Neutral ground in a burning region

The widening war in West Asia has thrust Pakistan into a familiar but perilous diplomatic terrain as it finds itself navigating between two gravitational poles of its foreign policy: the Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, with whom Pakistan has deep economic and strategic ties, and neighbouring Iran, bound to Pakistan by geography, history, commerce and shared religious identity.

Rather than rushing headlong into one camp or another, Islamabad has attempted to maintain equilibrium.
Pakistan has condemned both the US–Israeli attacks on Iran and Iran’s strikes on Gulf countries while simultaneously urging restraint and renewed diplomacy. In a region where tempers run high and alliances harden overnight, Pakistan is attempting to keep its powder dry while keeping doors open.

The deliberate dual-track diplomacy — part caution, part calculation — may well be the country’s most valuable strategic asset in a crisis that shows no signs of cooling.

Economic lifelines at stake

The Gulf region is the economic oxygen mask of Pakistan’s fragile economy. Remittances from Pakistani expatriates working across the Gulf exceed $40 billion annually, while Saudi-supplied oil remains a crucial energy lifeline. Any regional conflagration threatens both.

Pakistan’s calls for de-escalation, therefore, carry an unmistakably practical logic.

Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN Asim Iftikhar Ahmad, while condemning the “initiation of unwarranted attacks” against Iran, also condemned Iranian attacks against brotherly countries in the Gulf. 
“Safety of our citizens in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf is our top priority,” he maintained. 

Remaining outside the battlefield allows Islamabad to play what diplomats often call the role of the “good sibling”, maintaining cordial ties with all sides while avoiding the line of fire.

Defence commitments 

Pakistan’s strategic balancing act becomes more complex when security commitments enter the equation.

In September 2025, Pakistan signed the Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (SMDA) with Saudi Arabia. The pact states that any attack on one party will be considered an attack on both, reaffirming Pakistan’s longstanding role as a security partner to the Gulf.

However, Islamabad has been careful not to paint itself into a corner.

Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir’s recent visit to Riyadh reviewed joint air-defence cooperation, reinforcing military coordination. At the same time, Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar’s public warning to Iran not to strike Saudi territory carried both diplomatic and strategic messaging.

In doing so, Dar was generating what scholars call “audience costs”. By publicly signalling Pakistan’s commitment, Islamabad raised expectations of support, making any future retreat politically costly.

However, the wording of the defence pact leaves ample room for manoeuvre. There is no automatic invasion clause, no pre-programmed military response.

The ambiguity appears deliberate. Pakistan signals solidarity with Saudi security in principle while reserving the right to calibrate its response in practice. Deterrence — missile defence cooperation, diplomatic pressure, strategic signalling — replaces the spectre of troop deployments.

Meanwhile, the stakes are not merely external. Pakistan’s population of roughly 250 million includes a large Sunni majority alongside a substantial Shia minority estimated at 15–20 per cent. Relations with Iran’s Shia leadership, therefore, resonate far beyond diplomacy.

The killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader triggered protests within Pakistan, leaving dozens dead in a stark reminder that sectarian fault lines remain volatile.

By condemning attacks on both Iran and Gulf states while advocating dialogue, Islamabad also seeks to calm domestic waters. The policy speaks simultaneously to Sunni sentiments of solidarity with Gulf allies and to Shia anxieties over hostility toward Iran.

The multipolar chessboard

Pakistan’s diplomatic manoeuvre also reflects broader shifts in the international order.

China remains Pakistan’s closest strategic partner — the largest investor in the country and the backbone of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Beijing has openly praised Islamabad’s de-escalatory stance and continues to explore alternative regional security frameworks.

Relations with the United States, meanwhile, have grown more ambiguous. Pakistan has also recently joined Donald Trump’s eccentric “Board of Peace” alongside Israel, yet the unfolding war highlights a deeper truth: Washington may prioritise Israel’s security over its commitments to Gulf partners.

In such a multipolar landscape, rigid alignment can become a liability.

Pakistan’s middle path — neither fully in Washington’s orbit nor bound to Tehran — maximises its diplomatic options. Scholars term this strategy institutionalised hedging, a durable practice that preserves strategic autonomy and room for manoeuvre.

Islamabad is therefore attempting to keep several plates spinning at once: Chinese strategic cooperation, emerging Asian markets, economic ties with the United States, and pragmatic engagement with Iran.

Hedging as a strategy of survival

For smaller states navigating great-power rivalries, ambiguity can be an advantage. Secondary powers benefit from strategic hedging, a repertoire of actions that signals autonomy without provoking confrontation.

The historical record offers striking examples. Oman, perhaps the Gulf’s most skilled diplomatic tightrope walker, has cultivated a long-standing doctrine of neutrality and mediation.

However, states with neutrality are not passive actors as their neutrality becomes a form of agency, a way to gain influence without stepping onto the battlefield.

Pakistan’s strategy belongs in this tradition as its own history reinforces this logic.

In 2015, when Saudi Arabia sought Pakistani participation in the Yemen war against Iran-backed Houthis, Pakistan’s parliament refused. Islamabad instead offered diplomatic mediation and maintained neutrality.

That decision avoided dragging Pakistan into a regional proxy war and preserved its diplomatic credibility. Today, policymakers cite the Yemen precedent as proof that neutrality can prevent history from repeating itself.

Meanwhile, the region itself is evolving.

A potential Saudi–Pakistan–Turkey axis is taking shape. Turkey has reportedly explored joining the Saudi-Pakistan defence arrangement, creating what some observers dub the embryo of an “Islamic NATO”.

Analysts argue that such a bloc would combine Turkey’s military-industrial capacity and NATO links with Saudi financial resources and Pakistan’s trained manpower.

Meanwhile, rival alignments, including the growing UAE–India partnership, suggest a Middle East fragmenting into overlapping security networks rather than consolidating into a single alliance system.
In such a fractured environment, neutral actors like Pakistan occupy valuable diplomatic space.

Underlying these shifts is a deeper transformation.

For decades, Gulf monarchies relied on the US security umbrella. However, repeated moments of perceived American hesitation have shaken that confidence. The current conflict illustrates the dilemma. 

Despite maintaining bases across the region, Washington’s response to Iran’s missile attacks has been muted, widely interpreted as prioritising Israel’s security.

“If … a major US ally attacks [another] US partner, you are going to deeply question that American security umbrella you’ve paid top dollar for,” ECFR analyst Ellie Geranmayeh warns.

Saudi Arabia’s defence pact with Pakistan — and its exploratory ties with Turkey — reflect precisely this search for greater strategic autonomy.

The message reverberates far beyond the Gulf. Even European NATO members have begun debating alternative security guarantees.

A dominant power that lights fires without extinguishers forces others to take responsibility for the blaze. That is textbook balance-of-power logic: when Washington’s credibility falters, regional actors band together for their own security. 

We are already seeing the outlines of such a shift. Saudi Arabia, long the US linchpin, reacted to previous US “no-shows” by forging its own defence pact with Pakistan. 

Gulf states no longer see value in exclusive US protection when Washington acts unpredictably. Instead, they practice “multi-alignment” in the neo-Trimurti world, diversifying ties with the US, Russia, China, India and among themselves. 

The result is a mosaic of mini-alliances and strategic clubs, such as the I2U2 and the Gulf–South Asia partnership, rather than a single security bloc as US strikes fracture the very order America helped build.
 
For instance, the Shah’s dethroning in the 1950s or Saddam’s removal in 2003 — both achieved only by conquering an empty shell of a state — stand in stark contrast to Iran today, which still controls its neighbourhood. With US power focused elsewhere, local powers like Pakistan, Turkey, and the Gulf monarchies are effectively acting as their own guarantors.

“Regional actors must recognise that the war itself, initiated through Israeli/US attacks on Iran, threatens the entire Gulf security architecture and places neighbouring states in harm’s way,” former ambassador of Pakistan in Iran and the UAE, Asif Durrani, cautioned in a post on X. 

“Preserving the emerging spirit of detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia is vital not only for regional stability but also for Pakistan’s strategic equilibrium.”

In such an uncertain world, Pakistan’s neutrality can prove less like hesitation and more like prudence. The long-term prize goes to whoever offers a more stable and prosperous regional vision. 

Paradoxically, the historical horizon is now favouring states with a strategic neutrality that keeps the system from collapsing into a binary choice.