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The writer is author of Military Inc. and a visiting professor at Johns Hopkins University, US (ayesha.siddiqa@tribune.com.pk)
The US is currently engaged in strategic dialogue with both major states of South Asia. The dialogue with the Indians was meant to iron out some tactical problems in various areas including education, trade and counter-terrorism. The highlight was their discussion on counter-terrorism in which the Indian side emphasised the importance of getting access to David Coleman Headley, the man suspected of involvement in the Mumbai terror attacks. Washington had agreed to provide Indian investigators access to David Headley. However, the US authorities have signed a plea bargain with him, according to which he will not be handed over to either India or Pakistan. Access to Headley was important for the Indians as part of enhancing the bilateral understanding on counter-terrorism. New Delhi is not pleased about Washington not informing them of Headley’s presence in India and his connection with the LeT while he scouted for targets in Mumbai, but later visited Delhi in search for more. Since Headley was also working for the US Drug Enforcement Agency, he was allegedly on the radar of American secret agencies during his trips to India.
The Headley case is a sticky point in the US-India relationship. The Indian agencies are concerned about why Washington didn’t signal them about Headley’s presence in India where he could have easily been picked-up. After all, the US authorities did inform Delhi of a possible terrorist attack planned for a few months earlier than when it actually happened in Mumbai. There is a possibility that Headley deliberately misinformed the US authorities about the exact timing of the attack. The Indian intelligence wants to investigate this and much more. Since the access provided to the Indian investigators was not followed by any angry reaction from Delhi means two things. First, that the investigators did not find any conclusive evidence regarding any links between Headley and the serving Pakistan military. Second, it is also possible that the US might have convinced the Indians to show some restraint vis-à-vis Islamabad and use the information gathered from Headley more strategically to ensure that Pakistani authorities can be helped to wrap up groups like LeT. The majority in the US believes that Pakistan military is keen to sever its links with the militant groups. This is certainly what state functionaries and visiting analysts tell US policymakers.
Ensuring a balance between the two independent sets of dialogue remains critical for Washington. Reportedly, the dialogue with the Indians did not include any discussion on Pakistan. Contrary to what Islamabad tells its local audience, there was no mention of Kashmir. In fact, the US government is not keen to interject on this issue at all. Like the past, Americans are merely interested in acting as a firewall between the two neighbours during crisis and be a source for prodding them into a long-term peace arrangement. Washington does not consider itself in a position to dictate terms to New Delhi especially on the issue of an outstanding boundary dispute. The strategic dialogue with Pakistan has a different chemistry because that is a case of Islamabad and Rawalpindi asking for weapons and economic assistance. However, the more important fact is that the US wants to have a strategic relationship with both regional stakes on the basis of what they can offer in the relationship and the nature of synergy that can be built. Ultimately, the strategic component of the relationship will not just depend on Washington but the value of the partnering states as well. New Delhi has spent a couple of decades, if not more, to lobby for making American understanding the significance of building a holistic relationship with New Delhi. The relationship, hence, is not just based on military-strategic links but on cultural, economic and social ties. While creating a spin-off for other areas, the security ties itself can be considered a spin-in of the overall India-US bilateral ties.
Probably in a few years the US-India relations will become very strong. They will, of course, have differences but also the willingness and understanding to fathom the differences.
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If she can do it, why can’t we?
Quite right, in terms of Pak-America relations and India-America relations, India has won the war of perceptions. From outsourcing, to bollywood, to the army of cheap engineering and IT types who fill up silicon valley, to the allure of “India” as a destination, to the 1.1 billion consumers who are an eager market for American exports. The reality may be what it may be, but in terms of perceptions, American legislators of the coming years are going to line up to hail the key relationship between America and India.Recommend
One common interest between US-Rest of the World relations since 1947-48 is based on to country to country basis US would like to cooperate and in which field.
For instance US-Israel relations are purely based making Israel stronger against Palestine and rest of the Muslim Countries.
US-Pakistan relations are based on to protect US soil from any further terrorist activities.
US-Afghanistan relations are based on to have its military presence against Iran.
US-India relations are based on to make India an mini-super economic power in the region.Recommend
please enough of this jibrish.Recommend
Dr. Ayesha Siddiqa is correct in pointing out significance of David Headley case but talking to both stakeholders (Indians and Americans)I feel there are other critical issues that still remain open between India and the US.
Indians worry that the Obama administration has visions of a G-2 world, that they have downgraded India because Americans see Asia exclusively through the lens of an emerging China, with India’s role secondary. Americans claim that it is India which self-hyphenates, that India does not realize its influence and its interests have taken it beyond its immediate neighborhood (that is: do not obssess over China and Pakistan).
Americans also wonder if India has the drive to overcome obstacles to its own ambitious development efforts and speed up reform and attract more investment in more areas.
For example, General Electric and Westingouse, have signed MoU to build a pair of nuclear power reactors worth $10 billion in India. Before any contracts are signed, the US companies are asking the Indian parliament to pass legislation which would limit the companies’ liability in case of nuclear accidents. This issue was apparently raised more times than any other in DC.
Americans insist Indian law needs to be modified to set limits on the liability assessed to American companies involved with any kind of nuclear development. Even in the United States, liability is limited to about $11 billion, whereas the damage caused by accidents at nuclear power plants are estimated to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. US companies want similar liability protections.
Under current international law, the nuclear industry, or rather, state-owned nuclear enterprises, operate under sovereign limitation. In other words, Russian and French nuclear reactors can be protected by the built-in liability insurance provided by their respective governments, since they are publicly owned. However, Westinghouse and General Electric are not accorded this same security, as they are privately owned. In an analogous circumstance, during the US-Russia negotiations over the use of Cold War plutonium, including surplus plutonium from weapons in Russian reactors, the failure to arrive at a liability agreement was the major stumbling block in the execution of the deal.
The Convention on Supplementary Compensation is a UN convention responsible for limited liability, and its aim is essentially to deny fair compensation. Basically, the US wants India to sign and ratify this convention as a precondition of their participation in the deal.
Prime Minister Singh has been saying lately that it is deeply in India’s self interest for its parliament to lower standards of liability legislation so that it can attract American investors.
Americans complain that Indians are moving excrutiatingly slow.Recommend
Mr. Malick is correct in pointing out that David Headley issue is a very minor irritant between India-US. Nuclear deal is a bigger issue. Many India political parties do not agree to decreaase liability specially because of Bhopal incident. Minus legislative change much propogated nuclear deal is useless.Recommend
One fundamental problem that Pakistani strategists have is they have completely missed the bus on Kashmir, that is, they have not understood the nature of Kashmir issue. Ms. Siddiqa lives in an era when Pakistani elite still thought Kashmir was an “outstanding border dispute” between India and Pakistan. They have yet not come to terms that it is Kashmiris themselves that are the ultimate deal makers or breakers on Kashmir. Pakistani military still somehow believes it has constituency in Kashmir that can act on its whims. But that brief phase in Kashmir is over. Longtime pro-Pakistan elements in Kashmir have since realized that to remain relevant in Kashmiri political space they would have to speak the language of independence. The Chatham House poll recently conducted in Kashmir has shown how only 2 percent people would prefer to join Pakistan, against almost 95 percent who would want to be independent. It means essentially Pakistan is out of the question of Kashmir. It has very little resources or political presence to influence anything in Kashmir. Any dialogue that happens on Kashmir will be between Indians and the Kashmiri leadership. And the discussion will never be on such unpopular notions as joint sovereignty (forget accession with Pakistan), but on issues along a spectrum of choices between autonomy and full independence for Kashmir. Indians know very well that the dynamo of Kashmir issue is not in Pakistan (they have known it now for quite some time), but within Kashmir itself. For Pakistan it would still make sense to ally with Kashmiris, and continue to diplomatically support Kashmiris (it is better to have friendly Kashmiris than angry ones), but Pakistan needs to focus on its internal problems and save the federation, and provide a hope to its blighted nation that Pakistan is still a viable idea. If Pakistan hopes that US will intervene on their behalf in Kashmir it will be foolish. And not just because India is a market etc. But because even US understands that Kashmir’s solution lies in dialogue with Kashmiris, not in dialogue between India and Pakistan. They also understand Pakistan’s India problem is ideological, as India’s Pakistan itch is, and in reality “Kashmir” is simply rhetorical tool for Pakistan, as “terrorism” is for India. It is only a real material issue for Kashmiris. US would rather prefer India have a political solution with Kashmiris than India-Pakistan deal, which will never solve the Kashmir issue.Recommend