Five years of Taliban rule

Five years ago, the Taliban triumphantly marched into Kabul as the Ashraf Ghani government crumbled with dizzying speed. The Afghan National Army and police virtually vanished into thin air. The capital city descended into chaos after US troops completed their hurried withdrawal and foreign diplomats fled. At the airport, thousands of terrified Afghans surged through the gates and onto the tarmac, desperate to escape the Taliban’s return to power.

The haunting images of those final days have been etched into history. The last US serviceman boarding a military aircraft under the cover of darkness, captured on a night-vision camera, evoked another American retreat half a century earlier: the fall of Saigon. But nothing embodied the desperation of those final hours more vividly than a viral video clip of a US military transport plane roaring down the Kabul runway as frantic Afghans clung to its exterior and landing gear in a final, doomed bid for freedom.

After the longest and costliest war in American history, the United States handed Afghanistan back to the very Taliban it had ousted from power 20 years ago. The Taliban not only reclaimed power but also seized weapons worth billions of dollars left behind by the US military. The same weapons would later become available to transnational militant groups using Afghan territory as a launchpad to destabilise neighbouring countries.

A photograph of euphoric Taliban commanders ensconced in the presidential palace, flanked by gun-toting fighters, came to symbolise the group’s stunning battlefield triumph. For the Taliban, it was a historic victory. For Afghans, however, it marked the beginning of yet another uncertain chapter in the fraught history of their country.

Five years after victory

Since seizing control, the Taliban have consolidated their hold over Afghanistan, but the victory parade has given way to a far more difficult reckoning. Questions over security, a battered economy, women’s rights, a suffocated press and increasingly fraught ties with neighbouring countries haunt their rule. There was once hope that “Taliban 2.0” would be different: chastened by the failures of their first, hermetic stint in power. That hope, however, has proved illusory.

“The greatest threat to the Taliban regime comes from within: economic hardship and its restrictions on human rights, particularly women’s education and employment,” says Afghan affairs expert Imtiaz Gul. However, he believes frustration with the Taliban’s rigid governance has yet to reach a tipping point.

Maj Gen (retd) Inam Ul Haq agrees but warns that the Taliban’s grip on power could unravel quickly if the regime doesn’t change course. “On the surface, Taliban rule may appear solid under Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, but if Afghan history is any guide, undercurrents tend to surface unexpectedly and sweep everything along with them,” says Inam, who has written extensively on Afghanistan.

One major achievement the Taliban can claim is ending the nationwide war. They drove out US and NATO forces and humbled once-powerful warlords. With the likes of Ismail Khan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar either captured, weakened or gone, the Taliban faced no apparent formidable security challenge. And this sense of dominance has made them increasingly bold — and increasingly uncompromising.

The first cracks

That dominance, however, has also exposed the consequences of the Taliban’s approach to governance. While the de facto rulers have restored a semblance of security, their medieval approach to governance, inept handling of the economy, intolerance of political opposition and dissent, strict interpretation of shariah, and revival of public corporal punishments fuelled resentment, particularly among non-Pashtun ethnic groups. The spectre of civil war has returned. And the first embers are glowing in the northern Afghan province of Badakhshan.

Juma Khan Fateh, a non-Pashtun dissident Taliban commander, openly called for revolt against the regime. With people increasingly fed up with the regime, his call gained considerable traction. Fighting was reported in the districts of Darwaz, Nesi, Zebak and Yaftal-e Sufla. The Taliban mayor was recently killed, days after the provincial information and culture director was also gunned down.

Reports claim Fateh surrendered to the regime last week. However, analysts view the episode as a manifestation of growing tensions between local Badakhshani Taliban and non-local regime officials. “The majority of Taliban members are Pashtun, while other ethnic groups remain represented only in small numbers. Real decision-making power is concentrated in the hands of a very few, reflecting a highly centralised system,” says US-based Afghan rights activist Bahram Nooristani. “This concentration of power in the hands of one ethnic group is fuelling growing resentment.”

Meanwhile, other non-jihadi groups — including National Resistance Front (NRF), Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), Homeland Guardians Front (HGF), Afghanistan United Front (AUF), Green Trend of Afghanistan (GTA), Freedom and Justice Movement (FGM), and Afghanistan Republican Front (ARF) — are also reviving hidden caches, local stockpiles, and older weaponry to challenge the Taliban’s claim of complete control over the country.

Currently, the resistance is fragmented and may not pose an existential threat to the Taliban regime. But analysts believe if isolated confrontations coalesce, Badakhshan could develop into a serious challenge. The unrest could then spread to other northern provinces, where the Taliban have historically faced resistance from non-Pashtun communities.

“As of now, this Badakhshan insurgency does not represent any existential threat to the Taliban regime,” says Gul. “A lot would depend on whether the majority of former Northern Alliance commanders and leading figures return to Afghanistan or come to Tajikistan and lead the fight from there. If they don’t do this, then they don’t really stand any genuine chance of success against the Taliban regime.”

An economy surviving, not thriving

When the Taliban captured Kabul, fears of an economic free-fall ran high. The economy contracted significantly, but the regime managed to keep it afloat, even as it continues to struggle under the weight of international isolation, the absence of formal recognition, frozen funds, withdrawal of foreign aid, and a persistent liquidity crunch. Poverty, unemployment, food insecurity, and humanitarian hardship remain widespread.

The Taliban’s latest published budget, for 2023, stood at $2.44 billion — less than half the roughly $6 billion budget under the Ghani government in 2021. Inflation has compounded the pressure, rising to 7.6% by March 2026 from an average 3.6% in 2025, driven by higher food prices, supply disruptions and rising demand. Unemployment has nearly doubled since 2021, according to the UN, while more than half a million jobs have disappeared.

Under the Taliban, the Afghan economy continues to rely heavily on agriculture, trade and aid, with mining becoming increasingly important. The country’s gold, copper, lithium and rare earths reserves have attracted growing regional interest. The regime has expanded mining contracts and promoted the sector as a major source of revenue. Questions, however, remain over transparency and who ultimately benefits from the mineral wealth.

“The concern is that the Taliban may be treating mining primarily as a way to generate revenue and sustain their own government, rather than building a transparent, professional, and sustainable sector,” says Nooristani. “This approach might keep their government afloat, but it doesn’t build Afghanistan’s economy.”

Half the country shut out

For Afghan women, the Taliban’s return to power has meant a dramatic loss of rights. Girls remain excluded from education, while women have been pushed out of many workplaces. “Since 2021, girls have been barred from formal education beyond primary education, resulting in the systematic exclusion of an estimated 2.4 million girls from secondary education by 2026. Women have also been barred from university education since 2022 and continue to face severe restrictions on employment and participation in public life,” according to a report released by UNESCO this month.

These regressive policies have created divisions within the top cadres and invited widespread international condemnation.

“It seems to be a gender apartheid regime. The Taliban have made it clear that women will not receive education beyond the sixth grade. They are barred from working, while their movement and personal choices are severely restricted,” says senior broadcast journalist Hassan Khan. “After five years in power, there are no women doctors, engineers, nurses or teachers,” he adds. “This is not merely a human rights issue; it concerns the very future of Afghanistan.”

Almost half of Afghanistan’s population, around 22 million women and girls, are being denied the opportunity to participate in nation-building. Under Taliban rule, women have been steadily erased from public life — a policy with profound economic consequences for millions of families.

“This is particularly devastating in a war-ravaged country like Afghanistan, where many women are widows and the sole breadwinners for their families, yet they have also been shut out of the workforce. UN figures suggest that only around 7% of women now have access to employment,” says senior journalist Haq Nawaz Kattikhel.

Such sweeping restrictions on women exist nowhere else in the Muslim world. “Even Islamic Shariah does not permit the denial of women’s rights. A leading Darul Uloom has issued a fatwa stating that barring women from education and employment, or denying them opportunities to work, is strictly against Islam and Shariah. Those imposing such restrictions are violating the very tenets of Islam,” adds Khan.

A country without a free voice

The Taliban have also changed Afghanistan's media landscape over the last five years. Today, journalists face increasingly tight rules governing what they can report, whom they can interview, and how they can discuss political issues.

So far, the regime has issued more than 20 national directives and numerous provincial decrees muzzling the press. According to Reporters Sans Frontières (RSF), criticism of the regime is prohibited, women face sweeping restrictions, political debate has been silenced and broadcasting images of living beings is banned. In January 2026, a leaked new Code of Criminal Procedure offered no protection or exemption for media workers, leaving them vulnerable to legal threats, imprisonment and other severe penalties.

On the World Press Freedom Index, the country ranks 175th out of 180. “The women journalists and media workers still there may be the last generation Afghanistan has. With women barred from education and professional life for five years, there is no new generation of qualified female journalists,” says Khan.

Journalists, men and women alike, have been told not to violate ‘Islamic values’ or ‘national interests’ as defined by the Taliban, effectively criminalising criticism of their rule. “Afghanistan is now facing an almost total media blackout, with dozens of outlets shut down and women’s space in the media shrinking dramatically,” says Kattikhel, The Washington Post’s special correspondent on Afghanistan.

“In a conservative society like Afghanistan, women reporters were often the only ones able to access and tell women’s stories. With them pushed out, those voices have largely disappeared from television, radio and print — a serious loss for Afghan women and the world’s understanding of their plight.”

Isolation and regional realignment

Internationally, the Taliban remain isolated, but they are far from ignored. Regional powers continue to engage with Kabul, driven by security and strategic interests. China seeks stability and economic access; Iran is focused on border security; India sees an opportunity amid the growing Kabul-Islamabad rift; and Central Asian states prioritise trade and containing militancy. Yet none has formally recognised the Taliban regime. Russia remains the sole country to have done so.

“The biggest vulnerability facing the Taliban right now is international isolation. The world is not recognising them as a legitimate government. And it is not just international isolation, but domestic and regional isolation too,” says Nooristani.

Former ambassador Mansoor Ahmad Khan says the Taliban are to blame themselves for their global and regional isolation. “When they assumed power, the expectation was that they would work toward stability at home and stable engagement with the rest of the world, including the region and the wider international community. Unfortunately, that didn’t happen,” he adds.

“We advised them to strengthen their government through a participatory governance framework, engaging with other communities, political leaders and groups inside Afghanistan, and working out a roadmap for relations with the rest of the world. That did not happen either,” says Mansoor, who managed diplomatic ties in Kabul during the 2021 Taliban takeover, assisting with international evacuations.

While the Taliban have sought to diversify their external ties, their most fraught relationship may remain with their eastern neighbour, Pakistan. Many in Islamabad had expected ties with Kabul to improve after the Taliban’s return to power. Instead, relations have steadily deteriorated. “The Pakistan-Afghanistan relations right now aren’t just in a bad phase — they are arguably in the worst phase in the history of the relationship,” says Mansoor.

The main issue bedeviling the relationship is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the banned umbrella group responsible for much of the terrorist violence in Pakistan. Islamabad accuses the TTP of operating from safe havens on Afghan soil and using them as launchpads for attacks inside Pakistan. The Taliban regime has been reluctant to take action against the group, instead maintaining plausible deniability despite repeated demands from Islamabad.

“Pakistan’s central concern has been that whatever government sat in Kabul would cooperate with Pakistan on combating cross-border terrorism, particularly given the intensifying attacks in recent years from the TTP, the BLA, and other groups sheltering on Afghan soil. That cooperation never really materialised, and cross-border terrorism into Pakistan kept increasing,” says Mansoor.

The 38th report of the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team states that the Taliban continue to support the TTP as attacks against Pakistan increase in frequency and lethality. The escalation has resulted in deadly military skirmishes between the two countries, while border closures have disrupted trade and movement.

Inam finds the UN report genuinely disconcerting as it describes the threat picture coming out of Afghanistan as very complex. “Al Qaeda’s support to the TTP and the BLA has moved past advisory support into direct involvement,” he says. “The report also notes that TTP has raised two new divisions — one for Gilgit-Baltistan and one for Azad Jammu and Kashmir — and is developing its own drone capability, essentially an ‘air force.’ It's consolidating and expanding its reach, with collusion between TTP, al Qaeda, the BLA, and elements of the Afghan government.”

The UN report also says that around 2,000 TTP fighters and their families have been moved away from the Pakistani border. Mullah Hibatullah has reportedly warned the TTP to stop attacks or risk losing Taliban support. But the UN assessment suggests that such measures are aimed at managing the group rather than dismantling its infrastructure.

“If the UN is verifying that the Afghan side has taken some steps to manage the TTP, that is a positive development, but simply managing it is not enough. They need to take more credible measures that actually prevent the TTP from carrying out cross-border attacks,” says Mansoor.

It is intriguing that the Taliban are willing to risk their relationship with Pakistan by harbouring the TTP. “The Taliban have found it genuinely difficult to take strong military action against groups like the TTP and BLA — partly because they share ideological ground with them, and partly out of fear that cracking down on them could push those fighters toward bigger international terrorist networks like al Qaeda or ISKP instead,” says Mansoor.

Inam, however, believes the Taliban regime might be using the TTP and other terror groups as bargaining chips in its dealing with neighbours. “The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has learned it can use the TTP as leverage against Pakistan. It likely sees the TTP’s roughly 12,000 fighters as a useful ‘force in being’ for any future conflict inside Afghanistan itself. This nexus isn’t going away,” he adds.

The security concern extends beyond the TTP. The UN assessment points to a symbiotic relationship between the TTP, BLA and al Qaeda, as well as cooperation involving other militant networks, including East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

“The Taliban are supporting the TTP and providing safe haven to various terrorist networks, including al Qaeda, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, ISKP and ETIM,” says journalist Khan. “If the Taliban are allowed to govern Afghanistan as they wish, they would not only destroy Afghan society but also put the entire region in danger.”

The UN assessment, however, says the Taliban are actively fighting ISKP, the most prominent internal armed threat to the regime. The paradox is striking: the regime is fighting one militant threat while supporting another.

For Pakistan, that ambiguity is becoming increasingly difficult to accept. “Pakistan tried applying various forms of pressure and leverage to get results, and when that did not work, bilateral engagement channels were frozen from October 12 onward. The border has been closed, and there is no trade taking place between the two countries at all,” says Mansoor.

A relationship once viewed in Pakistan as a potential strategic opportunity is increasingly defined by mistrust. Yet geography makes separation impossible. The two countries share borders, history, trade routes and millions of personal connections. “Given the 2,600-kilometre border and deep civilisational ties between the two countries; the Pak-Afghan ties have to become something like a special relationship,” says the former diplomat. “But for that to happen, the Taliban need to demonstrate sustained commitment to making this border region genuinely free of terrorism. That requires a constitutional framework, which the Taliban still have not developed in five years.”

The unfinished Taliban project

While the Taliban may draw some satisfaction from having held power for five years, controlling territory is not the same as building a state. Afghanistan, according to experts, cannot achieve lasting peace, stability or prosperity under a system built on exclusion, medieval social norms, support for transnational militant groups and tightly centralised rule. The Taliban, they argue, must move beyond the politics of survival and recognise that a stable Afghanistan requires inclusive governance, respect for basic rights and a meaningful role for its people, especially women, in shaping the country’s future.

Regional connectivity and international recognition will also require engagement, rather than isolation. Independent observers believe the Taliban need a political vision that responds to the aspirations of Afghans, builds constructive ties with neighbouring countries and defines Afghanistan’s place in the wider world. Without such a shift, their grip on power may endure, but the country risks remaining trapped between international isolation and growing unrest at home.