As Pakistan once again seeks a truce with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa government led by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) is pushing to seize the initiative, amid fears that half-hearted measures could further strain Pak-Afghan relations and embolden militancy in the province.
The establishment has been trying to broker a settlement with the TTP and its factions, including the Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HBG) group, by pressuring the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to support its stance. The renewed push comes against the backdrop of a deteriorating security situation: about 8,000 active fighters are currently engaged in combat with the military, police, and paramilitary forces across the province, particularly in the newly merged districts, according to the inspector general of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Police. In the past six months alone, several senior officers have been killed — more than two dozen in KP, including one high-ranking official, and many others in Balochistan.
Amid the crisis, Imran Khan, the incarcerated founding chairman of PTI, has announced the formation of a Jirga to be led by Mehmood Khan Achakzai, the chief of the Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), an ally of PTI. Sources have confirmed that the Jirga will soon be dispatched to Afghanistan.
“The previous government of Pakistan consistently advocated dialogue with the Taliban, maintaining that lasting regional stability could only be achieved through negotiation,” Barrister Muhammad Ali Saif, spokesperson for the KP chief minister, told The Express Tribune following his visit to the Afghan High Commission last week. “A prime example of this approach is the United States, which eventually entered talks with the Taliban after fighting them for twenty-one years,” he said. Barrister Saif lashed out at the federal government for what he called a lack of ownership, inadequate support, and inconsistent policy in its failed negotiations with the TTP.
A history of talks and truces
The first round of talks between militants, led by Naik Muhammad, and the Pakistan Armed Forces was held in Shakai, South Waziristan, in April 2004. The negotiations took place under the patronage of then Corps Commander Peshawar General Safdar, with the assistance of Federally Administered Tribal Areas secretary Brigadier (retd) Mehmood Shah. The agreement that followed required Naik Muhammad to register foreign fighters present in the district.
The talks were triggered by clashes that erupted when the Army and Frontier Corps attempted to seize control of Naik Muhammad’s village, Kalusha. At the time, Naik Muhammad was closely aligned with al Qaeda and foreign militants — including Uzbeks, Chechens, and Arabs from both Europe and Africa — operating in South Waziristan near Wana. Security forces suffered heavy casualties as well, which pushed both sides back to the negotiating table in Shakai Valley.
The situation escalated further after Uzbek militants reportedly kidnapped Waziri women, provoking widespread anger across Waziristan. Locals rose up against the foreign fighters, and violence spread. Among the earliest victims of targeted killings in FATA were Farooq, brother of current PTM leader Ali Wazir, and their father, Mirza Alam Khan, along with the late Senator Faridoon.
Naik Muhammad would later become the first Pakistani Taliban commander to be killed in a US drone strike.
Sararogha Peace Agreement
The second major peace agreement came in February 2005, when the Pakistan government struck a deal with Baitullah Mehsud of the Pakistani Taliban in the Sararogha area of South Waziristan. Negotiations were initiated after officials realised that Taliban attacks were no longer limited to Ahmadzai Wazir areas but had begun spreading into Mehsud territory. In an effort to contain this expansion, the government allowed militants to retain their weapons and even offered compensation for damage to their homes and property.
Despite these concessions, Baitullah Mehsud, working in collaboration with foreign fighters in the tribal areas, laid the foundations of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan in 2006, in alliance with the Afghan Taliban. However, the TTP was not formally announced until December 2007, following an earlier declaration in July 2007 in the aftermath of the Lal Masjid operation.
Swat agreements
While earlier negotiations in South and North Waziristan had focused on tribal militant leaders such as Baitullah Mehsud and Hakimullah Wazir, the rise of the TTP in late 2007 inspired similar militant movements in Swat. There, Sufi Muhammad of Dir district, alongside his son-in-law Maulvi Fazlullah of Swat, revived the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), seeking to impose their version of Islamic law.
The first negotiations in Swat took place before the 2008 general elections, aimed at ensuring a safe environment for polling. After the Awami National Party and its ally, the Pakistan Peoples Party, formed the provincial government, more formal talks followed. In May 2008, a 16-point agreement was reached in the Malakand division and Peshawar, intended to end violence and restore peace in the valley. On February 15, 2009, the provincial government went a step further by announcing the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation, effectively acquiescing to the militants’ demands.
Agreements with HGB, Faqeer Muhammad
The Government of Pakistan inked an agreement allowing HGB militants to freely move in the region without hiding from the military. At the time, they were considered ‘good Taliban’ and had ties with political figures affiliated with Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazl.
Following the 2008 military operation Sher Dil, an understanding was reached in Bajaur with militant commander Faqeer Muhammad. Though largely unwritten, the agreement echoed earlier peace deals: militants pledged not to attack government personnel, including security forces and civilians, while Pakistan’s security forces, in turn, agreed not to target Faqeer Muhammad’s fighters.
In early August 2008, the government announced plans for a fresh operation in Bajaur. However, the offensive was briefly paused after appeals were made to pursue negotiations instead. A tribal jirga engaged in talks for over a week, but when differences persisted, the military resumed its operation—one that continued well beyond the initial phase.
Khyber Agreement
In June 2008, following Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem, an unwritten agreement was reached with Lashkar-e-Islam chief Mangal Bagh in Khyber Agency. Similar to earlier deals, the arrangement rested on mutual non-engagement: militants would refrain from attacking government personnel, while the state avoided direct confrontation with Mangal Bagh’s group.
As part of the settlement, the government compensated both militants and local residents affected by the operation. It also released several detainees who had been held on charges that could not be substantiated.
The Kabul Talks
After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and subsequent takeover by the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan adopted the “Qatar model” by initiating talks with the TTP on Afghan soil. The choice of venue was deliberate: the TTP had demanded a neutral, third-party location, nominating Kabul, while Pakistan sought to prove that the group’s leadership was indeed operating from within Afghanistan, a claim that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan had consistently denied.
The process was initiated by then Corps Commander Peshawar, General Faiz Hameed, who had recently been elevated to the position. His appointment carried political significance, as army tradition holds that any officer aspiring to become Chief must first command a corps. Faiz Hameed began secret negotiations with the TTP under the patronage of Afghan Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, keeping then army chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa in the loop. The assurance offered was that militants would eventually be repatriated to their native areas in Pakistan, with or without their weapons.
A committee member later disclosed, on condition of anonymity, that the talks stretched from 2021 until October 2022, under General Faiz’s direct supervision. He reportedly made at least three secret visits to Kabul in pursuit of a breakthrough.
The first phase of informal talks took place in Afghanistan’s Paktika and Khost provinces, where religious and tribal leaders from Pakistan met TTP representatives and conveyed federal support for the jirga process. The second, more formal phase was held in Kabul, where the TTP appointed delegates from all districts, while the Pakistani government sent a 75-member jirga comprising religious scholars, political figures, and notables from across Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.
On June 2, 2022, the jirga flew to Kabul aboard a C-130 aircraft. “We were briefed by Corps Commander Peshawar, General Faiz, in his office,” recalled Sahibzada Haroonur Rasheed, a senior politician from Bajaur and member of Jamaat-e-Islami. “He told us that the talks with the TTP had already been concluded, but to give the treaty public ownership, representatives from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa must travel to Kabul and formally ink the agreement.”
Following meetings at the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul, both sides announced a three-month ceasefire on June 4, 2022. Jirga members recalled that some TTP leaders were so enthusiastic that they declared: “We have already packed our belongings; within days we will be back in our homeland.” The delegation was formally welcomed and supported by Afghan Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who endorsed the process at both the opening and closing sessions.
At the conclusion, KP Information Advisor Barrister Muhammad Ali Saif announced a five-member committee to finalise the agreement, which included himself, Engineer Shaukatullah, former Senator Saleh Shah, and two military officials. However, the agreement was never formally written down.
The terms publicly declared were striking: all TTP members would be repatriated to their home villages within three months, allowed to retain their weapons, and granted state protection against prosecution for past crimes. Haroonur Rasheed and another jirga member later confirmed these details.
Preparations had begun earlier, between March and May 2022, when committees were formed across KP to gauge public sentiment and prepare local communities for the militants’ return, emphasising that their past actions should be “forgotten.”
Militants did begin returning to their native areas. But the deal quickly unraveled after the TTP kidnapped policemen in Swat. Audio recordings later leaked in which militants claimed: “The jirga in Kabul has assured us protection for all our actions.”
The importance of Bajaur and Kurram
Bajaur and Kurram tribal districts hold significant military importance not only for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also for militants including TTP, Islamic State, and al Qaeda. Cross-border incursions were attempted twice: first in 1950 in Kurram, and later in 1961 in Bajaur, when Afghan forces and tribesmen launched an attack that was repelled within a short time by the Pakistan Army with the support of local tribes.
In contrast, Pakistan also carried out offensives across the border, including an attack on Jalalabad in Nangarhar province via Torkham, as well as multiple strikes in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia provinces. The first drone attack was carried out in the Dama Dola area next to the border, in the presence of Al Qaeda deceased leader Amin Al Zawahri in Bajaur.
What the current KP government thinks
Former Speaker of the National Assembly, Asad Qaiser, hosted a gathering at his residence to discuss the parameters of a prospective jirga with Afghan Ambassador Ahmad Shukab and his delegation.
“The provincial government of KP cannot negotiate with the TTP without the backing of the federal government and the military establishment,” Barrister Muhammad Ali Saif told The Express Tribune in a telephonic conversation from Peshawar. He noted that earlier talks unraveled in the aftermath of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri’s killing in Kabul. “The dialogue with the TTP stretched for nearly a year, from 2021 to 2022, and played out in different phases, but failed due to Islamabad’s lack of support, ownership, and seriousness,” he lamented.
According to Saif, this neglect has translated into daily bloodshed, claiming the lives of security personnel, police, and civilians alike. He added that the KP government has already conveyed its willingness to pursue fresh negotiations in Afghanistan and submitted the required Terms of Reference. “We are still awaiting a response, but remain hopeful that a jirga will soon be dispatched across the border,” he said, framing it as the only viable path to break the current impasse.
Why previous talks failed
Pakistan has signed between 20 and 22 agreements with the TTP and other militant groups across KP’s merged districts and in Kabul, but all collapsed due to factors such as mistrust, violations of the terms, and the TTP worsening instability in the region. “The Kabul agreement was driven largely by Gen Hameed, who sought to claim credit for bringing peace to the merged districts. Instead, it has only brought more bloodshed to the region,” a senior military official told The Express Tribune on condition of anonymity.
“Gen Hameed’s symbolic declaration of victory — raising his cup of green tea in Kabul — has since unleashed havoc in the newly merged districts, fuelling unrest for both the military and civilian government,” the official said. He added that militants were transported not only to the merged districts but also to settled areas and major cities such as Mardan, Swabi, and Peshawar, creating a baseline of resistance against the military.
The US successfully adapted the Pakistani military’s model of talks in Afghanistan, where local Afghan forces were supported by an international coalition. In Pakistan’s case, however, both the militants and the military are local — alongside Afghans and a handful of foreign jihadists — making the conflict far more complicated.
“Whenever talks are held, militants gain space and time to regroup,” says Haq Nawaz, senior journalist at The Washington Post. “They re-arm, and casualties among military and state forces inevitably rise after each truce. Militants never honour their commitments; they expand. From the idea of Greater Pakhtunkhwa, they are now pushing for a Greater Emirate-e-Islami, which is dangerous. Gen Hameed sought credit for securing the western border, ending militancy, and stabilising Afghanistan, but those ambitions remain unfulfilled.” The government, meanwhile, repatriated militants without disarming or registering them, leaving their whereabouts unknown. For a period, they were even provided financial support — assistance that only emboldened their defiance.
Without public consent, parliamentary backing, and a coherent state policy, such talks only deepen unrest in KP and beyond. Lasting peace requires disarming, restricting, and monitoring militants, without financial appeasement or unchecked freedom.