Storm in a tea cup

The writer is an analyst and a former ambassador to Yemen, Nigeria and Italy

When it appeared that the memogate melodrama was not going to go away even after Husain Haqqani and Mansoor testify as scheduled on February 22, in London, an infuriated editorial (The News, February 12) demanded “Someone, somewhere, somehow must pay” and then asked whether “the army had reached the wrong conclusion” in which case, it would “reflect poorly on their competence”.

Who, has ever had any doubts about the army’s competence?  Surely, not after 30 years of direct army rule. And why should anyone have to pay for botching up matters when that’s never been the tradition in the army. After all, not a single head rolled for the farce that was Operation Gibraltar (1965), Dacca (1971), Kargil (1999) and all the other fiascos in 2011. When no one was made to pay for these egregious failures, why on earth should anyone do so over memogate?

The plain fact is that in Pakistan, both the military and the political elite have been soliciting the Americans, to do the other in, ever since Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan started the practice in earnest, soon after independence.  As for the Americans, they happily took advantage of the deep antagonisms between the army and the civilians to further their own ends, like anyone in the game of real politick would do.

On another occasion, Mansoor produced yet another ‘Confidential Memorandum’ (June, 29 1995) detailing how two serving generals and a leading politician were plotting to remove Benazir Bhutto (BB) with US support.

At BB’s request, I recall reading out what Mansoor had written, including the following portion that the politician in question had communicated to the Chief of Staff of the National Security Council, Nancy Soderberg, in Mansoor Ijaz’s presence, at the National Democratic Gala event on June 28, 1995.

“You must understand that this woman (BB) has done tremendous damage to the country’s economic and political future. There is now some thinking in the armed forces of Pakistan that the time has come that she should go. I urge you to give me a message that I can take back to the military generals in Pakistan. If you give me a message of encouragement, we can then move forward more confidently to remove her from power. We are prepared to commit to the US that there will be a civilian transition administration with elections to be held in 1-1.5 years and we think this change will put Pakistan in a better position to address US concerns.  The reason I am asking you for support is that the people with whom I have contact in the military are concerned that any action taken by them against the current government will be viewed unfavourably by the US Administration”.

Mansoor Ijaz then went on to elaborate how the plan to get rid of Benazir Bhutto was to be carried out.

As I recall, even as I read out Mansoor’s message, BB kept looking for something to take with her for her next appointment. Nor did she stop searching for whatever it was while I was reading. But, once I had finished, she looked at me and said, “So, Zafar, what’s new?’

“Well if you put it that way, prime minister”, I said, “nothing really.”

“Good, leave it here, I might talk to General Waheed,” she said, seemingly pleased that she had finally managed to find what she had been looking for.

And come to think of it, BB needed to say nothing more. She was there on army sufferance, so if she was going to be removed she could do nothing about it and, if she wasn’t, why stir the hornet’s nest.

In contrast, everyone here had their knickers in a twist as soon as Mansoor Ijaz wrote the letter to the independent newspaper. So much so, that I, too, was momentarily taken in. It was, therefore, a relief to know that Mansoor and Haqqani, two veritable peas in a pod, were having fun and games although in the process both got hurt as naughty boys often do.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 20^th, 2012.