Why are LGBTQ concerns moot in Pakistan?

It's a Pandora’s box where one is criticised by conservative Muslims, post-modern constructivists and closeted Muslims

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) concerns arise in secular, democratic and capitalistic economies with the shift away from extended to nuclear families due to individualism and growing gender equality. It can be argued that when the state steps in to provide employment insurance and pensions, citizens do not need to bear children for old age support and do not have to depend on extended relatives for a rainy day. This empowers individuals to make their own independent decisions. Additionally, with the state provision of education and the free market, women can financially emancipate themselves through the job market and make decisions regarding their life partners based on equality.

Therefore, the ability to make marriage decisions based on equality and not having to depend on children for old age security, both facilitate space for LGBTQ individuals. However, Pakistan is neither a secular democracy nor has it experienced a shift in the family system towards individual autonomy. Hence, LGBTQ concerns do not arise organically in Pakistani society, and it could be argued that LGBTQ concerns are moot in Pakistan.

There have broadly been two perspectives on human sexuality, namely the essentialist and the constructivist. Based on the former, sexual orientation is innate and immutable, whereas according to the latter, it is a social construct. Over the last few decades, human rights for LGBTQ individuals have mostly been achieved based on the essentialist perspective and therefore the creation of fixed identities. These rights are based on the argument to access public goods like healthcare and pensions for same-sex partners, just as they are accessed by other citizens. However, increasingly, some activists question the assimilation of LGBTQ individuals into heteronormative institutions. With increased sexual liberation due to the birth pill and condoms, they question the need for monogamous legal contracts, and argue that there is nothing wrong with pursuing sexual relationships based on free choice, irrespective of gender and sexual orientation. In this context, identities go beyond the heterosexual-homosexual and the male-female binaries to encompass a whole array of sexual orientations and genders. Thus, the discourse in capitalistic secular democracies has gone beyond supporting same-sex unions and towards pronoun usage and gender-neutral washrooms. This shift in LGBTQ concerns has happened organically in western secular democracies.

However, LGBTQ identities would be viewed as foreign constructs in Pakistan. This idea of foreignness would be supported by post-modernists and Islamists alike. The implication is that the discourse for educated middle class Pakistanis cannot arise in the same manner as has happened for educated middle class Indians. What Pakistan does have is a discourse based on indigenous identities including khawaja saras, which are not usually adopted by middle or elite class individuals. In this regard, Pakistani discourse is more attuned to the rights of transgender and intersex folks through the umbrella third gender identity than to the rights of gays and lesbians. As such, where the rights movement in western economies has shifted from same-sex unions towards non-binary concerns, the discourse in Pakistan remains frozen with the rights of the third gender. Indeed, there have been some improvements through government ID cards, employment in the public sector, and even a Sunni fatwa on the marriage of khawaja saras. More recently, Sarah Gill became Pakistan’s first transgender doctor. However, just as the late Benazir Bhutto’s coming to power did not herald liberation for all women, it would be long before societal change would reflect acceptance for transgender folks in general. This is especially true for khawaja saras from the lower economic strata of the society, who face discrimination and violence. Indeed, there are educated individuals whose transphobia is only cemented with advanced education. Some of them tap into the current transphobic narrative prevalent in the west to project their prejudice. Thus, social exclusion and discrimination remain, which at times lead to rifts within sexual minorities.

The issue of same-sex unions remains a taboo in Pakistan based on religious and cultural mores. It cannot be addressed through a constructivist perspective, as Pakistan is not a secular democracy that would facilitate free sexual expression between consenting adults irrespective of gender and sexual orientation. Similarly, the essentialist perspective, which rests on fixed gay and lesbian identities and allows support for monogamous same-sex unions, does not work for Pakistan because of religious taboos. Once again, even the essentialist perspective, which has allowed Episcopalians, the United Churches and both the Reform and Conservative Jewish denominations to affirm same-sex unions and gay priests and rabbis, only works in secular democracies. The best, therefore, would perhaps be a 'don’t ask, don’t tell' compromise position that has so far worked in past Muslim societies and in Pakistan. In this regard, the hadith which states that a characteristic of a believer is that he does not concern himself with that which does not concern him, is instructive.

It is also important to note that LGBTQ discourse is predominantly led either by those who uphold a western sexual liberation discourse or by conservative Muslims who view it as an anathema to Muslim family values where sex is regulated by the legal contract of marriage. Pitted against each other, neither approach pragmatically helps LGBTQ individuals in Pakistan. Unfortunately, there are not many who work at the intersection of faith and sexuality, partly because opening this Pandora’s box is a thankless job where one gets criticised by conservative Muslims, post-modern constructivists and closeted Muslims alike. This affirming discourse, which is based on rejecting the analogy of LGBTQ Muslims with the people of Lut, is viewed as stifling by post-modern constructivists and heretical by conservative Muslims. Additionally, it is viewed as oppressive by closeted Muslims, who are consumed by secret sexual encounters, guilt and shame, and who feel threatened by the normalisation of Muslim same-sex unions. Thus, with such overwhelming odds against an Islamic discourse on same-sex unions regulated by a legal contract, it’s no wonder that LGBTQ concerns are moot in Pakistan.