When success counts as failure: What the case against Pakistan's GSP+ status gets wrong

September 2025 white paper urges EU to withdraw Pakistan's GSP+ trade preferences over non-compliance

In September 2025, a Brussels-based research desk and a facilitation platform published a white paper calling on the European Commission to open proceedings to withdraw Pakistan's GSP+ preferences.

The paper is long, heavily footnoted and confident in tone. Its central finding is stated plainly: after more than a decade of monitoring, dialogue and technical assistance, "the conditionality mechanism has not succeeded in inducing compliance."

Read that sentence again, because it is not really about Pakistan. It is a verdict on GSP+ itself. The scheme exists to turn market access into reform: ratify 27 international conventions, implement them, accept monitoring, and keep your tariff-free access. If eleven years of that process counts as proof of failure, then the instrument has no theory of success.

That is the argument worth examining, because it is wrong on the evidence and corrosive in its logic.

The paper's factual spine is the Commission's Staff Working Document SWD(2023) 363, which covers 2020 to 2022. Its evidence is treated as the current state of play. Yet the paper itself reaches for 2024 and 2025 events when they support its case, such as the elections and the detention of a journalist, while leaving the reform record of the same period largely untouched.

That record, as documented by Pakistan's Treaty Implementation Cell in the Ministry of Commerce, is not trivial. It is self-reported and should be read as such, but it is specific and checkable. Rules were notified under the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act 2022, which the paper describes as still pending, and child labour surveys were reported complete across the provinces of Gilgit-Baltistan and Islamabad, with action plans notified, where the paper says Sindh and Balochistan lack updated data.

The exemption that kept Export Processing Zone workers outside the Industrial Relations Ordinance was withdrawn, extending association and bargaining rights to them, and child marriage restraint laws setting the minimum age at 18 for both genders were passed in Islamabad and Balochistan in 2025. A first National Adaptation Plan was adopted in 2023. Pakistan was also removed from the FATF grey list in 2022 and, according to the same document, from the EU's own list of high-risk third countries in 2023.

None of this proves full compliance. It does show movement, on exactly the kinds of questions the paper says have been ignored.

The items above are a sample. The Treaty Implementation Cell's account runs across all four pillars, and much of it is provincial, which matters in a federation where labour and environment are devolved subjects. As reported by the government:

Human rights. The national human rights commission holds A-status accreditation with GANHRI, a national mechanism for reporting and follow-up on human rights conventions has been set up, and Pakistan was elected to the UN Human Rights Council for 2026-2028. The death penalty was removed for drug offences in 2023 and narrowed under the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2025. Punjab allocated Rs126.49 million to rehabilitate victims of the 2023 Jaranwala attacks, including restoring 22 churches, and runs a Minority Card Scheme reaching 50,000 families.

Labour. Inspection management systems now operate in all four provinces, with geo-tagged inspections. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa enacted factory rules (2023) and an occupational safety and health act (2022), Balochistan notified six labour rules in 2025 covering bonded labour abolition and minimum wages, and Sindh inserted anti-discrimination clauses across its labour laws. Punjab reports vigilance committees notified in all 36 districts and meeting regularly.

Environment. The 26th Amendment added Article 9A, a right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment. Pakistan adopted a Clean Air Policy and Punjab Smog Prevention and Control Rules in 2023, issued an action plan for its hazardous waste policy, ratified the Kigali Amendment, and launched national carbon market guidelines in December 2024.

Governance. An anti-money-laundering authority law was enacted in 2023, an anti-corruption academy has been established, and Punjab's digital complaints system has logged 269,493 complaints and 26,283 cases. A Whistleblower Protection and Vigilance Commission Bill was approved by a Senate committee in 2025 but is not yet law.

Some of this is committees, rules and bills at an early stage, and the paper is right that implementation is the real test. But a record like this is exactly what the monitoring cycle's next review should weigh.

The paper never mentions the institution that best illustrates how conditionality is supposed to work. In March 2014, within weeks of GSP+ status taking effect, Pakistan's Prime Minister created the Treaty Implementation Cell, convened by the Attorney General, with counterpart cells in the provinces. Its members include the ILO, UN Women and the Pakistan Workers Federation. The Prime Minister chairs review meetings, and a sub-committee fast-tracks pending legislation.

Systems thinkers would recognise this as a feedback loop. An external incentive (market access) creates an internal coordination structure (the cell), which produces outputs (laws, rules, surveys) that are then fed back into the next review. Such a loop is slow and uneven, particularly in a federation where labour and environment became provincial subjects after the 18th Amendment. But it is the loop the Regulation was designed to create.

A paper that treats this machinery as invisible, and its outputs as non-events, is not measuring the mechanism. It is assuming its conclusion.

Here is the logic problem at the heart of the paper. It scores Pakistan as non-compliant across every pillar, using a matrix that it concedes has no basis in EU law and is "not legal in nature." It then argues that Pakistan's record exceeds the severity of earlier suspensions, even though those cases involved different schemes (the general GSP, or Everything But Arms) and, in Sri Lanka's case, a formal investigation of three named conventions.

The 2025 ethanol measure is offered as proof of the Commission's readiness to enforce conditionality, although the paper admits it was an Article 30 safeguard "unrelated to human rights." The citations wobble: the key Commission document appears under two different numbers and several dates, and events from 2024 and 2025 are attributed to a report published in 2023.

On this standard, no beneficiary could ever pass. A country that builds a standing implementation body, legislates in its provinces, secures delisting from international risk lists and still scores a clean sweep of failures has learned something important: effort is not rewarded. That is the lesson that damages GSP+. A scheme in which reform cannot be recognised stops being an incentive and becomes a trap.

The paper does acknowledge that suspension could hurt workers. It offers one paragraph on mitigation and, as a fallback, proposes withdrawing preferences from textiles, "Pakistan's largest and most politically significant export sector."

The numbers show what that means. Pakistan's exports to the EU grew from €3.56 billion in 2013 to €8.33 billion in 2024. Textile apparel and hosiery rose from €1.05 billion to €3.51 billion, and home textiles from €696 million to €2.07 billion. These sectors employ women and informal workers whom labour rights conditionality is meant to protect.

The gains run both ways. Total EU-Pakistan trade rose from €6.9 billion in 2013 to €12 billion in 2024, up 75 per cent, and Pakistan's exports grew by more than 100 per cent in 18 EU member states. EU exports of iron and steel rose from €202 million to €429 million and pharmaceuticals from €264 million to €358 million, according to the same document. GSP+ gives duty-free access on 66 per cent of EU tariff lines, and the EU takes 28 per cent of Pakistan's exports. This is a partnership with a history: the EU granted duty-free access in 2002-2004 in recognition of Pakistan's counter-narcotics efforts, and Autonomous Trade Preferences on 75 products after the 2010 floods.

The climate figures sharpen the point. The government says the 2022 floods cut exports by 13 per cent, from $28.0 billion to $24.4 billion, and the 2025 floods by 4 per cent, from $31.0 billion to $29.7 billion, while Pakistan estimates it needs $565.7 billion by 2035 for adaptation, mitigation and transition. A country absorbing shocks of that size is relying on predictable market access to rebuild.

Withdrawing preferences in that setting is a decision about who bears the cost of a state's shortcomings. The paper insists the measure is "not punitive." For a garment worker in Faisalabad, the distinction may be academic.

It would be a mistake to dismiss the paper entirely. Several of its concerns deserve a serious, good-faith response, and engaging with them is a sign of confidence in the process, not a concession.

Some of the issues it raises remain open, and Pakistan's own reform account has yet to address most of them. The blasphemy laws are unchanged in statute, and the steps reported so far are judicial acquittals and policy documents rather than legislative change. UN bodies have asked for enforced disappearances to be criminalised, which is still pending. Questions also remain over the trial of civilians in military courts, low union density and the pace of bonded labour prosecutions.

These are exactly the questions the GSP+ monitoring dialogue is built to take up, through time-bound benchmarks, independent verification by the ILO and UN treaty bodies, and clear next steps if commitments slip. The Regulation provides for this, and Pakistan's record of engagement suggests it can deliver on it.

There are two ways to damage a conditionality scheme. One is to look away from real violations. The other is to overlook a partner that is visibly engaged, so that the scheme's credibility rests on the loudest report rather than the full record. Pakistan has spent more than a decade inside the GSP+ process, building the machinery, passing laws and submitting to review, and a fair assessment starts from that effort.

The measure of GSP+ is not whether it has produced a perfect compliance record in a decade. It is whether engagement can change what states do, and whether the EU can tell the difference between a beneficiary that is moving and one that is not. Pakistan is a hard case for that test. It should be judged on the evidence, not used as an exhibit for a conclusion that was reached before the evidence was gathered.

WRITTEN BY:
Puruesh Chaudhary The writer is a futures researcher and has a master’s degree from Institut De Hautes Études Internationales Et Du Développement in Geneva. She is the founder and president of the NGO, AGAHI. She tweets @puruesh
The views expressed by the writer and the reader comments do not necassarily reflect the views and policies of the Express Tribune.

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