Taliban’s double game

Pakistan is once again being pulled into a deadly vortex of terrorism. Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, the country’s two most volatile provinces, are bearing the brunt, with attacks striking with alarming frequency and lethality.

The violence, however, has two dimensions. In K-P, it is driven largely by religious obscurantism; in Balochistan, it is rooted in secular separatism. Different ideologies, different agendas — but increasingly converging on the same battlefield.

An increasingly unholy alliance has taken shape between the two: terrorists separated by ideology but united by a common enemy. And, according to Pakistani officials, both have found safe havens across the porous frontier, under the watch of — and in connivance with — the de facto Taliban rulers in Kabul.

Long before the Taliban recaptured power, Afghanistan had served as a staging ground for terrorist attacks inside Pakistan. Islamabad accused the then Afghan intelligence agency, NDS, of colluding with India’s RAW to facilitate TTP’s terror campaign.

The Taliban’s return was thus seen in Islamabad as a potential security reset, with hopes that the new regime would dismantle terrorist networks and address Pakistan’s long-standing concerns.

A reset that never came

With those expectations, Islamabad invested heavily in keeping the Taliban regime afloat and engaged. It lobbied for international economic support, facilitated humanitarian assistance and kept political and diplomatic channels open — from religious scholars and tribal elders to ministers, intelligence officials and special representatives. Intelligence and evidence on terrorist camps on Afghan soil were shared with the Taliban, urging action.

The Taliban’s response, however, remained ambiguous, shifting between offers to mediate between Pakistan and TTP and outright denials that the group operated from Afghan soil.

“Their denial is a way to dodge responsibility,” says Hassan Khan, a senior commentator on Afghanistan. “Acknowledging TTP’s presence on Afghan soil would force the Taliban to act against a group deeply entrenched in their own ranks, particularly among second- and third-tier commanders,” he adds. “Fearing that such action could turn their own fighters against them, they deny TTP’s presence altogether.”

Publicly, the Taliban may deny TTP’s presence. But in private talks with Pakistan — both bilateral and multilateral, involving mediators such as Qatar, Türkiye and China — they have acknowledged the group’s presence and expressed willingness to act, only to keep delaying. The repeated delays have deepened Islamabad’s trust deficit.

The Taliban’s equivocation boils down to two possibilities: inability or unwillingness to dismantle the militant ecosystem thriving on Afghan soil. Pakistani officials, citing intelligence and evidence, argue it is the latter.

“If the Taliban supreme leader issues a single fatwa (religious decree), orders the TTP to leave or stop attacking Pakistan, and directs Afghan intelligence to cut off its support, the problem can be brought to an end,” says security analyst Maj Gen (retd) Raza Muhammad, suggesting the Taliban leadership lacks the will to act against the anti-Pakistan group.

The cost of cross-border threat

Terrorism in Pakistan has surged since the Taliban’s return to power. Pakistan ranked ninth on the Global Terrorism Index in 2021, the year Kabul fell. It climbed to seventh in 2022, fourth in 2023, second in 2024 and first in 2025. The human toll continued to mount. A Pakistani tally attributes 1,327 deaths and 2,484 injuries so far in 2026 to terrorism emanating from Afghan soil.

“Pakistan has unequivocal, undeniable evidence, including videos, audio recordings and media reports, that Afghanistan is serving as a sanctuary for terrorists, with India helping finance groups responsible for deadly attacks inside Pakistan,” says Gen Raza.

But more troubling than the grim figures is the alleged presence of Afghan nationals in terrorist ranks involved in attacks inside Pakistan. Intelligence suggests Afghans make up around 70% of infiltrating fighters. More than 260 Afghan nationals killed in Pakistan in 2026 have reportedly been identified through names, addresses and family details.

These figures, however, are only part of the picture. They don’t include the terrorists whose identities remain unverified, bodies that could not be conclusively identified, and Afghan nationals still embedded in active terrorist formations.

Some cases cited by Pakistani officials are particularly sensitive. In January 2025, Badruddin Yousaf, son of Maulvi Ghulam Muhammad Muhammadi, deputy governor of the Afghan province of Badghis, was killed in a security operation in Dera Ismail Khan’s Kulachi area and later buried in Badghis.

In February 2026, Ahmad, alias Qari Abdullah or Abuzar, a former Afghan Taliban special forces member, carried out a suicide attack on a security checkpoint in Bajaur. In May, Baitullah and Jalaluddin, identified as former Taliban members, took part in twin suicide bombings at a security forces camp in the same district. This shows recruitment into terrorist tashkeels (formations) is not confined to ordinary Afghan citizens but can extend into families connected to the Taliban regime.

“It goes beyond turning a blind eye [to TTP]. The Taliban are actively backing TTP with funding and ammunition, while recruitment drives targeting Afghan nationals continue in several provinces. Recruits are then sent across the border, adding to the threat facing Pakistan’s security forces,” says Khurram Abbas, a strategic analyst of international security.

Bound by ideology, united by war

This raises a question: why is the Taliban regime willing to jeopardise its key relationship with Pakistan to protect a terrorist group? Analysts point to several reasons.

“The Afghan Taliban and TTP share deep ideological ties and a history of fighting alongside each other — bonds that make it difficult for the Taliban to turn against their former comrades and help explain their continued support for TTP,” says Mansoor Ali Khan, a former ambassador to Afghanistan.

Hassan, meanwhile, believes that TTP is deeply embedded within the Taliban’s ranks, particularly among second- and third-tier commanders who feel indebted to the group for its support during the 20-year war against US-led forces.

“The two share ideological roots, religious beliefs and a common view of ‘jihad’. TTP also recognises Taliban supreme leader Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada as its Ameer,” he says.

“Beyond tribal ties, their social and religious networks are closely intertwined. Once seen as two sides of the same coin, the groups have become so intermeshed that distinguishing their fighters can be increasingly difficult.”

The fear of backlash

Beyond ideological affinity and battlefield camaraderie, some analysts argue the Taliban fear that moving against TTP could alienate their own ranks, trigger internal dissent and ultimately threaten their grip on power in Kabul.

“The Taliban face a strategic dilemma: confronting TTP could provoke a backlash from a group that has grown into a formidable force. Some within the Taliban leadership may fear that curbing TTP’s anti-Pakistan activities could trigger a blowback they would struggle to contain,” says security analyst Manzar Zaidi.

Abbas adds that the Taliban may be wary of pushing TTP too hard, fearing that the group could align itself with Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP), a rival extremist group hostile to the Afghan Taliban.

A militant ecosystem

However, TTP is not the only threat. Afghanistan has become a hub for transnational militant groups from across the region, including the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), IS-KP, East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and al Qaeda, which operate in a permissive environment under Taliban rule.

Gen Raza believes the Taliban regime relies on these groups to sustain its grip on power. “Afghanistan has become a sanctuary not just for TTP, but also for BLA, BRA, Majeed Brigade and other terrorist groups. These outfits serve as the Taliban’s muscle, helping it stay in power and extend its reach,” he says.

UN’s damning assessment

These are not just Pakistan’s claims or disputed intelligence figures. UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reports — the 35th, 36th, 37th and 38th — have also painted a similar concerning picture of a deepening terrorist threat from Afghanistan, with TTP gaining operational freedom and al Qaeda and IS-KP maintaining a presence.

One assessment identified more than 20 groups and up to 13,000 foreign fighters on Afghan soil, including around 6,000 TTP members, 2,000-3,000 IS-KP fighters and 400-1,500 al Qaeda members. The warning, then, is not coming from Islamabad alone.

“TTP’s presence in Afghanistan is now a universally acknowledged fact. UN, US, Chinese and regional assessments have raised similar concerns,” says Hassan.

“The latest UN monitoring report also points to coordination between TTP, al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, with al Qaeda providing training, logistics and funding, while the Taliban offer an umbrella of protection,” he adds. “It further reports assistance in facilitating TTP infiltration into Pakistan. The picture is clear: a terrorist network with sanctuary, support and the operational capacity to strike across the border.”

The foreign ministry of Russia, the only country that has recognised the Taliban government, also estimated in February 2026 that between 20,000 and 23,000 terrorists were operating inside Afghanistan, more than half of them foreign nationals.

The significance of these assessments for Islamabad is that they challenge the Taliban’s repeated denials that Afghan territory is being used as a base for terrorism.

UK Special Envoy for Afghanistan Richard Lindsay warned in June 2026 that TTP benefited from training camps, weapons, financing and safe havens inside Afghanistan. EU Special Envoy for Afghanistan Gilles Bertrand also referred to terrorist safe havens, training camps, weapons networks and financing structures inside Afghanistan.

Diplomacy runs out of road

Despite the Taliban’s denials, Pakistan continued to pursue diplomacy, expecting the de facto rulers in Kabul to address its concerns. From an eight-member Ulema delegation to Kabul in July 2022 to ministerial missions, tribal jirgas, clerics’ delegations and security-level talks, Islamabad repeatedly urged the regime to rein in TTP.

By the end of 2025, Pakistan says it had held multiple high-level visits and meetings, alongside 225 border flag meetings, 836 protest notes and 13 formal demarches. It also shared information on more than five dozen alleged TTP and BLA camps, staging areas and logistical facilities inside Afghanistan. The demands were simple and consistent: dismantle the TTP infrastructure, stop cross-border infiltration and provide verifiable proof of action.

“Pakistan has exhausted diplomatic avenues — from domestic engagement to bilateral, trilateral and multilateral forums. Yet, the Afghan Taliban have refused to provide verifiable ground-level cooperation against TTP, leaving diplomacy struggling to deliver results,” says Abbas.

From dialogue to deterrence

After years of diplomacy and failed talks in Doha, Istanbul and Urumqi, Pakistan resorted to “limited surgical strikes” against terrorist infrastructure in Afghanistan, taking precautions to minimise civilian harm. Analysts say Pakistan’s response was calibrated and legitimate.

“When a country is attacked and suffers casualties, it has the right to respond. Pakistan’s surgical strikes are defensive, not offensive. We did not initiate the strikes. We want peace, which is why our strikes are limited. But our response is legitimate,” says Gen Raza.

The Afghan Taliban condemned the strikes as “violation of sovereignty and international law,” and escalated by targeting Pakistani border posts, launching drones and hurling threats.

“Recent threats by Afghan Taliban leaders to attack Pakistan reinforce the concern that TTP is being used as strategic leverage. By keeping TTP in its orbit, Kabul believes it can exert pressure on Pakistan’s security, foreign and Afghanistan policies,” says Abbas.

Promises broken, trust eroded

The Taliban’s noncommittal attitude has eroded their credibility. They reneged on their previous commitments under the 2020 Doha Agreement that they would not allow Afghan soil to be used by terrorist groups. Instead, the regime released thousands of TTP prisoners who have since returned to the battlefield.

The 2022 killing of al Qaeda chief Ayman al Zawahiri in a Kabul safe house further undermined Taliban assurances. During subsequent Qatar- and Türkiye-mediated talks, Islamabad sought written guarantees and independent verification of action against TTP. Kabul’s de facto rulers resisted, offering only verbal assurances instead.

“If they failed to honour the Doha Agreement, why should Pakistan trust their verbal assurances? TTP operates from Afghan soil, recruits locally and collects donations in villages and cities in the name of ‘jihad’ against Pakistan,” says Hassan.

The perils of regime change

What, then, is the way out if the Taliban refuse to change course? Options being debated range from renewed diplomatic pressure to backing anti-Taliban resistance or a wider political upheaval in Kabul. Hassan sees support for resistance forces as a last resort, but Ambassador Mansoor says Pakistan has no consensus for involvement in Afghanistan’s internal conflict or externally driven regime change.

Gen Raza agrees with Mansoor. “I don’t think regime change is a wise option. The US experiences in Iraq, Libya, Syria and elsewhere show how risky such interventions can be,” he says. “No matter how powerful a country may be, attempting to change another regime can have serious and unpredictable consequences.”

The question now is whether diplomacy can still deliver an enforceable security arrangement. Ambassador Mansoor remains optimistic despite waning trust between the two neighbours and their peoples. “Diplomacy has not failed. Pakistan still has considerable leverage to put relations back on track,” he says.

India’s Afghan card

Analysts warn that the Afghan Taliban could use closer ties with India as leverage against Pakistan, potentially gaining access to drones and surveillance technology. They also see a possible two-front pressure strategy, with Delhi holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance and Afghanistan adding to Pakistan’s security and water-related concerns.

Ambassador Mansoor doubts Delhi can pull Kabul away from Islamabad. “Pakistan-Afghanistan ties are organic, while Kabul’s relationship with India is situational. India has long sought to exploit Afghan territory against Pakistan. If we deny it that space, its ability to undermine Pakistan will diminish,” he adds. “Pakistan, moreover, has far greater leverage in Afghanistan than India or any other country.”

From strikes to safeguards

Analysts say Pakistan’s security concerns are genuine, while the Taliban’s equivocation has deepened Islamabad’s frustration. They stress that Islamabad’s dispute is with the Taliban leadership, not the Afghan people, who have suffered from decades of war and economic hardship. Pakistan has historically offered Afghans refuge, humanitarian aid, healthcare, education and access to trade.

That said, Islamabad no longer appears willing to rely on verbal assurances alone. Its surgical strikes signal a strategic shift towards deterrence through limited force. “Pakistan is essentially pursuing a maximum-pressure campaign — what international relations theory calls deterrence by punishment. And I think it is working very well,” says Abbas.

Ambassador Mansoor, however, argues that kinetic force alone cannot resolve the conflict. “The better option, in my opinion, is dialogue and diplomacy,” he says, proposing a regional economic integration process linking Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia rather than mediation focused solely on bilateral disputes.

Abbas argues that security must come before economic integration, warning that Pakistan cannot afford to keep bleeding while waiting for regional cooperation to take shape. “The starting point must be the handover of TTP leaders living in Kabul. A joint oversight committee involving the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan, China and other regional countries should then independently verify Kabul’s claims of action against TTP.”

Pakistan’s challenge is to turn kinetic action into a verifiable security arrangement without becoming entangled in Afghanistan’s internal conflicts. Surgical strikes may raise the cost of Taliban inaction, but deterrence alone cannot dismantle the terrorist ecosystem or restore trust. Nor can economic integration succeed while cross-border terrorism remains unresolved.

The way forward lies in combining sustained diplomatic engagement with clear benchmarks: dismantling terrorist safe havens, disrupting recruitment and financing, and preventing infiltration. And, according to experts, a joint regional oversight mechanism could help verify compliance.

Ultimately, they say, Kabul must act as a responsible state rather than a militia, abandon equivocation, stop treating terrorist groups as strategic assets, and demonstrate through concrete action, not verbal assurances, that it will no longer allow Afghan territory to be used to threaten Afghanistan’s neighbours. Otherwise, the regime risks prolonged international isolation, further complicating its quest for international recognition.