After a few relatively calm years, Pakistan finds itself back under the shadow of brutal terrorism. If anything, the Islamic State Khorosan Province’s (ISKP) suicide bombing targeting a Shia mosque on the capital’s periphery – which killed 36 worshippers and injured more than 160 – during Friday prayers should raise serious alarm within the state on several levels.
The attack punctured what is routinely described as the country’s most fortified zone, signalling that the operational capacity of the terrorists cannot be dismissed as merely residual. It also risks reigniting sectarian fault lines in the country that had been subdued in recent years. Most critically, the attack points to the possible emergence of yet another militant front alongside the Pakistani Taliban and Baloch militants.
The ISKP, with a presence spanning across the region from Central Asia to Turkey, has faced significant losses in recent years due to the Taliban's relentless crackdowns in Afghanistan and the efforts of Pakistan's security forces, with the assistance of both regional and global intelligence services. These losses have included the deaths and arrests of key leaders, including the most recent one, Sultan Aziz Azam, who served as the group's top propagandist, ideologue and recruiter. Azam was taken into custody by Pakistani security forces in May 2025 from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. Notably, Azam was previously reported to have been killed in a US airstrike in Afghanistan's Nangarhar province in December 2018. However, despite these significant losses, the group has consistently managed to stage a comeback, launching sporadic but highly unpredictable attacks in Pakistan and other regional countries, which have left state authorities in a state of shock.
The Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL), the parent organisation of the ISKP, has consistently adhered to an anti-Shia ideology since its formation, remaining a cornerstone of the group's belief system. Over time, the organisation expanded its targets to include the US, Russia, and China, among others. A close examination of the ISKP's propaganda content reveals that the spread of anti-Shia content is an enduring theme, ranging from the generation of extreme hatred to the incitement of extreme violence against Shias. The ISKP's rivalry with the Taliban-led Afghan interim government, and even Hamas, is also closely tied to their ties with Iran, with the group viewing anyone who befriends Iran as a prime target.
The mosque attack in Islamabad was swiftly followed by a flurry of commentary on mainstream and social media, with many speculating that it was either an attempt to disrupt the PTI's announced countrywide strike to protest alleged election rigging or the Basant festival in Lahore. The latter is a centuries-old celebration of spring that features competitive kite-flying and was recently reinstated by the Punjab Chief Minister after a nearly two-decade ban. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that the operations of non-state actors are multifaceted, aiming to not only inflict physical damage on their enemies but also to achieve political and propaganda objectives by creating mistrust, social and political polarisation, and moral decay.
To understand militancy properly, it's essential to recognise its patterns. Such attacks don't occur overnight; rather, they involve weeks of meticulous preparation, including training in handling explosives, arranging transportation to the target location and securing accommodation in the vicinity while concealing identities. Additionally, extensive prior reconnaissance is conducted at the planned target site to gather intelligence on security protocols and to identify potential vulnerabilities. Once such preparations are complete, militant outfits typically act swiftly to exploit the opportunity before being detected and apprehended by the authorities. It appears that the attack's timing, which coincided with a major political or cultural event in the rest of the country, was more a coincidence than a deliberate disruption attempt, especially considering the ISKP's limited resources, its dormant nature and the intense domestic, regional and international surveillance it faces.
Unfortunately, instead of bringing together a unified stance and front on the state level beyond political opposition, every large-scale attack would be followed by a range of conspiracy theories, with many accusing state authorities of playing some sort of intelligence game. In countries like Pakistan, where the military establishment has dominated the country's political landscape since its inception, the establishment would suddenly face a major brunt of criticism from the political parties (particularly those in opposition), and media and social media users for failing to curb terrorism, despite enjoying widespread control over political, security and economic affairs of the country.
The Afghan Taliban, and particularly its intelligence service, the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI), has in a very little time mastered the art of using armed proxies to counter its archenemy, the ISKP, in Pakistan. Since last year, the Afghan Taliban have been extensively using the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Pakistani Taliban for countering ISKP pockets in Pakistan.
In the first notable incident, in March 2025, ISKP accused the BLA of committing “treachery” by attacking its hideout in the Mastung district of Balochistan, killing at least 30 of its members. In a detailed post-incident account, ISKP claimed that both groups used to coexist in the area without harming each other.
A second incident was reported recently, on February 3, in the Shinkai area of Qambar Khel, Bara sub-district of Khyber tribal district, by pro-Afghan Taliban digital media outlets, claiming that at least 11 ISKP members were killed in an overnight raid by “unidentified gunmen on an ISKP hideout in the area.” Local Pakistani authorities didn't confirm the raid and the consequent killings, but local media reported the recovery of four bodies in the same area who had been shot.
In recent years, ISKP has been transformed from a traditional, territorially-based organisation with traditional training methods for its members to a more camouflaged and diffused entity that prioritises the strengthening of its ideological indoctrination over territorial gains. This makes extensive use of a range of secure digital platforms to recruit, radicalise and direct operatives. However, while the Western world has the technological capabilities to effectively monitor, decipher and trace ISKP's digital activities, which has enabled the timely foiling of the group's planned attacks in Western countries in recent years, countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan lack the necessary resources to track ISKP's online presence, resulting in the group's continued successful attacks despite suffering significant physical losses in recent years.
In comparison to the Pakistani Taliban, ISKP is much more disciplined. For instance, ISKP will wait for hours and will not disclose details of their executed attacks until their central leadership releases a formal statement. On the other hand, the Pakistani Taliban quickly share information about the attacks they have conducted, or even if an attack is still underway. Just yesterday, some ISKP activists took to social media to express their frustration about the delay in claiming responsibility for the bombing of the Shia Mosque in Islamabad. Others quickly chimed in, advising them not to bring up such issues, stressing that they are different from the Taliban and should act in a disciplined manner by waiting for their central leadership to release details officially.
All facts and information are the sole responsibility of the writer
The writer is an Islamabad-based journalist and analyst who extensively covers militancy, Jihadist movements and other related security issues in the region and beyond