, University of British Columbia scholars Philippe Le Billon and Zelda Ladefoged made a similar point about China's bid, arguing that proximity itself creates influence. A secretariat in Xiamen would put the BBNJ framework within easier reach of Asian and other developing countries.

The Group of 77 and China have already stressed how much developing countries' participation matters. Their ministerial declaration of September 25, 2026 called for broader participation, better representation in decision-making and a secretariat located in a developing country. The worry behind it is a familiar one: representation has to turn into real influence, not stay a gesture.

Participation also costs money and expertise. The agreement covers marine genetic resources, marine protected areas, environmental impact assessments, capacity-building and marine technology transfer. Delivering on all of that takes serious scientific, technical and financial resources, and many developing countries struggle to join complex negotiations, carry out marine research or get the technology they need to protect biodiversity in international waters.

China's bid tries to lower some of those barriers. It was among the agreement's earliest signatories and Parties, and it is the largest contributor to the assessed budget. Its offer includes office space and accommodation for the secretariat, water and electricity costs for the first five years, and an initial $3 million for the BBNJ Agreement Trust Fund, which helps developing countries take part. An assessment cited by Dialogue Earth estimates that the office and operational support could save the secretariat at least $70 million over five years.

Belgium has also offered to cover office costs for five years, along with $70,000 for the Trust Fund. Chile has offered office space but hasn't said for how long. A treaty can't meet its conservation goals if the countries that most need to contribute lack the means to do so.

China's case rests on more than money. It brings strengths in marine science, oceanographic research, equipment manufacturing and technological infrastructure, along with stable governance and its position as a representative of the Global South. All of this could support the secretariat's administrative and technical needs and encourage cooperation between scientific institutions and developing countries.

The rival bids look weaker by comparison. Chile faces vulnerabilities in its information infrastructure and lacks the budget and resources to guarantee the smooth organisation of international conferences, while Belgium lacks broad international political support. In its bid to maintain hegemony over ocean-related affairs, Belgium seeks the right to host the CHM and its affiliated institutions, which could give it access to sensitive information from other parties and a degree of influence over decision-making at COP meetings.

The legitimacy of the co-hosting proposal is also in doubt. The host country's status is ambiguous, and there are concerns that deciding the host goes beyond the authority of the parties proposing it, without the required consultation and consensus. Merging bids after the contest began may have changed the original terms without consulting other States Parties, and it combines arrangements that Articles 50 and 51 reserve for the COP. Co-hosting would also impose a financial burden, disrupt CHM operations because of time-zone differences, undermine fairness and transparency, and prejudice the interests of the Global South.

There are practical problems too in splitting closely linked functions across two continents. The secretariat administers the agreement, and the CHM is the platform for sharing the information that implementation depends on. The two would need to work in constant step. Separating them could complicate coordination, data management, technical maintenance and long-term costs, and could bring delays that undermine the CHM's efficiency. A single host, unlike the split proposal, would keep the secretariat's administrative and technical functions together.

Then there are questions of principle. Chile presented its bid as a way to strengthen the Global South's representation, yet a key technological component of high seas governance would sit in Europe. Brussels already hosts the European Union, NATO and a dense web of diplomatic and policy networks, and adding another piece of ocean governance infrastructure there does little to ease the concentration of institutions. Critics may reasonably ask how a CHM hosted in Brussels would safeguard sensitive information shared by Parties, and who would hold authority over its technical operation.

None of this is about whether Chile and Belgium can work together. It is about whether the process respects the Parties' collective authority. The eventual decision will only be as legitimate as the process behind it: transparent, fair and open to every State Party.

Xiamen's candidacy speaks directly to the goal of giving developing countries real influence. Its financial commitments, operational support and scientific capacity make the bid competitive, and its location would help loosen the grip of Europe and North America on ocean governance institutions. A secretariat there would anchor a stronger Asia-Pacific presence and offer a more accessible platform to countries that have long been far from the centres of maritime decision-making. That wouldn't sideline Europe or the Americas. It would make the system more balanced, which matters all the more as marine biodiversity comes under growing pressure from pollution, climate change, overexploitation and ecosystem degradation. Protecting the high seas depends on cooperation, fair access to scientific knowledge and technology, and follow-through on conservation commitments.

The first COP, scheduled for January 11-22, 2027, in New York, will decide the secretariat's location and related arrangements. That decision will shape not only how the agreement runs day to day but also the character of international cooperation on the high seas.

The choice should rest on transparency, efficiency, fair competition and equitable geographical representation, not on diplomatic manoeuvring or arrangements that bypass the collective authority of States Parties. Choosing Xiamen would be a meaningful step toward a more inclusive ocean order, giving Asia a stronger institutional voice and keeping the protection of the high seas a truly shared responsibility.

WRITTEN BY:
Afshan Hussain

The writer is an independent journalist with a special interest in geo-economics

The views expressed by the writer and the reader comments do not necassarily reflect the views and policies of the Express Tribune.

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