Pakistan’s N-policy dilemmas: a rebuttal

Kashmali Khan’s musings have left me confused despite the fact that I have extensively written on nuclear issues.

Kashmali Khan’s musings (“Pakistan’s nuclear policy dilemmas” published in these pages on October 4) have left me confused despite the fact that I have extensively written on nuclear issues since 1998. Consider. She starts with mention of Pakistan becoming the new chair of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors even as it has blocked all “talks proposing a treaty to ban production of fissile material... for nuclear weapons”. So, Pakistan should not have been elected to the chair because of this even if its policy is “justified on the basis of maintaining a power balance in the region...”?

She then says that Pakistan has not signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) “along with Israel and Iran [sic!]”. Iran, of course, is a signatory to the NPT but facts must not stand in the way of a good story.  So, Pakistan should sign the treaty; or be penalised for not signing it? What’s the argument? We are also told that because of “accusations of smuggling nuclear weapons technology” the “selection of Pakistan as the chair is [considered] problematic”. The minor fact that Pakistan was approved the new chair unopposed is eschewed.

Similarly, while mentioning Pakistan’s refusal to sign the NPT (which has its own reasons), Ms Khan ignores the fact that it is an IAEA member since 1957; that this one-year position rotates among the regions, gives Pakistan no power to decide the UN nuclear policy, and that under the IAEA's statute Pakistan enjoys the same privileges and rights as all other IAEA members. What is the linkage between Pakistan’s refusal to sign the NPT, blocking of a deal on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and her election as chair of the IAEA’s Board of Governors — unless she is arguing that because Pakistan has not signed the NPT and is a spoiler on FMCT, it should not be chairing the IAEA board? (Here, we are not going into the pros and cons of Pakistan’s FMCT policy.)

Perhaps the writer is arguing that there are international concerns regarding Dr AQ Khan’s proliferation activities. If that, then she needs to make a clear distinction between Dr Khan’s activities and the state of Pakistan. She does not do that, a glaring omission. She then compounds the problem by steering the debate towards nuclear terrorism, throwing in the now-fashionable scenario of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND), which may not be confused with a Radioactive Dispersal Device (RDD), commonly known as a dirty bomb.

The IND scenarios require a separate debate but let it be said that because, unlike an RDD, it refers to a reliable nuclear weapon, its acquisition, regardless of whether it is bought or stolen or fabricated through weapons-grade fissile material, would require extremely elaborate plans and logistics which could be detected rather easily. A 2004 paper commissioned by the WMD Commission describes at least six undetected steps for such a scenario to take place: A terrorist group with the necessary technical and financial resources to execute this scheme must organise and begin operations. The group must choose to engage in an act of nuclear terrorism at the highest level of violence. It must then acquire sufficient fissile material to fabricate an IND, through gift, purchase, theft, or diversion; must next fabricate the weapon; must transport the intact IND (or its components) to a high-value target and must (be able to) detonate the IND.

For a host of reasons, meeting the last four conditions, even when the first two are in place, is almost impossible, even if probable. What is more problematic is Ms Khan’s assertion that this possibility could emerge from Pakistan when it would be logistically easier for any rogue group to pick up a gun-type device from within the US (for example) than try to carry one or its components from Pakistan. It may also be instructive for the writer to study the organisational structure of Pakistan’s National Command Authority as also the various safety and security procedures in place which, not surprisingly, are based on worst-case scenarios, including the current insurgency.

The issues she has casually treated have invited inquiries by some of the best minds in the field and all are much larger than Pakistan alone — and complicated.

Published in The Express Tribune, October 6^th, 2010.