Regarding Dr Hoodbhoy’s article “What Pakistan needs to do in Afghanistan”, published in this newspaper on March 18, while it is hard to argue with the fact that strategic depth was a failed strategy, it is also important to understand the antecedents of that strategy, because without such an understanding any analysis, however well-meaning, is ultimately superficial.
Hoodbhoy is correct when he says that Afghan president Daud Khan prioritised the Pashtunistan issue in his dealing with Pakistan, leading to a pushback by the Pakistani government. However, it should also be noted that Daud did not create the Pashtunistan bogeyman, but was in fact only one of its most vocal proponents. Afghanistan was the only country to oppose Pakistan’s entry into the United Nations in 1947, using the argument that the newly created state was formed partly from Afghan-claimed territories. Two years later, the Afghan Loya Jirga declared that they did not recognise the Durand line and supported the Pashtun’s right of self-determination, effectively opening the way for subsequent territorial claims and cross-border infiltration. Tensions came to a head when King Zahir Shah made a famous anti-Pakistan speech in 1950, coupled with a renewed propaganda campaign in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Daud’s contribution to souring Pak-Afghan relations is considerable, as he is the person who in 1962 actually sent Afghan troops across the border in Pakistan, precipitating a crisis that led to his sacking by Zahir Shah. A decade later, Daud having removed Zahir Shah, instigated a proxy war in Pakistan. In response to Daud’s interference, Pakistan began to shelter and support the more Islamically-inclined Afghans. These included Ahmad Shah Massoud, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Burhannudin Rabbani. This then is the historical soup in which the bacterium that would eventually evolve into the policy of ‘strategic depth’ first germinated. It was a policy that initially aimed not so much at providing space against India, but at ensuring that any Afghan government would be, if not friendly, then at least not openly hostile. That an essentially pragmatic strategy later gave way to a militarist and evangelical fantasy is regrettable, but we need to realise that in this regional game, Pakistan has been as much sinned against as sinner.
One reason for Pakistan’s early support for the Taliban was that they promised to provide just such a ‘friendly’ regime, along with the stability necessary to realise the long-dreamed of Central Asian connection. The policy was thus not a purely military one, but also had an economic dimension. I personally disagree with the commonly held perception that Pakistan ‘created’ the Taliban, and instead feel that we simply took advantage of a historical opportunity to have an allied force in Afghanistan and then continued a policy of aid and support in the hopes of having a ‘friendly’ Afghanistan. This is verified by none other than Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, who claims that the movement predates General Naseerullah Babar. The policy delivered in part. A Taliban-controlled Afghanistan was friendlier to Pakistan than ever before, but the negative fallout was also considerable. The Taliban are not, and never were, puppets on a Pakistani string. Nor would a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan be in Pakistan’s interests.
Certainly, our approach to Afghanistan needs to focus more on ‘soft’ power but that cannot be our only focus, just as we cannot cling solely to the chimera of a military solution. If Pakistan were to act against the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network, regardless of stretched capacities and the inevitable backlash, there is no guarantee that other states will also abandon their designs and favoured proxies. Nor is there any guarantee that Afghan leaders will not themselves seek out such alliances in order to boost their own coffers and status. Even a basic understanding of how the world works tells us that we will never have such guarantees. To thus denude ourselves of such ‘assets’, however unpalatable we may find them, in the absence of a firm and verifiable commitment from the international community is naïve, and naivety cannot be a hallmark of either foreign policy or analysis.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 24th, 2012.
COMMENTS (15)
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Brilliantly put Mr. Khuhro! I wish all Pakistanis started thinking as realists!! Thank you for edifying us with this holistic and nuanced understanding of things. Lets us end a Manichean black and white world view!!
"If Pakistan were to act against the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani network, regardless of stretched capacities and the inevitable backlash, there is no guarantee that other states will also abandon their designs and favoured proxies" There is no guarantee for anything in life. Who plays in Afganistan and how should only be Afganistan's concerns, Why should u treat Afganistan as a play ground. Havent u reaped all the "benefits" for such a policy you have played in Afganistan in the past. You can try keeping away and see whether u can get a "Peace dividend". I am sure you will. "Nor is there any guarantee that Afghan leaders will not themselves seek out such alliances in order to boost their own coffers and status." The entire period of paksitan's alliance with US till now is an example of this mind set. I think this statement, if it concerns you, looks like poking into neighbour's house without being inviited. Not advisable
Great article as always gives you something to think about. I don't mind recaps about our history, since what is going in the name of history is an amended version and is not helping us formulate our future..personally I think we have always lacked "friendly Pakistan" components in and outside our country which is why we are in such a state -- we've been sold forever since we have always had a price....
Sir, brilliant. conclusion could have been more moderate but perhaps the truth is bitter and stranger than fiction sometimes.
I agree with writer that Pakistan has plenty of reasons to involved in Afghan's Internal matters but Pakistan strategic polices are contested with realpolitik's essential element of rationality. Although rationality is itself a contesting concept but in assessing capabilities, Pakistan strategists should focus on their country's internal problems both societal and economical. Main problem with Pakistan is that Its interest in Afghanistan always collided with sole superpowers and that fail Pakistan diplomatically in the world arena. Pakistan need more wise and brilliant mind to coup with problem. As long as we will rely on stupid Generals and hypertension defense analysts, we cannot protect Pakistan and cannot achieve the objectives of prosperity of people living in state,the ultimate objective of any defense and foreign policy.
But there is a difference between supporting proxies in another country, and indoctrinating your own civilians for proxy wars. US supported mujahideen during cold war, but didn’t indoctrinate American civilians in some extremist church. What we have done is beyond ridiculous. During past 3 decades, over 0.5 million Pakistanis became part of one jihadi group or another. Taliban presence on our soil has radicalized the society. Extremism is no solution to nationalism. The policy has failed; Taliban don’t accept the Durand line despite the extremist indoctrination.
The recap on history was helpful but the conclusion is somewhat disagreeable. I think a much better policy would have been improve the socio-economic conditions of people of KPK so that they could have integrated well with the rest of Pakistan and therefore, would have been less likely to support demands of separation from Pakistan (a route similar to what India is taking Kashmir). I agree that the idea that Taliban were exclusively controlled by Pakistan is overrated. However, to whatever capacity we have supported them has led to grievances in our neighboring country and that should remind us that a strategy built on insincerity might be the smartest strategy in the short run but the costliest strategy in the long run.
Absolutely brilliant article. People like Hoodbhoy and Kamran Shafi find it fashionable to keep tagging the tired old line of failed strategic depth while skillfully avoiding debate on why it was necessary in the first place. Your article is unique in identifying the true roots of this policy.
The first emotion-less piece in ET. Taliban are an Afghan force that won the peace/stability back then and are the only ones capable of providing stability in Afghanistan, which is what Pakistan needs in Afghanistan more than central asia access, trade, secure/recognized borders etc. The taliban, as has been pointed out by learned individuals, are a rural majority Afghan phenomenon against the kabuli elite and ethnic warlords who've swayed from communism to tribalism to warlordism and now to "democracy" and secularism - always out of touch with the people of Afghanistan. Not surprising that they are losing, again. They - the taliban - can't and won't be Pakistan's proxy. During their stay in power they never recognized the border and won't do so in the future when they get back to power. But Afghanistan's inability to recognize that Pakistani Pashtuns want nothing to do with Afghanistan politically is not really an issue for Pakistan, and never has been. It's for domestic consumption which they are entitled do. I'll disagree with the author and say that Afghanistan's transgressions (for which they are paying for it immensely) were never that great. Daud Khan himself realized the folly of his "pashtunistan" stunt, as it simply was never going to succeed, not because international law or Pakistan opposed it, but because the people concerned (Pak Pashtuns) aren't of the ethno-nationalist separatist mentality. As for what Pak needs to in Afghanistan, they should continue their support for refugees and students from Afghanistan while keeping contacts out to all players and recognize that the Taliban are the main force in Afghanistan. Interesting tidbit, the only ones in Afghanistan that recognize the sins of Afghanistan and the legitimate legal international border with Pakistan are the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras (ones opposed to the pashtunization of Afghanistani politics). But the Taliban aren't an entirely ethnic force, they include Uzbeks and Tajiks in their ranks.
Support of regressive, anti-democratic, fanatic elements as Taliban, will always be counter productive. Why can Pakistan not try to befriend the non-Taliban Afghans ? Do you have a answer ?
The writer assumes that readers are not conversant with history of the 80s well before the Taliban became the regressive force that they are today - when Zia launched his jihad in Afghanistan using hardcore Islam as a glue to bind Afghans, Pakistanis and thousands of foreign fighters from Arabia, Egypt, Sudan etc. Later, despite having once playing host to Massoud and Rabbani, why did Pakistan withdraw its support to these leaders, instead funding first maniacs like Hekmatyar and finally the Taliban? The fact is that Pakistan's insecurity drives its policy in Afghanistan (even today); and that it prefers an impoverished Afghanistan living in the dark ages (as under the 'popular Taliban') to one that is prosperous and independent of Pak influence. This is why (to refer to Dr Hoodbhoy's article) Pakistanis are unpopular in Afghanistan today, not because of Indian influence or niggling territorial disputes - areas that are not under the writ of either state.
The idea that Pakistan is as much sinned against as a sinner is a complete falsehood. On Dr Hoodbhoy's board I had recounted precisely the same history as the author here mentions, but leading to conclusions entirely different from the author's. That ET moderators did not publish that is their problem.
The 'doctrine of necessity' where Pakistan or some other people "HAD to do this or that" has been Pakistan's ruin, and there is little indication of any abatement in Pakistani fascination with it.