Stabilising Afghanistan

At a preliminary level, we may think of stability in Afghanistan as ending the long cycle of conflict and building a durable peace. But how can it be done and why have the communities that comprise Afghanistan, regional countries and the international community not succeeded in achieving this objective fully?

Before I answer these questions, I wish to dispel two common misperceptions about the Afghan people. First, that they are born to fight and it is in their culture to live with conflict and turmoil. This is an absurd idea. Conflict is a social condition that develops when either the state fails to perform its primary functions to ensure social order and justice or, owing to its failures, these functions are assumed by certain social groups that act like the state. Our own experience in recent years in the border regions might explain this point.

The second misperception is that Afghan social groups and their leaders are solely responsible for the chaos that Afghanistan has been through during the past 30 years. It is partly true, but largely false. Superpower ambitions and their power play turned this unfortunate country into their battleground about two decades back. The social, security and political effects of that war continue to trouble the country and its neighbourhood, especially Pakistan. The effects have been truly traumatic for the Afghans — migration, dislocation within the country and perpetual warfare. Outsiders, including us, have usually blamed the Afghans, who happen to be victims of the Cold War conflict which was scripted by the great powers.

In a way, the American-led war, though launched in an unusual national political climate, changed the structure and magnitude of the conflict with two objectives in mind: termination of the Taliban regime and rebuilding the Afghan state. In a way, the Americans had to pay a heavier price for neglecting Afghanistan and for having in place a self-centred policy of walking away from that country once its global adversary — the Soviet Union — was down and out.

There is also an important lesson to be learnt form that painful experience: leaving Afghanistan without effective state capacities to stand on its own feet and defend itself against militants might create greater chaos within the country and around its borders. Otherwise, we may see the same regional game players and agents of civil war stage a comeback.

True, Afghanistan is better off today, in terms of indicators of state and nationhood, than it was when the Taliban movement fought and defeated the various mujahideen factions that were perpetually at war with themselves since the departure of the Soviets. With the generous support of the international community, Afghanistan has made progress, but this needs to be consolidated and further developed. It is in nobody’s rational interest to keep Afghanistan on the boil — except militant groups that have some radical ideology or glorify violence and armed struggle for political gains.

There is no shortage of ideas about how to stabilise Afghanistan. The question is what is likely to work and what is not going to work. One thing that can never be an effective solution itself is more war in Afghanistan. Wars must have parallel political tracks to negotiate, reconcile and accommodate different interests and social groups. Delightfully, that is beginning to happen with Afghan leaders taking the initiative of peace talks and seeking reconciliation with the Taliban groups.

Building peace in conflict zones cannot be a one-step action but a process that would need to be pursued single-mindedly without any fear of failure or slack in efforts.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 15^th, 2010.