The Gordian knot of civil-military relations in Pakistan

True to our character, the ashhrafiyya-driven political system cannot survive without churning out regular storms in the nation’s teacup. December was no exception. The saga of the Army Chief’s tenure’s extension was followed by the storm around the verdict against Gen Pervez Musharraf in a “no holds barred” manner. The royal decree of dragging, multiple hangings and so on — without due regard to the national sentiment in general and that of the Armed Forces in particular — by the Judge speaks volumes about the attitudes, mind-sets and prejudices at a precariously dangerous level. One is not qualified to judge the legality and jurisprudential correctness of the judgment; therefore, this discourse deals with power usurpations and constitutional manipulations within the wider context of civil-military relations.

The 1947 Constituent Assembly framed the Interim Constitution under the 1935 Government of India Act, replaced by the first Constitution in 1956. Gen Ayub “abrogated” this Constitution in 1958, imposing martial law. He promulgated the second constitution in 1962, containing provisions for “basic democracies” and a federal form of government. In 1969, Ayub Khan relinquished power to Gen Yahya who imposed the second martial law, “abrogating” the 1962 Constitution besides abolishing “basic democracies” and “One Unit” through a Legal Framework Order (LFO). In 1973, Pakistan’s third and current constitution was adopted; later “suspended” by Gen Zia through the third martial law in 1977. He issued the 1981 Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), providing a framework for the government under martial law. Efforts to reinstate the 1973 Constitution resulted in ending military rule in 1988 and allowing elections. In 1997, the parliamentary system was adopted with a revocation of the president’s power to remove a sitting government. In 1999, Gen Musharraf seized power “suspending” the 1973 Constitution. He ruled by decree as “chief executive” initially and as president since 2001. In 2002, the Constitution was reinstated after a referendum, incorporating a new LFO that restored the presidential powers removed in 1997.

This brief constitutional history reveals our political anguish to decide on a form of government — presidential or parliamentary and the martial laws — where generals are both usurpers and law-givers. Without condoning takeovers, the military in each instance acted in supreme national interest, in accordance with the prevalent public sentiment and at times at the urging of the political opposition. One is reminded of Gen Zia speaking to the joint session of Parliament in 1987, lamenting “Ham martial law bhi aap he key kehne per lagate hain” (we impose martial law at your [politicians’] urging).

The path to military takeovers is lined with systemic fragility, manipulation and corruption by the ashhrafiyya-dominated political class, inexperience and incompetence of squabbling politicians when in power, the ensuing lack of deliverance and pettiness morphing into public discontent and the ultimate breakdown. The judiciary, cognizant of this, has provided all military takeovers with full, legal and constitutional cover. The “doctrine of necessity” is a useful reference point.

When not in power, the military has been exercising self-restraint — truth be told. For the military to stay out of power and civilian leaders to command respect of the uniform, the political class has to match the military with an equally nationalistic outlook, above narrow partisan, ethnic, provincial, sectarian and numerous other fault-lines. And it does not happen quite often. With the top politicians conspiring to grab power instead of respecting the majority vote, losing half of the country in the process; political masters handing over intelligence dossiers to the nemesis; political appointees asking foreign powers for interference in domestic politics; politicians pursuing narrow monetary interests over national interests; and politicians resorting to unrestrained criticism of their own military, whenever, politically conducive.

There are no two opinions about the core issue of “civilian control of the military”. As enshrined in the Constitution and bedrock of democracy, the armed forces are and should remain subservient to civilian control. However, there are reasons for aberration from this desired norm. First, the armed forces alongside other organs of the state constitute the “deep state” or — more fashionably — the “establishment”. Savvy politicians all over the world complement their deep state and not confront it. Even the US is no exception. Second, the nature, mandate and organisation of the establishment make it very nationalistic in outlook; a vigilant watch to protect national interests as institutionally perceived. Political leadership may take this jealous ownership as curtailing their liberty of action. Third, in Pakistan’s case, our existential security challenges would always catapult military to outsize prominence. Fourth, civilian capability and ability sadly leaves yawning gaps. The military would never take over in a politically stable environment with the economy doing well and governance at “minimum” optimal levels.

The Kayani-engendered “self-restraint” continues to this day as evident from the military’s “relatively” muted response to the numerous storms directed at it, multiple hangings of Gen Musharraf being the latest. However, the armed forces are not a monolith. Troops, junior officers and senior leadership all need to feel respected. Derogatory, insulting and less than graceful opinions against past and present military high command are never taken kindly.

Drawing on four decades of professional experience, one can safely conclude that the military is always willing to carefully cede authority provided the political counterparts are able to deserve and assume it. Ironically, it is the military-run National Defence University (NDU) that conducts the now biennial training seminars to nurture the future civilian leadership. Participants comprise politicians, elected and non-elected, from councilors to MPAs, MNAs and senators, businessmen, media leaders, civil and military officials and other notable citizens from all walks of life. The focus remains on the political, geo-strategic, security and economic imperatives of the country, particularly aimed at the newly elected political leadership, that generally wins elections by delivering fiery speeches, but fails on deliverance.

The interplay among various organs of the state is another important facet of the wider debate. The executive, at times, doesn’t know its powers and obligations referring politically risky decisions to the judiciary. The judiciary exercises an enthusiastic overreach and in the process creates a parallel executive. The legislature remains a venue for political filibuster and point-scoring, instead of making laws and overseeing their implementation. The media — free and unrestrained — is manipulated, manipulative and beholden to ratings’ war, or money to be more precise. Every now and then, it brews a storm in Pakistan’s tea cup from seemingly frivolous issues. The government and opposition are perpetually locked in verbal duels rather than governance and constructive criticism respectively. So not surprisingly traders take their grievances to the Army Chief. And the establishment — Foreign Office included — rather than legislative committees and the government impacts important policies like national security, defence and foreign relations. Ignoring the establishment results in ignominies like the recent embarrassing debacle of the last minute withdrawal from the Malaysian summit, under ostensible Saudi pressure.

With the prevalent state of affairs, the military’s civilian supremacy would only remain a pipe-dream and dreams are said to be true if seen closer to the wake-up time.

Published in The Express Tribune, December 31^st, 2019.

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