Exactly one week ago, Baloch terrorists once again targeted Chinese nationals in Pakistan, launching a suicide bombing on a convoy carrying them as it left Karachi airport. The attack resulted in the deaths of three individuals, including two Chinese nationals, and injured over 12 others. This incident was swiftly followed by a brazen assault on coalmines in Balochistan’s Duki district, which left 20 miners dead.
These recent attacks, along with a series of others in the past few months, suggest a significant escalation in the violence carried out by Baloch separatist terrorist groups. Just over a month ago, in August, they killed over 70 people in coordinated attacks across various districts of Balochistan. What was previously considered a ‘low-level’ insurgency by security analysts now appears to have intensified in both frequency and intensity. The October 6 attack in Karachi, along with a similar bombing in the city back in April, indicates that the terrorists are also increasingly expanding their operations beyond Balochistan’s borders.
Power shift in the BLA
The banned Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) has claimed responsibility for the recent wave of attacks. Sources close to the matter suggest that a specific faction within the BLA, known as the ‘Majeed Brigade,’ is currently spearheading these offensives.
Historically, two groups within the BLA have held influence: the ‘Hyrbyar Group,’ led by Hyrbyar Marri, who is based in London, and the ‘Acchu Group.’ While the Hyrbyar Group previously controlled the BLA, it appears that the organisation is now under the leadership of the Acchu Group. According to sources, Bashir Zeb, the leader of the Acchu Group who operates within Pakistan, also heads the Majeed Brigade. This development suggests that the BLA’s local leadership is driving the current surge in terrorist activities, and that the leaders based abroad no longer hold the sway over the group that they once did.
Broader snapshot of militancy
In addition to the BLA, several other factions form the core of the insurgency in Balochistan. These groups include the Baluch Liberation Front (BLF) led by Dr Allah Nazar, the Baloch Republican Army (BRA) led by Brahmdagh Bugti, the Baloch Republican Guards under the leadership of Bashir Domki, and the Mehran Marri-led United Baloch Army (UBA). There are also militants referred to as ‘Khwarjis’ operating in some areas, with an alliance that connects them to the broader insurgent activities.
What are BLA objectives?
An intriguing factor that stands out in each of the recent attacks by BLA is timing. The October 6 attack, for instance, comes right as Pakistan prepares to host the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Heads of State Council Meeting in Islamabad and at a time when the England cricket team is present in the country for a Test series.
“We have identified clear links, showing that they [terrorists] planned to ruin the SCO conference. A lot of people are in anguish [about SCO meeting] so that it should not be organised,” Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi had told the Senate following the coordinated August 26 attacks. Like the Karachi bombing on Oct 6, those attacks also coincided with the Bangladesh cricket team’s tour of Pakistan.
The Duki attack, meanwhile, was carried out just a day after a high-powered Saudi delegation arrived in Islamabad and signed MoUs worth $2.2 billion. Interestingly, Saudi Minister for Investment Sheikh Khalid Bin Abdul Aziz Al Faleh, who is leading the delegation, had confirmed on Thursday that the kingdom’s Manara Minerals was set to buy a stake in the Reko Diq gold and copper mine, located in Balochistan, in the coming weeks.
By timing high-octane attacks with high-profile international visits, the BLA on one hand aims to internationalise the Balochistan issue. At the same time, the selection of targets suggests it wants to simultaneously hurt Pakistan’s image and economy, and drive away potential foreign investment.
This is particularly true in the case of China and Pakistan’s relationship. Attacks on Chinese nationals have already begun to increase concerns, both among China’s leadership and its citizenry. Officials in various Chinese firms that currently operate in various sectors in Pakistan have begun to whisper their fears at the prospect of visiting the country.
While official statements from the Chinese government continue to reiterate the all-weather friendship, the language used and the response enacted suggest Beijing’s patience is wearing thin. In response to the Karachi bombing, China on Tuesday sent a task force to Pakistan.
“[The team] demanded that the Pakistani side properly handle the aftermath, spare no effort in treating the injured, thoroughly investigate the truth of the incident, apprehend and punish the perpetrators, and adopt stricter security measures to ensure the safety of Chinese personnel, institutions and projects in Pakistan,” the Chinese foreign ministry said in a statement following the team’s arrival.
Previously, Chinese firms halted work on hydropower projects in Pakistan in March after five Chinese nationals were killed in a terror attack in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.
What has emboldened the militants?
One factor that has increased the capacity of various Baloch groups including the BLA is a growing nexus with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Since July 2022, four Baloch groups were documented by several think tanks to have joined TTP, allowing the latter to expand its organisational presence in Baloch areas for the first time.
In a June 26 news conference announcing the arrest of two key TTP commanders, Balochistan Home Minister Ziaullah Langove shared a pre-recorded statement from one of them that detailed how the Majeed Brigade commander Bashir Zeb helped him cross the Pak-Afghan border into Balochistan.
The influence of this nexus on Baloch insurgency is also evident in the change in tactics, such as the increasing reliance on suicide bombings and attacks on targets outside of Balochistan. The withdrawal of US and Nato forces from Afghanistan have not only provided Baloch groups and the TTP with ease of movement in the war-torn country, it has also allowed them to benefit from the modern weapons and equipment the foreign troops left behind.
Reports have also suggested that the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) has also increased its presence in Balochistan. According to one Reuters report, Sanaullah Ghafari, the 29-year-old leader IS-K is believed to be living in Balochistan as well.
Foreign hand
A preliminary report over the Oct 6 Karachi bombing has indicated that the attack was executed with the assistance of a foreign intelligence agency. The report, submitted by the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) to the anti-terrorism court, stated that the suicide bombing targeted Chinese engineers as part of a conspiracy to damage Pakistan-China relations.
Pakistani security officials have long accused ‘hostile agencies’ of trying to destabilise Balochistan and other restive parts of the country in a bid to disrupt investments and developments. While the term is usually seen as pointing to India, it is also used as a veiled reference to certain Western and Middle Eastern interests as well.
The West, the United States in particular, has long viewed China’s interest in Balochistan with suspicion. A report by an American website that claimed Pakistan had agreed to let China set up naval base in Gwadar Port was ‘rubbished’ by the Foreign Office just last month.
Some in official circles also view Iran’s role in Balochistan with suspicion. According to them, the Gwadar port factor creates contention with Iran’s plans for Chahbahar. They cite the case of RAW officer Kulbhushan Yadav, who travelled to Balochistan using Iranian documents.
Protests and militancy
According to government officials, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) led by Mahrang Baloch is a ‘soft proxy’ for Baloch groups’ terrorist activities. The state views Balochistan's ‘resistance’ as fuelled by foreign-backed insurgents rather than genuine grievances. The protests, according to state narrative, are not a response to ‘oppression’ but a ‘manipulated display’ orchestrated by separatist elements to create an image of discontent not reflective of the broader population's sentiments.
The state believes that military operations are necessary to maintain law and order against these armed militants and that some elements choose to use words like ‘forcefully disappeared’ for arrests of those involved in activities that threatened national security. It asserts that any releases were made under legal frameworks, not due to pressure from protests.
The BYC, according to the state, is promoting anti-state sentiments and encouraging a separatist agenda under the guise of ‘peaceful resistance’. It believes the presence of external ethnic groups and foreign elements in these protests, suggest a coordinated attempt to destabilise the region with cross-border influences
The state also views with suspicion the role of certain foreign actors given how other ‘proxies’ for militant groups like the Dr Naseem Baloch-led Baloch National Movement (BNM), Baloch Voice For Justice (BVP) and Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) operate from foreign nations like the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands and South Korea. BNM leader Dr Naseem, who used to be in self-exile in France, recently moved to the UK to lobby for Mahrang Baloch.
End solution
‘Hostile agencies’ notwithstanding, the present situation in Balochistan does represent at least some failure on the security and governance front. A state distracted by political tensions in the centre has limited bandwidth to deal with a multitude of challenges, particularly with regards to security. At the same time, hostile elements have seized on the ‘opportunity’ presented by Pakistan’s current economic and political polycrisis to ramp up pressure on the government.
At least part of the solution requires the government and other stakeholders to sort out the political crisis in the centre in a sustainable manner. The present approach in dealing with that particular issue has only exacerbated the crisis rather than bringing it to a resolution.
Likewise with Balochistan, a lasting solution will require an acknowledgment and redressal of the genuine grievances of the province’s people. “Radicalisation is a linear process which starts with grievances. When grievances are left unassuaged for a long period of time, they create a cognitive opening among the people espousing them. This is when the aggrieved people become receptive to any ideology that they find compatible with their grievances. The embrace of ideology leads to radicalization, eventually pushing the espousers to sign up for deployment,” said Naveed Hussain, a senior journalist who writes on security-related issues.
“This means the use of force alone cannot provide a lasting solution. We need a comprehensive approach that tackles the issue step by step. We need to address underlying grievances, counter radical narratives with alternative ideologies, and integrate the use of force strategically where necessary,” he added.
Security operations have been ongoing in Balochistan to quell the current phase of separatist insurgency set off by the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti in a military operation in 2006. However, the separatist violence has only increased in the volatile province. “The government has to come up with a comprehensive strategy combining both kinetic and non-kinetic components to heal this festering wound,” he said.
The non-kinetic approach must be spearheaded by civilian governments and political leaders. They need to proactively engage with the legitimate grievances of the Baloch people, rebuild trust, and tackle the deep-rooted feelings of deprivation and alienation in the province. By doing so, they can effectively counter the separatists’ narrative and diminish its influence.
“Unfortunately, successive governments have largely failed to address the feelings of deprivation experienced by the people of Balochistan. In exchange for securing their electoral seats, they effectively relinquished authority to security forces,” Hussain added. “Initiatives like the PPP government’s ‘Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan Package’ in 2010 and Nawaz Sharif's ‘Pur Aman Balochistan Package’ in 2015 were introduced with great fanfare and ambitious promises, but ultimately fell short of meaningful implementation.”