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The futility of using lashkars

Published: November 22, 2010

The writer is a shift in charge at The Express Tribune naveed.hussain@tribune.com.pk

In its exasperating fight against militancy, the government has been doing some weird things — without caring for the consequences. That’s understandable because a desperate government wants to defeat insurgents at any cost. One such bizarre thing is its support for tribal lashkars, or armed militias, which it paradoxically calls ‘amn’ (peace) caommittees, to fight the Taliban in restive tribal regions and parts of the volatile Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. In some areas, no doubt, this policy worked. And proponents of this policy would cite the examples of Dhog Darra in Upper Dir, Ambar in Mohmand tribal region and Salarzai in Bajaur Agency where local lashkars successfully confronted the militants. But the cost of this policy dwarfs its gains.

The ‘lashkarisation’ of the tribal society, perhaps the most heavily-armed in the world, brought death and destruction of massive proportions. The vengeful militants have targeted lashkars with impunity, killing and maiming hundreds of volunteers and tribal elders since 2008. In Bajaur Agency, the government, in an effort to seek local acceptance for a military operation, encouraged tribesmen in the Salarzai area to raise a lashkar to fight alongside security forces. Reprisal came shortly. On November 6, 2008, a Taliban suicide bomber set off an explosion amidst a jirga (grand assembly) of Salarzai tribal elders, killing 25 chieftains and injuring dozens more. The jirga was convened to raise a lashkar to fight militants. And it didn’t end here. Tens of Salarzai chieftains were target-killed in suicide and bomb attacks in the days and months to follow. The message was loud and clear: anyone siding with the government would be killed.

In neighbouring Mohmand Agency, the Utmanzai tribe also decided to form a laskhar in the Ambar area. On July 9, 2010, their elders met in the office of a local government administrator in the Yakaghund sub-division to discuss details. The Taliban struck with double suicide bombings, flattening the once bustling marketplace and killing over a hundred innocent tribesmen. Most jirga members survived but Malik Sahibzada Utmankhel, who had successfully commanded an anti-Taliban lashkar in his home village of Prang Ghar area, wasn’t lucky enough.

Now come to Orakzai Agency, where a full-fledged military operation was launched in March this year. But before that, the authorities convinced the tribesmen to form an anti-Taliban lashkar. On October 10, 2008, hundreds of tribesmen from Ali Khel tribe gathered in the Khadizai area to discuss the make-up of the militia. A Taliban suicide bomber detonated an explosive-laden vehicle at the venue, killing 85 tribesmen and injuring over 200 more. The bloody story doesn’t end here. Hundreds of tribesmen have been killed in similar fashion in North and South Waziristan tribal regions, in Khyber Agency and in the semi-tribal area of Darra Adamkhel.

In Adezai and Bazidkhel, two villages on the outskirts of Peshawar, Haji Abdul Malik and Fahimur Rehman, both local nazims, had formed similar lashkars to challenge the Taliban. So far, the two militias have lost scores of volunteers in this unending fight. Disillusioned as they are with the government, they now feel that they have been left at the mercy of a formidable adversary like the Taliban. Another ill of this policy of ‘lashkarisation’ is indiscriminate killings of anyone suspected of being a Talib. The tribal legions, comprising mainly young tribesmen full of vengeance, hound Taliban guerillas in their respective areas and kill them without mercy, burning down their houses and banishing their innocent kinsfolk from their native villages.

The short-term consequences of the policy of ‘lashkarisation’ are appalling, but the future scenario is more horrific. The feuds triggered by lashkars could make the Pashtun society, already embroiled in long-running blood feuds, a living hell, even after militancy is banished from the region for good.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 23rd, 2010.

Reader Comments (6)

  • Nov 22, 2010 - 11:37PM

    The role of private combatants in a war zone is already murky. The awakening movement in Iraq is a good example where the state backed by the US armed militias to maintain peace in exchange for monthly wages. It worked, deaths due to terrorism fell. However, the Iraqi government today is left with the headache of funding those payments or risking the very same fighters turning on their former masters.

    Added is the problem of accountability. Who is going to keep the lashkars in check? What came of the tall claims of regularising FATA and spurring development? With individuals heading such lashkars, they become a power unto themselves. What guarantee is their that once peace returns these lashkars can be easily disbanded? Who is going to pay for them? Will they receive training?Will they have to forgo their meek livelihoods to be members of such groups?Recommend

  • faraz
    Nov 23, 2010 - 12:20AM

    I agree, asking poor tribals to form lashkars against heavily armed taliban is immoral.Recommend

  • Omer Khan
    Nov 23, 2010 - 9:52AM

    We have already had too many bad experiences of encouraging non-state actors to fight our wars. Instead of learning from past mistakes, we are again nurturing a Frankenstein.

    The long term effects of the lashkar policy can be disastrous. It must be understood that the motivation for most young recruits to militias, whether on the Talian side or government side, is the power and nuisance at local level it brings to them. This nuisance is in most cases exploited to the fullest to settle personal scores and get benefits. This in turn affects the social structure and order of the tribal society. The same happened during the Afghan War in 80s when a new group of people suddenly became very powerful and challenged the authority of traditional elders, and the results are today in front of us.Recommend

  • Muhammad Usman
    Nov 24, 2010 - 10:24AM

    Although there are adverse implications of organizing anti Taliban Lashkars in the heavily armed tribal areas of Pakistan but what choice one has in this regard. The Army cannot man and guard every nook and corner of FATA. Mustering armed support from the local tribesmen seems to be a necessity for the law enforcing agencies. In the face of ferocity and barbarity of the battled hardened enemy, hell bent to upset and destroy the local culture of governance; what else could be the answer.Recommend

  • Abaabeel
    Nov 25, 2010 - 2:33PM

    well done Naveed!Recommend

  • Aslam Mir
    Nov 27, 2010 - 8:20PM

    Dear Naveed Sb keept it up.

    Cheers,
    AslamRecommend

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