What to make of India’s dangerous ‘error’

On 10 March (Thursday), a ‘supersonic object’, originating from the Sirsa in India's western Haryana state crashed near Mian Channu in Pakistani Punjab. As per DGISPR, ‘the object was picked up inside Indian territory by the air defence operations centre of the Pakistan Air Force’. Pakistan has strongly protested the ‘flagrant violation of its airspace’; and the Indian defence ministry on Friday, ‘regretted’ that a missile "accidentally" entered Pakistan, attributing the incident to a "technical malfunction".

"On March 9, 2022, in the course of routine maintenance, a technical malfunction led to the accidental firing of a missile," the ministry said in a statement. "It is learnt that the missile landed in an area of Pakistan. The government has taken serious view and ordered a high-level court of enquiry," the statement added.

This piece discusses the what, how and why of the ‘errant’ launch and its implications.

First, the ‘what’ side – a Pakistan Air Force senior officer is quoted about the undergoing forensic analysis of the ‘object’, with initial studies suggesting it to be an unarmed surface-to-surface supersonic missile, flying at 40,000 feet, at speed Mach 3 (three times the speed of sound, independent of ground distance and wind), crashing 124 km inside Pakistani airspace. The rear end of the ‘object’ curiously matches the honeycomb structure at the tail of the Indian supersonic BrahMos cruise missile as per reports in the media and its photographs.

The Medium-range BrahMos (designated PJ-10) is a Supersonic Cruise Missile (one of the fastest in the world) that can be launched from land, air and/or naval platforms. It is based on the Russian P-800 Oniks cruise missile using sea-skimming technology, jointly developed by Russia’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya and the Indian DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation). Even the name is a combination of Rivers Brahmaputra (India) and Moskva (Russia). The missile is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and its Land, Ship and Air-launched variants are already in service.

India is currently working on its hypersonic version BrahMos-II, capable of cruising at Mach 7–8. This version is expected to be ready for testing by 2024 and would boost India’s aerial strike capability. Its current range is 800 km and planned is 1,500 km; and it is designated to hit protected targets with pinpoint accuracy. Russia initially supplied 65 per cent of the BrahMos' components, like its ramjet engine and radar seeker. India now makes 65 per cent of the missile components indigenously, planning to raise it to 85 per cent, using an Indian made seeker and booster. A 2009 test failure was attributed to software problems, with missile missing the target by seven kilometres. So that is where the problem could be...if and when.

Russian and India jointly see this as mainstay missile capable of hitting an intended building among a cluster; and targets behind a mountain with pin-point accuracy, in steep-dive mode. It can also engage ground targets as low as 10 metres, ostensibly for ‘surgical strikes without collateral damage’.

Its Inertial Navigation System (INS) using Indian, US and Russian navigation satellites provides high-accuracy below five meters. On 30 September 2020, its extended range (over 400 km) supersonic cruise version was successfully test-fired, using indigenous airframe and booster from a land-based facility in Odessa. On 24 November 2020, DRDO successfully test fired upgraded 800 km BrahMos variant.

At present, the BrahMos surface-launched (Block I) has four variants with two upgraded variants; one anti-aircraft carrier variant; two air-launched variants; and three submarine-launched variants. A more versatile and lighter BrahMos-NG (Next Generation) is reported to have 290 km range cruising at Mach 3.5 speed in all army, navy and air force variants. It weighs only around 1.5 tons, is just 5 meters long and 50 cm in diameter. BrahMos-NG has lesser RCS (radar cross section), is hence harder to locate and engage by air defense systems. It was scheduled to test flight in 2022, and most probably that is the BrahMos that crashed in Pakistan.

Most test launches of surface-to-surface versions have been conducted from the Integrated Test Range (ITR), Chandipur (Orissa or Odessa) along east coast on the Bay of Bengal; and at Pokhran test range near in Rajasthan, using Tatra truck-based mobile launchers. Sirsa - the suspected point of origin of the crashed missile - and Pokhran are some 500 km apart. Sirsa has an important IAF base Forward Operating Base (FOB) along Pakistan’s border and the missile launch from there raises questions.

Second, the ‘How and Why’ of the incident. DGISPR, while avoiding jumping to conclusions, attributed the incident to ‘possible error’ and not ‘deliberate action’, probably because of the technical/human fault during routine tests and trials.

However, in that case, as per standard bilateral procedure involving missile launches, especially the ICBM/Cruise variants etc, India was bound to pre-inform Pakistan. Since India did not do so, as the limited range launch was BrahMos NG intended to remain confined to the Indian territory, therefore this also confirms the possibility that it was perhaps, a BrahMos NG gone astray or led astray, given the missile capability to maneuver.

Moreover, given the Indian offensive posturing recently and the missile’s significant features; this does not seem so innocently accidental. It could have been a deliberate effort to check Pakistan’s Air Defence, readiness both at the PAF and the Army levels.

Third, that brings us to the implications of the incident. As already highlighted, the unarmed ‘missile’, not only endangered domestic and international aviation traffic in both the Indian and Pakistani airspace, it could have caused massive casualties in case of hitting our densely populated towns and cities (thankfully no casualty is reported). The fact that it did not, can be credited to its cited features.

Lastly, even an accidental launch has the potential of causing unnecessary and dangerous alert between nuclear-armed neighbors. A non-accidental launch with deliberate deviation from ‘ostensible’ path has even deeper military implications. The proximity of both countries does not give any reaction time to the other side given the speed, short time of flight and distance to various targets. Hence any launch has the potential of being perceived as hostile, to be responded to.

One hopes that the Indian military planners comprehend the gravity of the error that goes beyond their perfunctory clarification. They need to institute robust mechanisms with Pakistan, to obviate chances of misunderstanding, miscalculation and undue and unnecessary escalation. Pakistan's resolve should never be in question by New Delhi.

(The author is a retired Pakistan Army major general who writes on defence, global affairs and political sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and his Twitter handle @20_Inam)