Kurram – burying the undying demons

The path to peace in Kurram requires state action, community trust, and long-term, inclusive strategies.

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The year was 2007 and I had just returned from Parachinar after tying up contingency military response with other LEAs like FC troops under my command. There were reports of an imminent sectarian flare-up. And when it happened despite the good intentions of both sides, we were prepared to quell the entire (former) Kurram Agency, and area up to Hangu and Usterzai closer to Kohat, in precisely eleven days, with a truce 'imposed' on the warring parties, and the writ of the State imposed. The Political Administration, local leaders, the Military, and Civil Armed Forces, working in unison.

The weaponry used by both sides included ROB 107 rockets, RPG-7 rockets with their high explosive cone drilled and filled with gasoline to make them incendiary on impact, 12.7 mm Dashaka heavy machine guns, mortars mostly the deadly 82 mm, and land mines etc. Most of these arms were part of the qaumi asliha (tribal arsenal) or were hired from the weapon dealers in the former tribal belt. Artillery and combat aviation were the only superior assets with the State, used for 'deterrence'. The munitions were supplied to both sides by the weapon smugglers from Afghanistan, with the rates jacked up.

The recurrent sectarian wars were and are funded by religious organisations and their foreign backers, expat locals in the Gulf states, and through 'levy' of local donations. Both sides had communication equipment and sometimes they would interfere with military communications. Plenty of retired military and CAF veterans are available to both sides in these sectarian wars of hatred and ethnic cleansing, to plan, advise and execute military style maneuvers now under drone coverage.

Larger Kurram's geo-demography is an enigma. From Teri Mangal on the Pak-Afghan border, Sunni Mengal and Maqbal Tribes inhabit the western part up to the outskirts of Parachinar city, which then had predominantly Shia Turi tribe, and some Sunni population from Bangash tribe…the latter was forced out of the city in different conflicts, finally evacuating it in November 2007, when Mira Jan Colony was cleansed. I had left by then. Outside Parachinar area, most tribesmen belong to Bangash tribe, the only Pashtun tribe with Shia minority. From Parachinar to Sadda – an important Sunni town – for some 55 km, the area north of the road is Shia including the Shalozan area; and the Sunnis inhabit the southern side with Boshera and Balash Khel villages, the perpetual flashpoints.

Kurram River divides the area all along. Shia settlements dot either side up to Sadda, but beyond up to Bagan (8 km from Sadda), the right (southern) bank has Shia villages, and the left (north/eastern) bank has Sunni villages. Sadda is exclusively Sunni, besides the entire Central Kurram in the east. Central Kurram then joins Orakzai District. This Sunni belt extends up to the town of Hangu and beyond. Hangu (Kohat District) is Sunni majority with strong Shia minority, that extends north and northeast well into the Orakzai District. From Hangu towards Kohat there is another Shia enclave in the two Usterzai villages (Bala and Payan) midway to Kohat. So, both communities can and do block road access to the other at will.

The main communication artery is Parachinar-Kohat Road (183 km), connecting Sunni Sadda to Sunni Bagan (8 km), from Bagan to Sunni Alizai (7 km), from Alizai to Tall Cantt (14 km), Tall Town/Cantt to Hangu (55 km), Hangu to Usterzai Villages (25 km) and from Villages to Kohat (20 km). As per 2017 Census, the over 0.6 million population in Kurram District is 58% Sunni and 42% Shia. The adjoining Hangu District stood at over 0.5 million (2023) with 90% Sunni and 10 % Shia inhabitants. Likewise, the Orakzai District, at little under 0.4 million (2023) is 82% Sunni and 18% Shia. Orakzai has a history of Taliban incursions (2006) from the neighboring Khyber District, whereas Kurram bordering north Waziristan, has experienced TTP/Da'esh presence.

In this geographic and demographic riddle and confusion, inter-dependence and living side-by-side is the only way to go. However, the sectarian hardliners, in trying to undo their geographic and demographic imperatives, look outwards. Demographically squeezed Shia community naturally feels under pressure and resorts to militant activism, not to show weakness. On their side, the Tehran-influenced Zainabiyoon veterans, whose local cadre is now more committed, and battle-hardened after war experience in Syria etc, is the latest entrant.

TTP sides with Sunnis, who find themselves under pressure around the Parachinar-Bagan belt. Hence the conflict in the area has 'become' a proxy war between TTP and foreign-backed militants. And proxy conflicts generally have a long life when the sectarian sentiment runs so deep and is hardened by each episode of violence. Half-hearted truces, cobbled together by tribal jirgas and imposed on exhausted belligerents, only provide temporary reprieve from violence, and cannot address the complex and intractable root causes. Some 64 such agreements to date, served as regrouping pauses before the next showdown.

Frontier Corps troops are stationed in Hangu, Tall, Alizai, Bagan, Sadda, Parachinar and Teri Mangal. Army is stationed at Tall and Parachinar. LEAs' regular deployment is insufficient to handle security flare-up over such a large stretch of area with charged demography, given the cited military capability of the combatants, and the frequency and unpredictability of violence. Displaced Sunnis from Parachinar, now settled in Sadda and Bagan areas, dominate the road. Their likely collusion with TTP and IS-K (in Central Kurram), makes the Shia road travel of over 60 km from Parachinar to Bagan dangerous. Convoys are hence escorted on given days with known schedule, facilitating ambushes. Protection of convoys without route picqueting is of little value.

Another aspect of the recent carnage in the area is the intensity of violence. The worrisome disturbing trend entails wanton killing of women and children, against Islamic, Pashtun and tribal ethos; prisoner-taking and other unspeakable acts. The youthful militant cadre on either side seems to run amok under emotionalism and sectarian vengeance, without any effective control. The paradoxical and traditional mix of tribal clergy and elders, militant commanders and the elected representatives makes lasting decisions resulting in lasting peace, almost impossible. The State's reliance on such truces has and will never yield because compared to the rest of erstwhile FATA, the traditional elite in this area is weaker and is now compromised.

In this deadly mix, the State must be present and seen as such…forcefully, continuously and proactively. Continues…