If any event has come close to causing the kind of global disruption seen during the Covid-19 pandemic, it is the ongoing US-Iran conflict. Despite periodic pauses and promises of peace, there is little indication that the confrontation is moving toward a lasting resolution. A recent World Bank forecast has warned that the conflict is already weighing on global growth and that, if prolonged, it could push dozens of developing economies into years of stagnation. A few months ago, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) echoed similar concerns, warning that if the conflict continued to push oil prices toward $100 per barrel for the rest of the year, it could further destabilise the global economy.
The cost is already mounting for Washington, with the bill crossing $37 billion, according to Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s latest testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, nearly $8 billion more than the previous estimate in May. According to a BBC report, the Trump administration has asked lawmakers to approve an additional $87 billion in Pentagon funding, including $67 billion for operations in the Middle East. But that is only the official cost borne by US taxpayers for a conflict whose consequences have spread far and beyond, disrupting the energy supplies and so much more.
While President Trump has dismissed concerns about the economic fallout at home by arguing that the war is in the best interest of Americans, the conflict has clearly taken a global toll — particularly in the Global South, where the effects are already being felt and are pinching every pocket. From New Delhi to Bangkok, Istanbul to Islamabad, people have been bracing for a new wave of inflation driven by disruptions in the world’s most important energy corridor, the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has shut in retaliation for US strikes on its infrastructure and leadership.
I sat down with Ashok Swain, professor of peace and conflict research at Uppsala University, to discuss what has become one of the most consequential conflicts of our time, a war whose impact continues to extend far beyond the battlefield, threatening global stability, energy markets and millions of lives. Here is what he had to say:
ET: Beyond the battlefield, what are the short-term and long-term consequences of the US-Iran conflict?
AS: President Trump’s war with Iran is harming the world far beyond the battlefield. In the short term, disruption around the Strait of Hormuz has raised oil, gas, transport and insurance costs, while attacks near the Suez Canal and the Red Sea threaten another vital trade route. The result is higher inflation, disrupted flights, falling tourism and greater uncertainty for businesses and households. The IMF describes the closure of Hormuz as the largest disruption in the history of the global oil market, effectively imposing a sudden additional cost on energy-importing countries. But in the longer term, the damage is political as well as economic. The US administration has shown that negotiations can be abandoned for bombing and ceasefires treated as temporary pauses for rearmament. That destroys trust in diplomacy, encourages Iran and other states to seek stronger military deterrence, and accelerates the decline of an already weakened international order. Military superiority may win individual battles, but it cannot create legitimacy, cooperation or lasting security. Trump entered this conflict promising control and quick victory, but he has produced a wider war, strengthened hardliners in Tehran and made the world more insecure.
ET: Given the existing vulnerabilities across the Global South, how is this war affecting the weakest economies?
AS: The poorest countries are paying for a war they neither started nor can influence. For rich states, higher oil prices are an inconvenience, for fuel-importing countries in Africa, South Asia and elsewhere, they become a national emergency. Governments already burdened by debt are forced to draw down scarce foreign currency reserves to pay for fuel, fertilizer and food imports, leaving fewer resources for health, education and climate adaptation. Transport costs then raise the price of almost everything, especially basic food. Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and many African economies are particularly exposed because they combine energy dependence with limited fiscal space and large low-income populations. Wealthier governments can subsidize fuel or release reserves, but weaker governments must borrow, cut public spending or allow prices to rise. The result is hunger, unemployment, currency depreciation and political unrest. The cruel inequality of this war is therefore clear – decisions made in Washington and Tel Aviv are being felt in markets and at kitchen tables thousands of kilometres away. Pressure on one country can quickly become an economic shock for many others because global markets do not respect borders. The consequences travel downward until they reach those least able to absorb them.
ET: As a scholar of peace and conflict, what are the most important ethical questions this conflict raises?
AS: The first ethical question is what authority President Trump had to impose such enormous human and economic costs without presenting a clear, achievable and legally defensible political objective. Preventing nuclear proliferation is a legitimate concern, but killing civilians, attacking infrastructure and destabilizing an entire region cannot be treated as morally acceptable merely because Washington possesses the military capacity to do so. There are also serious questions about legality, congressional authorization, proportionality and the protection of civilian facilities. A second concern is the unequal value assigned to human life. Iranian civilians often appear in political language as collateral damage, while the suffering of people in countries affected by inflation, food shortages and displacement is barely counted at all. A third question concerns responsibility for creating the crisis. Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement that had placed verifiable restrictions on Tehran, replaced it with a policy of maximum pressure and later escalated confrontation into open conflict. He cannot erase that history and present each new escalation as an unavoidable response to Iranian actions. I would say that academics must also scrutinise Iran’s repression and attacks on civilian targets, but moral consistency requires us to examine the stronger party most closely because it has the greatest ability to choose a different course.
ET: In March, President Trump claimed multiple times that he had won the war. How can a conflict continue in phases after a declared victory? What do the competing narratives from Washington and Tehran tell us about the nature of this war?
AS: Trump’s repeated declarations of victory in March reveal the distance between political messaging and military reality. A war has not been won simply because a president repeats the word “victory.” Victory must mean that clearly stated political objectives have been achieved and can be sustained without a return to combat. Yet Iranian attacks continued, Hormuz remained contested, negotiations repeatedly stalled and American forces carried out new strikes in July. The war keeps returning in episodes because ending a conflict requires political compromises that are often harder than winning individual battles. Washington’s narrative emphasizes destroyed targets, weakened Iranian capabilities and American military superiority. Tehran’s narrative emphasizes survival, resistance and its ability to impose costs on the United States and its allies in the region. Both sides exaggerate, but they are not measuring or fighting the same war. America counts the targets it destroys, Iran counts its survival and continuing capacity to retaliate. Trump can win battles while failing to produce a stable political outcome. Iran can suffer destruction while claiming that preventing regime collapse constitutes victory. These competing narratives sustain the conflict because each government needs a story that makes compromise look unnecessary and renewed violence appear justified.
ET: In this war between the US and Iran, who do you think, apart from the people of Iran, are suffering the most?
AS: Apart from the people of Iran, those suffering most are ordinary people across the Gulf and in fragile energy importing countries. A number of countries across the region face missile and drone attacks, damaged infrastructure, disrupted water and food supplies, lost tourism and the realization that hosting American military bases may make them targets rather than guarantee their protection. Migrant workers are especially vulnerable because they have little political protection, limited savings and few opportunities to leave. Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen risk becoming secondary battlefields even though their populations have already endured years of conflict and economic collapse. Beyond the region, poor households in South Asia and Africa suffer through higher fuel, fertilizer and food prices. There is also a generational cost. Children displaced from schools, families pushed into poverty and young people drawn toward armed groups will continue to bear the consequences long after leaders announce another ceasefire. Even American families are losing soldiers and paying higher prices for a war that around two thirds of US adults now consider not worth fighting. The pattern is familiar: political leaders claim strategic gains, military contractors and energy companies profit, while civilians, workers and future generations pay the bill.
ET: What role should developed countries play in preventing this conflict from becoming a forever war?
AS: Developed countries should be using their economic and diplomatic power to restrain the belligerents, the US and Israel, protect shipping, support mediation and ensure that any agreement is backed by credible monitoring and sanctions relief. They should also provide emergency assistance to poorer countries facing food, fuel and debt crises. Instead, most have played either a limited or contradictory role. European states have called for restraint while continuing military cooperation with Washington and Tel Aviv and offering little meaningful resistance to Trump’s escalation. Some have treated the conflict primarily as an energy supply problem rather than a war that requires political intervention. Others have defended themselves against Iranian missiles without seriously challenging the policies that widened the confrontation. China and Russia have criticized American power, but have done very little to stop the conflict. What is missing is an independent coalition prepared to say that neither American nor Israeli bombing can establish a sustainable order. Developed democracies have institutions, financial leverage and diplomatic networks that could support such an effort. Their failure to use them shows how weak multilateralism has become. The world is already multipolar, but it lacks a functioning order capable of restraining powerful states.
ET: Have we crossed the point where this conflict could have been prevented from becoming a forever war?
AS: We have not crossed the point at which a forever war is inevitable, but we have passed many easier opportunities to prevent it. The withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, the failure of later negotiations, the turn to regime change rhetoric and the repeated violation or manipulation of ceasefires have created a deep trust deficit. Ending the conflict now will therefore be far harder and more expensive than preventing it would have been. If it becomes permanent, the region will suffer several kinds of loss: thousands more deaths, destroyed infrastructure, displaced populations, weakened economies and another generation shaped by fear and revenge. Gulf states will lose their image as safe centers of investment and commerce. Iran may become more authoritarian and more determined to acquire a nuclear deterrent. Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen may face renewed proxy warfare. In the end, I believe that the United States will lose credibility, resources and influence, while China and Russia will gain opportunities without necessarily providing stability. The deepest loss, however, will be political imagination. A region that spends years preparing for the next attack gradually stops believing that coexistence is possible. Forever wars do not continue because they are impossible to end, they continue because leaders discover that engaging in conflict is politically easier than making the compromises required for peace.
ET: Is diplomacy still a realistic path forward?
AS: Ending the war requires diplomacy, but not diplomacy conducted with a bomb on the table and an ultimatum attached. There must first be a durable and monitored ceasefire covering attacks by the United States, Iran, Israel and aligned armed groups. That must be followed by phased arrangements on Iran’s nuclear programme, missile deployments, sanctions relief, maritime security, and the reopening of Hormuz. Regional states, particularly Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, need a central role because they have both influence and a direct interest in preventing a forever war. But agreements alone will not be enough. The central problem is trust, especially after Trump withdrew from the earlier nuclear deal and later escalated confrontation while negotiations remained possible. Iran will demand guarantees that Washington cannot simply abandon another agreement after a change of administration or political calculations. Washington must also accept that Tehran cannot be forced into unconditional surrender without an occupation that would be disastrous for everyone. Lastly, this conflict will end only when both sides exchange maximalist ambitions for limited, verifiable objectives. In my view, peace requires restraint, institutions and a regional security framework that can survive beyond the leaders who negotiate it.