Defence by Intimidation

Trial of General (retd) Musharraf is a trial of us as a people & is also political & it is about self-accountability.

Fair-minded and reasonable people seem to disagree on what needs to be done regarding the Commando. The disagreements are based on the procedures adopted, the ‘how’ of it since the ‘why’ is obvious. The extent and scope of the trial, the association of aiders and abettors, and the nature of ‘treason’ as an offence, whether it’s political or a formal legal one, constitute the spectrum of disagreements. One can want General (retd) Musharraf to be held accountable and disagree with the way it is being done and feel perhaps, that a higher standard of due process has to be followed, or simply believe that we as a people are not ready yet. Many of the divergent positions are rational and defensible, and one can simply agree to disagree with friends

However, there is another line of reasoning in his defence, namely, outright intimidation. The crude end of the spectrum is Mr Ahmad Raza Kasuri being himself and threatening to ‘sort out’ journalists who ask discomforting questions. Nobody takes Mr Kasuri seriously, including most notably, Mr Kasuri himself and hence, any more comment on him is unnecessary. The greater cause for concern are the thinly veiled threats by retired army officers (defence analysts, if you will) and other assorted analysts. The line of reasoning goes, if General Musharraf is tried, particularly for the subversion of the Constitution (termed treason by the Constitution), there is a risk of ‘institutional clash’ and of course, the ‘morale of the troops’ will be lowered.

Morale of the troops now is more relevant than ever, and with their continuing sacrifices in the present conflict, it shows no signs of dipping. However, the morale of the soldiers is always brought up in contexts where it does not belong. To assert that our soldiers will be disheartened and their spirits will sink due to having a military dictator facing the courts might be owing to ignorance, yet, most likely it is due to maliciousness. The argument of the defenders is that the 600,000 soldiers of the armed forces will take the trial of the former Chief as a personal affront and will either become depressed or else, rise up in arms and in doing so, may ‘derail’ the system. Firstly, for the love of whatever you hold holy, please abandon this euphemism. ‘Derailing’ the system is simply saying that a coup would be imposed. What they are really saying is that the army as a collective will be so unnerved by the Commando being tried for ‘treason’ that it will commit treason again as a response. Even though this might be true, it is just wrong. This is no argument, it is just a naked threat and is unconstitutional.

This does a grave injustice to the majority of the armed forces by misrepresenting the dynamics of how decisions of military takeovers are deliberated and implemented. There is no referendum held in the army and the army does not impose a coup as a collective (however, most of them do support or comply with it, once done). Even more significantly, it seems to imply that a significant number of the armed forces can, if they choose, subvert the Constitution and we should be fine with it and exercise ‘caution’ in dealing with this ‘delicate’ situation. Precedents from our ‘chequered history’ are being cited and ‘realism’ urged. The reliance on cliche in defending the patently indefensible is the governing strategy.

To those who cite the ‘sentiments’ of a few hundred thousand soldiers and that the said sentiments should be shielded from ‘hurt’ as then the situation might become ‘uncontrollable’, let us hypothetically take their claims on face value and ask this. Did the voters of Mr Zulfikar Ali Bhutto have no such sentiments when their leader was executed? Did those who voted for Mian Nawaz Sharif in 1997 had no such feelings when he was sent off to exile? There is no parallel either in numbers or the reaction. Or are they just saying that military sensibilities are more important than not only civilian sensibilities but also the Constitution. And, yes, that is exactly what they are saying.

While everybody and their cousins have rather dramatically assumed the role of being spokesperson for the army and how the soldiers feel or might feel, etc., it will be the appropriate time for the ISPR to publicly disassociate itself with this punditry.

Another dimension of all this is the conflation between the man and the institution. General (retd) Musharraf is uncritically accepted as the representative sample of the army and as symbolising the entire institution. Fairly recently, when allegations surfaced against the son of Justice (retd) Iftikhar Chaudhary, the institutional response of the Supreme Court was to take this as a personal slight to the entire judiciary. For the past few years, there was a very deliberate effort to portray Justice (retd) Chaudhary in his person representing the judiciary as a whole. Now, exactly the same model is being repeated with General (retd) Musharraf. Arguments having a similar texture are made regarding an honest conversation on the Fall of Dhaka, 1971 and more recently, in the aftermath of the Asghar Khan verdict, which ironically dealt with the idea that no one institution can claim to be the guardian of ‘national interest’. The Urdu term riyasti idaaray (Institutions of the State) more often than not refer to the armed forces. It seems we have no other institutions left (the only other time that the term ‘institution/s’ makes an appearance is in regard to enterprises which the state seeks to sell (privatise). ‘Agencies’ is another term which seems to say too little and perhaps, too much in the terse formulation. Even the term ‘intelligence’ before ‘agencies’ now seems surplus to requirements.

In essence, if one were to believe or agree with these analysts, the military is the only ‘surviving’ institution of the state, hence embodying and representing the state and General (retd) Musharraf represents the military. So, General (retd) Musharraf represents the state itself. Ridiculous as it is, cut through the hubris and that is the core argument of the defence and senior analysts. The warning embedded is if the military is under attack (basically by the Commando being tried), the military will retaliate. To complete the full circle, there is no substantial difference in the message of the tactless Mr Kasuri and the more sophisticated pontificating; it is only the delivery that differs.

Nobody should be baying for General (retd) Musharraf’s blood and the legitimate differences on how all of this is conducted have to be considered and debated. The trial of General (retd) Musharraf is a trial of us as a people, and is also political, and it is about self-accountability, and if it has to be done, it has to be done right. In any event, the Commando’s fate is largely irrelevant now, he is a defeated man. As for those who were beneficiaries and accomplices during his reign, all we ask is to stop the threats, own up and apologise.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 23^rd, 2014.

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