Rumours are that former president Pervez Musharraf is getting ready for a safe exit from the country. Many believe this to be a compromise and the PML-N leadership would earnestly avoid the dilemma of taking on the former dictator. The fact of the matter is that this may not be so critical a matter for the new government to start its career on a confrontational note with the armed forces. The establishment did send its message through the National Defence University (NDU) team, attending a meeting of the Senate Committee on Defence headed by Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, indicating their displeasure at how the former general was being treated in the media.

This is not Chile and Musharraf is no Augusto Pinochet. Ultimately, a lot of Pakistanis, especially in Punjab, which has the bulk of population, will not really sympathise with a derailment of the political process if it is seen as being caused by a civilian leader. Prior to elections, I had heard many a people invoke caution in voting for the PML-N, arguing that since Nawaz Sharif’s ascendency to power will most certainly result in a clash between him and the armed forces, it would be a better idea to not vote for him or contain his election victory. The majority would rather believe that the military has conceded space and we look like a healthy democracy even if it were a lie.

In Chile, on the other hand, there was large-scale support for trying Pinochet and punishing him for his brutality. His military was not professional and hence less adept at hiding its sins. Had it brutalised people selectively it would not have fallen out with the Chilean society at large. Selective brutality is relatively easier to hide and is under-reported through careful manipulation of the media. In any case, opening up the front right at the beginning would mean that the establishment might unleash the power of the media against the Sharif government.

Moreover, there are bigger battles to fight at the moment than Pervez Musharraf. The new prime minister has indicated his will to be the boss as laid down in the 1973 Constitution. This means that he will have to devise a strategic plan to negotiate with the military and find ways to curtail the institution’s power. Restoring some amount of institutionalism in the armed forces through appointing the senior most as the service chief will certainly be a healthy beginning. In the past, political leaders were too keen to play the game of the most loyal. Such a formula always proved risky.

A glance at the literature on civil-military relations (CMR), particularly some of the work by renowned political scientist and CMR expert Alfred Stepan, shows that power has to be negotiated gently with the military. The armed forces’ ability to control and exact violence makes them a critical member of the elite. They would never negotiate on their critical interests. For instance, the command and control of their organisation or any part of it (including an intelligence set-up) is non-negotiable, especially in a democracy in transition. That the prime minister is the ultimate boss is easier said than done particularly in an environment where civilians hardly have a capacity to challenge the military’s strength.

The fact that the army leadership has visited Mian Nawaz Sharif at his residence, or that the military is willing to give briefings to the parliament should be seen in context. The PML-N chief may not be the immediate beneficiary but he has to begin building civilian capacity to negotiate political space. This can only be done through rationalising and restructuring the Ministry of Defence to meet the standards envisioned in the original paper conceived during the early 1970s. The first secretary defence appointed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was not even a civilian bureaucrat but a gentleman from the private sector. Subsequently, civilian bureaucrats ran the ministry with the help of some military bureaucrats who were placed in certain positions to build understanding between civil and military. This situation persisted even during Ziaul Haq’s period. It was during the 1990s that serving or senior retired military officers were appointed as secretary defence. This must change and so should the appointment of senior military officers as additional secretaries. However, for such restructuring, the government would have to build the capacity of its civilian bureaucracy. Perhaps, even designate defence bureaucracy as a special service group in which officers are groomed for the work and their expertise built.

The various committees of the parliament on defence (also foreign affairs) would have to be re-energised. This includes the Cabinet Committee for Defence and the Defence Council. The parliament could also establish a think tank or a group of experts that could continuously provide input to the parliament and, hopefully, counter information and argument. It is critical for the parliament to access alternative source of information and perspective to build its capacity. The Senate Special Committee on Defence’s method of conducting tutorials for its members in a room filled mostly with students from military-controlled universities and passed off as public hearings must be replaced with a better method to educate and empower parliamentarians.

Mian Nawaz Sharif had also mentioned instituting a Kargil Commission and presenting the report by the Abbotabad Commission. He must certainly disclose the latter. The former he could use to negotiate on other policy areas like regional peace.

But most importantly, Mian Nawaz Sharif must remember that this time, there is little room for taking odd shortcuts for increasing his relative power. Of course, making extraordinary compromises or giving excessive sweeteners will not work. He ought to have a team with special ears and eyes to make the elephant dance.

Published in The Express Tribune, May 23^rd, 2013.

Two days after the general elections in Pakistan, I sat watching a debate between senior leaders of the PTI, the MQM and the PML-N regarding rigging in elections. The most amazing part of the conversation was the suggestion by the PTI leader that perhaps, intelligence agency wallahs were stuffing ballot boxes at a polling station from where a PML-N candidate won. The same leader also talked about an opinion piece suggesting that the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) was bribed to ensure a certain win. The other day, I heard a ‘so-called’ journalist talking in a television programme, of foreign countries like Turkey being involved in ensuring certain election results in Pakistan. Notwithstanding some genuine complaints of rigging, the conversation and suggestion reflected a desire to delegitimise the larger election process, which did not bring about results that a certain segment of the population desired. While it is necessary to sort out the urgent issues regarding glaring discrepancies in results and measures to strengthen the ECP, it is also necessary for the post-May 11 Pakistan to find closure. Instead of constantly delegitimising the process, it is necessary to accept the fact that a large part of Pakistan that voted differently from how certain people thought they would, also represents the country. Its opinion ought to be respected as well.

There is a great risk of a segment of the population that was enthralled by the idea of Naya Pakistan getting depoliticised out of frustration. Like others, I have also heard conversations in which the Naya Pakistan wallahs were going around cursing people’s decision, calling them stupid and even suggesting that participating in elections was an effort not worth their while. Some even went to the extent of calling people paindu (rural) and illiterate. Besides a lot of institution-building and strengthening that is required, Imran Khan must nurse the wounds of his supporters at the earliest and draw their attention towards the fact that it is a great achievement that the PTI has risen from being a party of one in parliament to over 30 members. Moreover, unfavourable results do not mean that we stop emotionally and physically investing in this country. People’s choices must be respected. This nursing of the wounds is part of the larger process of making efforts to bind the country together.

The other interesting trend pertains to the image of regionalisation of politics. To an outside observer, Pakistan does not feel tied together. The PML-N has emerged as a big force in Punjab, the PTI in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, the PPP relegated to rural Sindh, the MQM in urban Sindh and Baloch and Pashtun nationalists in Balochistan. A lot of people are hugely angry on the PPP’s lacklustre performance of the past five years. So, one could argue that it got what it deserved. Notwithstanding the errors made by its leadership and erosion of ideology from the party, the fact remains that we are observing the breakdown of what was once the only genuine national party. The federation needs to be connected, which it is not at the moment. The PPP’s weakening as a party within Sindh itself will have repercussions for sociopolitical development in the region and its connection with the federation. The crippling of the party, for which the leadership is to blame as well, has and will create spaces which will be dominated by pro-establishment parties or the nationalists. In both cases, it does not bode well for the province or the federation. It is necessary to appease the disgruntled youth in Sindh who may be tempted to fight against the state, especially in reaction to the use of force by it. The number of missing people and dead bodies is increasing in the province.

The above narrative means that party or parties have to move rapidly to shun their character of being regional entities and reach out to other regions. In the past five years, the PML-N leadership has shied from visiting other provinces. At least, this is a complaint one heard from urban and rural Sindh. The PML-N winning seats in the Balochistan Assembly is a good sign. It now needs to do more to expand in other parts. Shedding the image of a Punjab-based leadership and party is necessary. The development agenda also has to extend beyond a single province.

As part of the effort to strengthen the federation, the ruling party at the centre will also have to look more carefully to the needs of south Punjab, which seems to have given a huge mandate to the party. As a region known for both poverty and popularity of the PPP, some were surprised to see the PML-N sweep elections there. This happened due to a combination of factors, such as the party aligning with emerging power centres in the region, especially those representing new capital. In some cases, it also partnered with electables from amongst the Seraiki-speakers, who were already disgruntled due to the PPP not properly marketing the idea of a new province of south Punjab and Bahawalpur. An ordinary voter was left with pragmatism to support a party that might win and deliver. But the more important thing is that the people have honoured the PML-N by putting their confidence in it. The best way of consolidating such gains is to not ignore the need for a new province and offering a plan for better distribution of resources even within Punjab. The PML-N has done well in improving Lahore but now it also needs to distribute development to other parts of the country and the province itself.

While the list of things that the new government ought to do is endless, the need for strengthening the federation should be one of the primary goals. Accepting the legitimacy of the electioneering process and legitimising political and development agendas through meeting people’s needs will go a long way.

Published in The Express Tribune, May 16^th, 2013.

Lately, social media is abuzz with chatter about either the former president Pervez Musharraf or Zaid Hamid, both unsavoury characters. However, what is even more depressing is to see some television channels also engage in discussion with or about Zaid Hamid, a person who, at best, can be described as an anarchist. He may not claim links with an organisation like Hizbut Tahrir (HuT) but his ideology seems to be in line with it, since both support some amount of violence and chaos to bring about a change in Pakistan and implement a system of caliphate. Just about a couple of months ago, the Oxford University Pakistani Students Union had organised a conference on Pakistan which reportedly was managed by the HuT, in which the organisation, not yet banned in the UK, had discussed its vision of seeing Pakistan as the next caliphate.

But referring to Zaid Hamid’s publicity, a television programme got highly controversial and then taken off air because it involved the use of abusive language about the sitting army chief by Zaid Hamid’s former assistant Emaad Khalid. He was talking about the way Hamid tries to instigate young officers against the top army leadership even suggesting use of violence to remove those at the top. Given that the HuT had successfully managed to provoke an officer into assassinating Anwar Sadaat, this almost looks like their signature move. The same evening there was yet another programme that interviewed him.

Not that either of the anchors or producers of those programmes were interested in propagating his agenda; they were probably anxious to know more facts about the report circulated by Hamid’s former assistant about him getting money from various quarters, it got him more publicity than what he could have imagined. Watching and hearing about the man, one also wondered about the capacity of both the army and the ISI to make expensive mistakes. As if it was not enough that their own creation, Masood Azhar of Jaishe Muhammad was involved in an assassination attempt on a former army chief Pervez Musharraf in 2002, another character seems to have been built to either scare or attempt the killing of another army chief. The critical question is why are such vulnerabilities created?

Zaid Hamid, the man who now has an amount of traction amongst the youth and more, is a product of the establishment itself. Having done his engineering from NED, Karachi, he was attracted to jihad in Afghanistan where he went during the 1980s. He claims to have fought alongside Ahmed Shah Masood, which he presents as an argument that the jihad is above sectarian considerations. He seems to have dropped off the screen for a few years but then brought into ‘strategic circles’ under Musharraf’s government. Apparently, he was hired by the then Interior Minister General (retd) Moeenuddin Haider as an advisor in his ministry. He claims to have provided the ministry, as well as business groups, with intelligence. When I went to visit him a couple of years ago, his office was located at a stone’s throw from the main gate of Chaklala Cantonment. There were some cupboards in the office full of files that he claimed were security intelligence reports to assist commercial enterprises. It sounded like the US group Stratfor or Eurasia that claims to do the same.

The 1980s and 1990s context is self-explanatory as this was a period when people were recruited to fight the war in Afghanistan. Zaid Hamid’s case was of a young man motivated by religious zeal and anxious to contribute to jihad. But then, what do you do with such characters afterwards? Do you or do you not try to re-integrate them in society? But then, Hamid was one of the many characters who were treated as assets and kept hanging around for another critical job. His resurfacing towards the end of Musharraf’s years in power coincide with the urge of the military leadership to create another political alternative and narrative of an exciting middle class changing the face of the country. Here was a man extremely verbose and eloquent, addressing the youth and inciting them against the political society and political institutions.

The drive to promote Hamid didn’t end with Musharraf but it continued. There were many who would refer foreign visitors to Zaid Hamid as a security expert. This expertise and its propagation were used to detract people about Pakistan. Not that the political system does not require revamping but this was a case of the army staying a few steps ahead of the people and society and trying to bring change artificially. Having tested and tried partnership with traditional power centres, the military now probably wants to create a fresh breed of stakeholders, which it would then like to market as a ‘new Pakistan’. Those buying into this project completely forget that Pakistan has been through four distinct cycles of elite injection. The good or bad leadership that we see today is primarily a product of the 1980s and a lot of these people were middle class then. However, the middle class narrative, which is being used now, was missing during the 1980s.

The problem with this approach is twofold. First, until the structures remain the same or the manipulation of power from behind the scenes continues, the middle class narrative itself may not change Pakistan. There will certainly be new stakeholders or faces but not very different conditions. Second, the method is highly risky as it destabilises the country and its institutions and creates anarchy. Furthermore, it gives the impression that the army is no longer a professional whole but divided from inside. The army chief may be the most powerful man but there are other forces that can endanger his life or seriously challenge him through such non-state actors.

The main issue here is that if the army is so divided and manipulative then this is not a country that nuclear weapons could save.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 25^th, 2013.

Any general would smack his lips at what is stated as Pakistani youth’s almost mass approval of the army versus democratic institutions in the recently released British Council survey. Apparently, 32 per cent of the youth considered military rule better for the country as compared with 29 per cent supporting democracy. Skimming through the results, page by page, it becomes obvious that the study is less nuanced and suffers from absence of control questions considered necessary for teasing out opinion through the use of quantitative methodology. The study done by the Sustainable Policy Development Institute (SDPI) “The Political Barometer”, hence, is much better than this one.

But more important, the accompanied summary of the British Council survey fails to even pick on the nuances of its own research and mainly focuses on acceptance of sharia and military. For instance, while condemning democratic rule, 34 per cent of respondents considered the democratic system as comparatively better for providing access to water, gas electricity, education and heath care. However poor a democratic system, it is still the only one that caters for a larger redistribution of resources than military rule. As far as the seeming condemnation of democracy is concerned, this is not peculiar to Pakistan because Latin and South Americas have experienced similar situations where people seemed far more supportive of the military especially under democracy in transition, which is always beset with greater problems.

The report also failed to flag the significance of perception-building, especially through the extensive use of media, since 56 per cent admit to the influence of television channels and media (unlike the SDPI data, this one fails to consider people’s opinion about media itself). The electronic media, followed by print media, has played a major role in the past five years in building perception regarding various organs of the state. The political players get lambasted from morn until night adding to people’s anger and the media tends to exaggerate the shortcomings of the politicians vis-à-vis other players.

Similarly, the positive opinion reported in the British Council survey regarding the judiciary (51 per cent believe it has improved) is based on constructed perception rather than reality. The breaking news culture in this country is a “shock and awe” method of constructing opinion without analysing ground reality. Ordinary people hear about the suo-motu actions but fail to match these with actual and ultimate results in these cases. Ordinary folk are impressed by, for instance, action taken in Shahzeb Khan’s case in which the higher judiciary did not allow witnesses to retract. However, this is still no answer for improving the judicial system that makes it possible in hundreds of terrorist cases for criminals to escape conviction because no efforts were ever made for securing evidence. Are we even talking about a witness protection programme?

Meanwhile, the state seems to be collapsing at places, a term that people hate to use in this country. But what does one call a situation where police officers resort to extra-judicial killings and are then paraded around the place as heroes? Punjab, in particular, is known for this method, which, in itself, is travesty of justice. The state police is appointed and trained to apprehend criminals and bring them for fair trial. Police officers are discouraged by lack of capacity and corruption of the judicial system, and encouraged by political bosses, to resort to quick fix solutions like extra-judicial killings. This method, however, allows crime and criminals to expand and go deeper into society. Why would a criminal, for instance, surrender to the police or take an amnesty plan seriously if he fears being summarily murdered? An extra-judicial killing may look exciting in a film but it is technically plain murder. Moreover, with this method in place, where is the difference between the state police and the Taliban who also often kill people in the name of speedy justice. Why condemn the tribal areas when other parts of the country have also become tribalised?

Naturally, this method provides very short-term relief but it also makes society susceptible to violence — if random police officers can kill without trial, then why can’t individuals if they think they are delivering justice? The fact is that the overall policing system has collapsed to a great degree. Police officers tend to compete with one another in extra-judicial killings and then boast of having brought down crime in their areas by fudging and manipulating numbers. All it takes is for the police not to register an FIR for the crime figures to go down. Sadly, there is no mechanism for an objective and impartial assessment of the police that could go as feedback to the government. Extra-judicial violence also has the effect of scaring organised civil society that, in any case, comprises a lot of corrupt elements who then eulogise such action rather than condemning it. When you have posters and banners by civil society patting a police officer for such action, it is something to get worried about and not celebrate.

Pakistan definitely needs to restructure its internal security apparatus, especially the police. A professionally trained and disciplined force is necessary and it must not have some of the cowboys that we have today. However, a change in the policing system must go hand in hand with major restructuring of the judicial system. It is obviously attractive to play to the gallery but if the superior judiciary of this country wants to be remembered by posterity, it must take measures in streamlining and improving mechanisms for strengthening its capacity to provide justice. The present method of evidence collection and its interpretation by the court is vague. The exceptions made in the Shahzeb Khan or the Memogate cases need to be institutionalised.

The muck of the system is not just stuck with political society but is all over. Wonder who will volunteer to clean up?

Published in The Express Tribune, April 11^th, 2013.

The idea was to gather in a coffee shop in Islamabad and discuss ways civil society could help stop the killing of Hazaras, Shias and minorities in general. But we were taken by surprise by a serving ISI officer who got inadvertently invited through Twitter due to his claim of having deep interest in the Hazara issue. He may have come due to organisational concerns but he posed as an innocent bystander who came to protest out of personal interest on the issue. It could be that the agency may have no knowledge of his interest or of his Twitter ID (despite the fact that his face is recognisable on his Twitter account). That he didn’t hide his identity was proof of his honesty.

But then marketing techniques change. I was reminded of how street beggars have changed techniques over the years. While traditional street beggars would implore you for cash, newer ones ask you to buy them food and not necessarily give them cash. The more modern types come in the form of suited-booted men and women selling the story of having their bags stolen and if you could contribute money to help them get back home. It is all about winning confidence. No wonder the ISI directorates in most cities provide patronage to beggars’ networks as a source of intelligence and raising revenue.

The disclosure of identity and claiming that his agency did not know about his participation in Hazara demonstrations was to win confidence and then guide our entire conversation in one direction. But from experience, his claim is questionable as there are spooks watching spooks and it is not possible to have a Twitter ID of liberal pretence and go around all protests, be it for Rimsha Masih or Hazaras, with the agency not knowing anything. I was reminded of my once chance meeting with one DG (Analysis) ISI at a diplomatic reception. The gent didn’t encourage conversation, which I later found out was because of not wanting to blow up his chances of promotion as Lt General.

With a ‘trojan horse’ in our middle, it was not possible to have a sensible conversation. He tried to slip in his bright idea of stopping the Shia-Sunni conflict by reducing the gap between the military and intelligentsia. It is the new fixation with psy-ops and media as a tool of war. One wondered how many people does the agency want to buy? The ISI has tremendous access to all forms of journalists, columnists, academics, print and electronic media. As if tapping phone calls was not enough, the agency has eyes glued on social media as well. A well-informed friend once told me that spooks even watch the number of likes/retweets on your Facebook and Twitter comments and the nationalities of those that do so. Thus, if there are more Indians liking your comments, you are immediately seen as an enemy of the state. Such recipe stinks of low IQ and EQ as it reflects a lack of understanding of how the internet has made the world fairly transparent. To use this method to gauge someone’s nationalism is pathetic.

How does one even begin to take an agency that only uses people seriously? The spook, who was a colonel, was dismissive of the current caretaker chief minister of Balochistan accusing him of being part of a racket to destabalise the province. This is the same as rumours being spread about the ISI paying a couple of singers these days who have recently joined a political party. Even if it is for a good deed, the mere fact that such information is being disclosed is good enough to make such characters suspicious. Perhaps, a few years later, when these singers are in responsible positions as social and political icons and happen to defy the agency, another colonel will boast of knowing them “in and out” and how they were not reliable. Maligning sometimes helps in creating the perception of an agency’s neutrality. For instance, the spook discarded Jaish-e-Muhammad’s Masood Azhar as an Indian agent, despite the agency’s continued support to the jihadi leader. This is similar to the agency bad-mouthing a journalist of being a double agent after he was kidnapped, tortured and killed in May 2011.

Clearly, the intent of the colonel was to micro-manage debate on the critical issue of the murder of innocent citizens for the “sin” of being an ethnic and religious minority. He talked about the army not being on the same page as the ISI. This is in the same vein as spreading stories about inner disconnect within the organisation — since all directorates within the organisation operate independently, the officials of each reports to their respective director-generals but not to a single person at the top, which creates confusion. Or that “I as an individual have often supported liberal values but it is the top brass the needs to change”. Such impressions smack of a smart method to present the organisation on autopilot so one could never accuse it of anything. For example, it was a couple of days after Mumbai that the army and the ISI went to confess before foreign diplomats that there were a couple of junior officers who had links with the plan and not the organisation.

Not that the ISI and the army do not disagree or that everyone in the agency has knowledge of a central plan. Lt General (retd) Shahid Aziz confirmed that the ISI was out of the information loop during Kargil. Musharraf did not want to share information with an organisation headed by General (retd) Ziauddin Butt as he was close to Nawaz Sharif. A colonel may pretend to have extensive knowledge, which in reality is limited to what he is told. His knowledge of civilian life may also be limited because the gap between civil and military understanding of each other is fairly huge and real. We certainly need a meaningful civil-military dialogue and that certainly cannot happen with “iron curtains” — gagging conversation and spreading propaganda to malign people. Such an environment compromises rather than ensures security.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 4^th, 2013.

During a recent revisit to Lahore, my nephew shared with me the lament of the owner of the famous Pak Tea House, a place that was a hub of Lahore’s intellectual life for many years. He had cribbed about how the government did not let him sell the property. Surely, this is unfair because for him it is no longer ‘business as usual’. Times had changed. My nephew thought this was because the Tea House was now in a congested place and parking could be an issue. His remark reminded me of the good old days of the Pak Tea House that I used to visit with my mother during the 1970s and the 1980s. I realised that we were talking about the end of the Pak Tea House just like ‘the end of history’.

It is not possible to recreate the magic because the people, their attitudes and the circumstances in which literature used to happen then, as compared with how it takes place now, have changed. To begin with, the breed of writers is different now. Those that livened up the place once did not have a lot of material entrapments and so it was possible to take a lift with someone to the Mall or even take a rickshaw or taxi. Like a lot of other things in this country, the shift of attitude of the writers and intellectuals is also linked with General Ziaul Haq. As plots, cars and positions were distributed, it brought a gradual end to the darweshi of the fiction writer and the poet. The intellectual competition no longer remained that but had material dimensions as well.

When we talk of the Pak Tea House, it is about the intellectual depth of the city. This was a place where the intellectual left met the right and had decent but meaningful conversations. There were always three to four intellectual groups, which then slowly changed into mafias. But then, not everything can be blamed on Zia. There were other critical developments, such as the growing chasm between the native Urdu writer and the non-native, who over the years, produced better literature but was ignored for political reasons. This problem was more acute in Lahore as compared with Sindh because Punjab did reach out to accepting Urdu with greater excitement. However, if the judgment was made on the basis of ethnicity and not the quality of literature, then it surely got frustrating and confusing. Therefore, it is a combination of reasons that people in Lahore seem to be forgetting great names like Jamila Hashmi, Muneer Niazi, Majeed Amjad, Umme Ammara, Mukhtar Masood, Imtiaz Ali Taj, Hijab Imtiaz Ali and many others.

This is really the end of intellectual history for Lahore that no one amongst the present generation even knows of what a vibrant place the Urdu Bazaar used to be or the characters who oiled the intellectual machine. People like Mohammad Tufail of Naqoosh Press, who was not just a publisher but very deeply a part of the intellectual scene, often engaged writers in conversations and ideas. Also, the conversations that were left unfinished would happen elsewhere. There were smaller groups that competed but produced. The same time that the Pak Tea House was closed around the mid-1990s was also when intellectual life began to change and the groups that were earlier based on ideas turned into mafias. However, this was also a watershed moment for literature in Punjab, and especially Lahore, in that the language began to change. English slowly started to dominate and the literature festivals are a reminder of how this is actually the end of the Pak Tea House.

It was great to have a literature festival in Lahore. But it also made one wonder about its capacity to connect with plural traditions in terms of language, culture and historical legacy. For one, there was no discussion of Punjabi or Seraiki literatures — two languages that dominate Punjab. Furthermore, there is very rich fiction and poetry being produced in these languages that would enrich the crowds at any festival. But perhaps, the corporate world that seems to have now taken over literature and literary festivals is all about numbers and glitter.

The majority of attendees of the festival were people who had little idea of the richness of the city and its literary scene. Sadly, there was no effort made to connect with a lot of those who are part of the city’s intellectual legacy. A lot of writers, who have produced exciting fiction on exciting and deeply political issues, like the 1971 debacle, were not even invited to attend. Perhaps, this was because a lot of these names are not visible to the English-speaking world or have not been taken over by the corporate universe. Unfortunately, literature, art and culture have to now conform to the Coke Studio standard to remain relevant or attract attention. This is certainly a different age.

Once upon a time and not too long ago, Lahore’s literary life lived its ideas and literature. Habib Jalib was not just supposed to be sung at all odd hours by the strangest of people but imagined in real life. There was a deeper politics behind the words, which made Faiz or Manto much more real than the present-day presentation by the corporate world. Now, we tend to recite their poetry and read their fiction without understanding the spiritual and intellectual journey behind the words. Surely, all of this is partly natural and part of some change. However, it is a sad fact when intellectuals are brought down to the level of popular brands with little interest in the real spirit behind the ideas. No wonder, we are so fond of singing and reciting Faiz Ahmed Faiz’s “Hum dekhein gey” but fail to ever bring those words to life. More important, every society needs a handshake between ages. This is not about comparative wisdom but about learning and keeping the secret of ones’ culture intact. I wonder if we realise that the end of the Pak Tea House is not about closing down of a shop. It is symbolic of closing down of a window to a rich legacy of art and literature.

Published in The Express Tribune, March 7^th, 2013.

It is certainly a cruel statement to make but it seems that the killing of Hazara Shias and their subsequent protest has initiated a debate regarding sources of terrorism in the country. Although a popular argument is that the internal chaos and bloodletting are the work of outside powers, some questions are being raised about our own inefficiencies in dealing with extremist forces operating in the country. Two propositions are being forwarded. First, that the jihadis are indeed Zia’s children and of the generals that followed him. Second, that these jihadis may be the military’s creation but that it is now the political parties who have the dominant ownership.

To begin with the second line of thinking, a lot of fingers are being pointed at the Punjab government. There are reports of the party trying to work out an electoral deal with the political component of the SSP/LeJ for some seats in central and south Punjab. At this juncture, there seems little difference between the PML-N and the PTI as far as their support of militant groups is concerned. However, it is also important not to de-contextualise the entire debate.

The PML-N government was not always like this. It had contested the SSP/LeJ network during the 1990s, but with little support from the establishment. For instance, when Nawaz Sharif and his brother screamed their heads off about sectarian violence in Pakistan and Punjab, they were contradicted by the Foreign Office. The Sharif government of the 1990s also targeted the LeJ resulting in a botched terrorist attack on the then prime minister, Nawaz Sharif. The LeJ terrorist leader Riaz Basra also threatened them. This was a point when a combined intelligence and police operation could have helped but it didn’t happen. Moreover, the government was dismissed in 1999. There is certainly a possibility that the Sharifs got scared. More importantly, there was also the issue of being caught between the devil and the deep blue sea after they returned to Pakistan and power in 2008.

The Pakistan and Punjab of the 2000s was different in terms of its relationship with terror groups which were being neatly put to order, rearranged and regrouped. The number in Punjab fell from about 70 odd militant groups (small and large) in the 1990s to a few large ones. However, these were protected and had links with the agencies and continue to do so. The government in Punjab and the police were not authorised to question and challenge most of these groups. Police officers often complain of situations when they arrest terrorists who are later whisked away from police stations by other more powerful intelligence agencies. It was certainly not the PML-N that had allowed organisations like the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) to walk in and out of the Pakistan Air Force, whose officers were later involved in one of the assassination attempts on Pervez Musharraf. Interestingly, the JeM continues to be treated as a good friend and allowed to expand infrastructure. The logic for continued friendship is that the operation was conducted by splinter groups and not the mother organisation.

Moreover, at that point in time even the media was not too keen to hear about jihadis in Punjab. I remember in 2007-08 no one in the larger civil society was ready to hear about the problem in Punjab. In fact, when a New York Times journalist did a story about the problem, a local English daily went out of its way to counter the report and do several stories negating the presence of extremist elements in Punjab. In fact, Mushtaq Sukhera, the senior police officer, who has been dispatched to Quetta to fight LeJ, was then RPO Bahawalpur and vehemently denied a jihadi presence in south Punjab. He even claimed that the JeM madrassa on the main GT Road was ordered to stop any further construction. However, those orders, if there were any, were never carried out.

More than personal inefficiency, this was about the real powers continuing to support the JeM and other Deobandi and Ahle Hadith militant groups. It is indeed a fact that none of the main parties in power had any knowledge of Mumbai or any control or communication with the LeT or any of the other religious-militant groups. This was not their domain, especially not after the Mumbai attack.

The decade of the 2000s is also the period when a lot of the militant organisations were allowed to go underground, which meant spreading in society far and wide. They started building their social clout, which the intelligence agencies now believe can be capitalised in mainstreaming these organisations and thus taking them away from violence. It is definitely not any political government’s idea to bring the militants into politics as it goes against the logic of electoral politics. More parties mean more concessions and dividing the vote bank. Until now, supporters of all jihadi networks happily voted for one or the other party without burdening them with any consolidated demands. However, it is now that they are being made to think of forming their own political platform. Sadly, the mainstream political parties are happy to go along and do seat adjustment partly because of their inability to openly challenge Zia’s children. Such cowardice is not forgivable but it is essential to understand the context.

These jihadis will disappear the day their creators run out of uses for them. They were raised initially during the 1980s but integrated in the tactical planning, as indicated in one of the papers produced at GHQ, to play the role of additional division to fight India. Later, they were put to multiple uses. These will get costly with time especially if they are not needed after 2014. In any case, these are risky assets to maintain in a nuclear environment. Going by the splinter-group theory, what if they start an accidental war? Getting rid of them at this stage is not hugely difficult either. In Punjab and Sindh, where these are spreading rapidly, they could be removed through an intense intelligence and police operation. It is mainly the intent and planning that could get things going.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 28^th, 2013.

It seems that Balochistan is no one’s responsibility when it comes to dealing with crisis but everyone else’s responsibility when it is a matter of taking critical decisions. Thus, no one wants to deal with the law and order problem but the province’s natural resources are just another matter. Eventually, no one does anything meaningful for the province. One of the biggest examples of the above-cited attitude is the federal government’s signing of a deal with China to develop and run Gwadar port or the MoU signed with Iran for the gas pipeline through Balochistan. Both the projects are great and will hopefully bring some level of prosperity to the region. However, it is the manner in which both actions have been taken, which must be questioned; the federal government signed off control of the port without any major involvement of the provincial government.

Was it that the provincial government was too absorbed in dealing with the Hazara killings of last month and thus it could not attend to such an important matter? Or is it that the federal government thought it was in a better position to negotiate interests? Such behaviour is odd especially after the much-propagated Eighteenth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, under which major ports and shipping falls under the list of subjects that are shared responsibility of the federal and provincial governments. This means that the Balochistan government should have been included in the negotiations and part of the signing process. Surely, there are many who would draw attention towards the capacity issue. They would argue that a government that cannot protect its citizens, like the Hazaras, does not have the capacity, hence the right, to be part of the process. However, capacities don’t grow on trees and unless people are made to take responsibility, they will never learn. Pakistan’s 66-year history has also been that of crowding out of regions and institutions by the more powerful ones, so in the end things remain where they are because those who are supposed to do the work don’t know how to do it. In any case, there shouldn’t have been any fear of opposition from a fairly pliant provincial government. According to an expert, who works on devolution of power from the centre to the provinces, with a pliable government in Quetta, there was no likelihood of anyone raising any question, so why not include the province just for the sake of appearance. Indubitably, the provincial government’s capacity to protect its Hazara population should not be used to take away its right to decide the use of its resources.

Intriguingly, no federal institution is ready to take responsibility for securing law and order in the province for which everyone, including the highest courts, would like to blame the inept provincial government or the prime minister who does not really control various forms of the security establishment in the country, especially those operating in Balochistan. Raja Pervaiz Ashraf has a lot to answer for but he certainly does not control the various militant outfits like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) operating in the province. The LeJ operates in Karachi in its various forms — it is running wild in Balochistan and is expanding happily in Punjab and Sindh without anyone stopping such proliferation. Malik Ishaq, who is one of the leaders of the LeJ, sits happily in Punjab with full knowledge that nothing serious can happen against him except for being jailed under the MPO. He knows fully well that the only case in which he was caught was of the murder of an Iranian diplomat in Multan in 1997, and this case was closed by the Supreme Court in 2011. The SC not only released Ishaq but overturned his death sentence by the anti-terrorism court (ATC). Sadly, the case dragged on until the time that the ATC judge giving the sentence escaped the country and the LeJ walked around merrily shooting down each of the about a dozen eyewitnesses who had given evidence in the case, including a senior police officer from Gujranwala, Ashraf Marth.

Now, the security agencies happily hide behind the artificial classification of ‘controlled’ versus ‘uncontrolled’ LeJ. The narrative being popularised is that there is a good LeJ headed by Ishaq that sits in Punjab and is friendly to the Pakistani state versus the LeJ International (al-Alami) that is stationed in North Waziristan and attacks the state and its citizens. However, it is also very odd that the intelligence agencies and the security establishment has not done a thing in using Ishaq to negotiate with the bad LeJ as was done during the attack on the GHQ in 2009. Ishaq was flown in to buy time from the assailants to secure senior army officers stuck in the headquarters. The larger argument is that the good militants are used to negotiate with the bad militants. Intriguingly, this is the same formula suggested for Afghanistan in some of the papers written and supervised by the establishment types and sold to the public as consensus document.

Those buying into the ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ militant argument forget that the LeJ and other militants have always been and remain conduits of state actors. Pakistani scholar and former police officer Hassan Abbas’s book Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism (M E Sharpe, 2005) is essential reading to understanding some of the connections. The author lays out the connection between our prime intelligence agency, America’s CIA and the LeJ in the killing of an Iranian diplomat in 1997. There was a money trail from the US to the LeJ’s Riaz Basra responsible for the killing. Leafing through the book, one is forced to think if the same logic or relationship prevails now. The LeJ in Balochistan could happily take cover of the shared suspicion of Iran by Islamabad and Washington to kill the Hazaras that many in the Pakistan establishment consider as being close to Iran or (even trained by the neighbour). A similar suspicion of the above linkage in the 1980s had resulted in a Shia massacre in early 1988 in Gilgit-Baltistan, which was then suspected of becoming too autonomous of the state and going under Iranian influence.

Sadly, with no one taking responsibility of security and foreign policymaking, the Hazaras and Shias or other minorities may continue to be killed.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 21^st, 2013.

Now that in his State of the Union address on February 13, US President Barak Obama reiterated his intent to pull back the bulk of American troops stationed in Afghanistan, the question arises that will the region naturally head towards peace and quite? Moreover, will the exit be a harbinger of the end of extremism in Pakistan as the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) would like us to believe? The underlying assumption is that extremism and terrorism landed in Pakistan with the US moving into Afghanistan. Such opinion does not consider all the pre-9/11 violence in the country that mostly took the form of, what is popularly termed sectarian violence. At one level, terms like sectarian violence or genocide are problematic as they cast this dimension of terrorism in the light of inter-communal rivalry. The state’s law and order functionaries usually tend to hide behind this and take an act of violence relatively lightly as, for them, it is nothing more serious than an expression of a historic anger of one community against the other.

But referring to the US and Isaf 2014 pull-out from Afghanistan, it is bound to create tensions for Pakistan at many levels. First, peace within Pakistan will largely depend on the kind of solution which has been worked out in relation to it. Given that Pakistani forces have been involved in training Afghan troops, we now know that there is some understanding regarding Islamabad’s share in Kabul’s larger future power structure. However, the second important question is that will the Pakistan Army be satisfied with the power arrangement as it will not be the only ‘kid on the block’ after the US pull-out? Third, will GHQ continue to maintain a certain level of ‘strategic assets’ or abandon them as part of some peace deal?

It is foolhardy to imagine that the TTP is the only form of militant-extremism in the country. In fact, there are three kinds of elements operating inside the country: (a) friendly Ahle Hadith militants like the Lashkar-e-Taiba(LeT)/ Jamaatud Dawa (JuD) network, (b) mildly-uncontrolled Deobandi militants like the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and (c) friendly-and-controlled Deobandi outfits like the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and the Lal Masjid gang. These forces are critical as they operate at the level of being a social and political force as well. If Tahirul Qadri could land in Islamabad with about 40,000-odd people from his Minhaj network, these various outfits can produce an even greater force. Furthermore, it is difficult to calculate the damage done by the presence of these forces as their existence in a geographical area is not necessarily commensurate with the levels of violence in that area. In fact, one of the key features of the friendly and better-controlled outfits is that they tend not to generate violence in their areas of operation so as not to attract attention. For instance, a comparison between the peace and quite in Bahawalpur versus the mild violence in Rahim Yar Khan is a case in point. While a better-organised JeM ensures silence in Bahawalpur, the relatively loosely controlled SSP/LeJ network cannot hide its traces due to the proliferation of Shia-Sunni conflict in the latter district.

The absence or presence of conflict, however, is not a commentary on the level of extremism in an area. These various outfits have ensured their continued presence due to the state’s dependence on them to fulfil its national security goals. To a military mind, this is indeed the cheapest form of available force that can fight with maximum commitment. But this also means that these various outfits continue to procure manpower from within the country for which they need to maintain a certain level of extremism in society. The LeT/JuD network’s extensive wall-chalking throughout the country, especially Punjab, which calls for jihad, or JeM’s extensive discourse development on religious war is an extensive intellectual investment with string bearings on segments of society where these outfits operate.

These various above-cited networks have sufficient space to operate as there is no counter-narrative to challenge their existence. A local historian from South Punjab shook me up by his statement that the Barelvi school of thought as a counter-narrative was almost dead. This was to highlight the bitter fact that neither Barelvi scholars nor Sufi institutions had expanded in terms of a counter thought process. While the shrines are there and continue to attract people, there is an extensive decay in the moral fiber of the Sufi orders that control the shrines. Some khanqahs have become a method of extortion rather than a source of spirituality. Although there is a difference between the Sufi and Barelvi schools of thought, the two institutions were loosely connected, hence, the weakening of one has impacted the other. Recently, talking to one of the heirs of one of the big Barelvi scholars, Ghulam Mohammad Ghotwi, I realised that the greatest threat to Sufi Islam was not just from the rabid mullahs but from the pirs and sajjada nasheens themselves. Moreover, post-1980s, with the state backing extremist and militant forms of religion, the pirs have also lost their value as prime negotiators between the poor and helpless mureeds and the state. Thus, the mureed today is uncomfortable with a pir who, besides his blessings cannot deliver in terms of intervention with functionaries of the state like the patwari, the tehsildar, the local thana, or even a minister.

Could the state then have used Tahirul Qadri and his 600-page fatwa against terrorism and suicide bombing to establish the basis of a counter-narrative? Qadri’s fatwa has intellectual issues but has the energy and meat to develop a strong argument against lawlessness and violence sold in the form of religious diktat. But Qadri denotes a wasted resource and, perhaps, indicates the state’s unwillingness to disengage with violence and extremism. This is because the Barelvi cleric was launched as a political force to destabilise the current leadership rather than a means of encouraging peace in society. Therefore, some of the key political parties have no reason to look away from their active engagement with Deobandi extremist organisations, including their plan for seat adjustment in Punjab for the coming elections.

In the absence of an alternative narrative on national security, politics or religion, extremism unfortunately will continue to have a vibrant future. Violence is a tap that the extremist networks will open and close at their behest.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 14^th, 2013.

During my recent visit to India it was interesting to watch Rahul Gandhi, heir to the Congress party, being launched. Listening to his speech one couldn’t resist thinking about similar trajectories of politics of the two South Asian neighbours — both struggling to get defined or redefined. On both sides, the core battle seems to be between old, traditional and exhausted political parties that are still ideologically more liberal, versus new ones that seem more efficient and socio-economically more promising yet right wing. At least, Gandhi’s speech reflected his realisation that hanging on to the old norms of politics and traditional patronage structures would not help. The speech stated what ought to be the vision of a young leader of an experienced political party calling for a normative change that created a stronger leadership cadre rather than a heavily centralised leadership.

Naturally, one was tempted to compare Rahul Gandhi’s debut speech with Bilawal Bhutto’s, which echoed a traditional and exhausted leadership style. Some Indian friends were quick to remind me of the difference in age between the two — while Bilawal is in his 20s Gandhi is in his mid-40s — suggesting that the former may improve with time.

An Indian friend was of the view that it was possible that India’s political trajectory may not change in 2014 and would wait another four to five years before transformation took place. Such an assessment was based on an assumption that the restless and argumentative young Indian might still be too lazy to come out and vote in the next elections. Similar are the concerns in Pakistan and so, when people say that millions support new parties or leaders, one is not sure what kind of victory it will translate into.

Whether new parties will succeed in the coming elections or the one after is not the real issue. The key factor is that both states are experiencing a demographic shift which means increase in the number of young people who may not be satisfied with the traditional method of politics or be willing to remain part of traditional patronage structures. If old parties have to survive then they have to play a different music for a more restless audience.

The recent opinion polls by US-funded think tank IRI (International Republican Institute) in Pakistan showed an increase in PML-N’s popularity even in Sindh where the PPP is believed to be the only or the key choice of the general public. Although the opinion polls indicate a dramatic reduction in the PPP’s popularity, Bhutto’s party still has some future in Sindh. This fact alone shouldn’t result in complacency because the overall situation for the party is not very exciting. Since its inception at the end of the 1960s when it dominated Punjab, it has been reduced mainly to rural Punjab and Sindh. Besides losing its urban base, the party has also begun to behave like a network, especially in the two provinces, Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, where party politics has practically been outsourced to political warlords like Manzoor Wattoo in Punjab or Anwar Saifullah in K-P. Over the past three to four decades the PPP has even been limited to pockets in urban Sindh.

Here, I am not analysing how this descent came about but just drawing a picture of the challenges faced by a party usually viewed as the only true national party to have emerged after 1947. It may or may not get swept out in the coming elections. In fact, it will still be around in the 2013 elections. However, this conclusion would not suffice for the party leadership that will find it difficult to attract a new breed of jiyalas who would be committed to an ideology. The jiyalas of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto days were men and women who were attracted to the party due to its promise of better distribution of resources and egalitarian politics. The older generation of party faithful remains and is still hooked on to what the PPP offered ideologically despite that its leadership turned towards becoming centrist or even right of centre. This generation of jiyalas is not multiplying. Of course, there are others including the more educated and urban jiyalas some of whom believe in the party’s traditional ideology but there is an increasing number that is there to make some political and economic gains. This means that they are not necessarily inclined to make the party’s top leadership think of the numerous challenges that it faces, the greatest being becoming a party of the past rather than the future.

In its bid to survive the establishment’s onslaught the party has become very centralised over the past few decades. This does not bode too well as a survival tactic since it requires not one single young man at the top but several of them who can engage with a restless, ambitious and apolitical youth that demands better governance and have little reverence for old politicians or their networks. For a political party that has weakened ideologically faces massive opposition from the establishment and is deficient in leadership in terms of quantity, it would certainly take more than just cash subsidies for the poor.

Bilawal is certainly youthful and a good learner. But more than presentation, he and his minders must focus on the content which ought to reflect sensitivity towards ordinary folk whose everyday life gets severely affected by commodity prices and lack of resources. It is easy for these people to get tempted towards other institutions if the ones that are supposed to deliver do not do so. As is obvious from the politics of rural Sindh, the ordinary folk are more willing to follow extremist and right-wing forces because they may be the only ones that seem to have the gun-power to challenge the traditional power structures. These extremist forces that are the neo-feudal of the area have even attracted partners from other political parties including the PPP. This undermines young Bilawal’s idea of fighting extremism and terrorism.

A real debut speech requires a vision of governance and the ability to move away from the past to the future.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 31^st, 2013.