KARACHI: This is with reference to the cover story by Javed Hussain titled “Phantom soldiers” published in The Express Tribune Magazine on November 11.
The report was good but I would like to discuss certain aspects of it. It was not Air Marshal Nur Khan who had raised units of Ground Combateers (GCs) in the PAF after the 1965 war as mentioned by the writer. Rather, it was the initiative of Air Vice-Marshal Sir Richard Atcherley, the second British Commander-in-Chief of the then Royal Pakistan Air Force (RPAF), who was in charge from 1949-1951. He actually raised the RPAF Regiment for ground defence of air bases and installations on the lines of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Regiment.
This comprised ground combateers (GCs) and their training commenced in Quetta in 1952 under the command of Squadron Leader Luster of the RAF. Incidentally, I myself was in the first batch of GC training. Moreover, I am also a trained commando and had volunteered for the SSG in 1960. I have also attended a number of training courses at SSG in early 1960s.
Mock exercises to test the effectiveness of GCs were carried by the PAF much before the 1965 war in which the SSG was employed to carry out mock attacks against the facilities. But valuable lessons were also learned by the SSG as well, when during these exercises, their surprise was taken away by the defenders every time due to non-tactical moves by the SSG while they were far away from their targets. The SSG personnel silently wanted to sneak in the facilities but were detected by the defenders and the SSG had to change their tactics and turned their silent infiltration in to breakthrough assault in sheer frustration. Had these mock exercises been held with live ammunition they all would have met the same fate as that of the terrorists who attacked the PAF Base Minhas (Kamra) met on August 16 this year. But since there was no fear of live ammunition the SSG used to rush in like a violent mob disregarding all rules of a mock exercise just to make them victorious.
Similarly, the writer has missed mentioning the botched operation by the SSG in September 1986, when Pan Am Flight 73 was hijacked by terrorists while it was refuelling at the Karachi airport. The commando unit was headed by Brigadier TM Shah and was tasked to rescue the hostages. But when SSG stormed the plane in a hurry without any solid planning, passengers suffered heavy casualties with 22 dead and more than 150 injured.
In Operation Silence, carried out by the SSG’s Zarrar Company, against a handful of terrorists hiding in Lal Masjid, the result was not commendable. The SSG had to raid a target inside their own country under the protective umbrella of hundreds of Rangers and police around Lal Masjid. Moreover, SSG has its own sources of intelligence gathering regarding their targets. They were not called suddenly to raid Lal Masjid without any reconnaissance and planning but yet blame was thrown on poor intelligence reports provided to them with sketchy information about the number of people held up inside the complex. This confusion and poor planning resulted in killing of the company commander Lt Col Haroon Aslam and 10 SSG personnel, while they were trying to make their way inside the mosque. Just imagine what would have happened if they had to launch a similar operation on a target inside enemy territory.
It is suggested that the SSG carry out mock exercises of raiding different types of targets with live ammunition used by both attackers and defenders so as to test their effectiveness. This should be done at least once a year and only then the real worth of the SSG will be known.
Sqn Ldr (retd) S Ausaf Husain
Published in The Express Tribune, November 19th, 2012.
