Will the Waziristan militants put up a fight?

They know they cannot take on technologically, numerically, and professionally superior security forces in open combat

The army’s armoured vehicles have rolled into North Waziristan Agency, the ‘centre of gravity’ for militants in Pakistan and beyond. The myth of invincibility about the region has been smashed. Operation Zarb-e-Azb, dubbed as the crucial battle against homegrown militants and their foreign cohorts, was launched after the government exhausted all its options. The militants didn’t appear to be amenable to peace talks, though publicly, they professed a commitment to dialogue. The peace initiative started on a high note and came amid high expectations. But soon it hit roadblocks. The militants squabbled, tried to dictate terms, and in the end bullied the government. And then the inevitable happened: the talks broke down.

Now, the ground operation is underway. Surprisingly though, there has been little resistance from the militants thus far. And they might not put up a stiff fight for more than one reason.

First, the TTP has been weakened by splits and infighting. Its emir, Mullah Fazlullah, who is operating from safe havens in the northern Afghan province of Kunar, couldn’t ward off centrifugal trends plaguing the umbrella group since the death of his predecessor, Hakimullah Mehsud. Fazlullah’s authority eroded: a) because he was missing from the war theatre, and b) because some senior cadres were unhappy with his ascendency. Traditionally, the TTP leadership remained exclusively with the Mehsud tribe, which provides the bulk of foot soldiers to the group. When Khan Said, aka Sajna, the commander of TTP’s Waliur Rehman group, took over the group’s command in South Waziristan, his rival Sheheryar Mehsud of the Hakimullah faction didn’t acquiesce. The tug of war turned violent and the two factions fought bloody battles for nearly three months. Finally, Fazlullah stepped in to stop the infighting. He replaced Sajna with Khalid Sheikh Haqqani, but the former refused to submit. And the TTP fell apart. Sajna and his men walked away, accusing the group of criminality.

Second, TTP militants rely on guerilla tactics or asymmetric warfare. They fight at night, target the military’s supply lines with homemade bombs, mount suicide attacks on military checkpoints, or ambush troops in the treacherous mountainous terrain. They know they cannot take on the technologically, numerically, and professionally superior security forces in open combat. Realising their weakness, some of their fighters might have fled into neighbouring Afghanistan or gone into hiding.

Third, the military has significantly damaged the Taliban infrastructure with precision air strikes and heavy artillery in the run-up to the ground operation. Dozens of hideouts have been decimated in the bombing campaign since June 15 or even before that. Fourth, Hafiz Gul Bahadur of Shura-e-Mujahideen, North Waziristan, is not aligned with the TTP. He played host to the Haqqani network, likeminded TTP factions and Middle Eastern militants. They all have focused their energies on fighting US-led foreign troops in Afghanistan. Bahadur’s group had been at peace with the government until June 10 when he accused the government of reneging on a peace agreement the two sides had forged in 2007. After initial belligerent statements, he said his group wouldn’t fight at least during the month of Ramazan. Similarly, the group of Mullah Nazir, now led by his successor Bahawal Khan, aka Salahuddin Ayubi, is allied with Bahadur. Their stronghold was Wana, South Waziristan, and they acted as a counterweight to the TTP in the region. Maulvi Nazir, who died in a US drone strike last year, had successfully driven out fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan from Wana after a deadly battle in 2007. Reportedly, the groups of Bahadur, Ayubi and the Haqqani Network might have slipped into Afghanistan, probably into the Khost province.

This provides sufficient grounds to believe that it wouldn’t be a high-casualty war. But the military might not have a walkover either. Some die-hard militants might be waiting in hiding for the military’s supply line to stretch out before launching sporadic counter-attacks. Nonetheless, the military is likely to re-establish the writ of the state in North Waziristan in weeks, not months.

Published in The Express Tribune, July 9^th, 2014.

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