This article may have even a shorter shelf-life than most newspaper articles, if the rumours about Hafeez Shaikh’s possible candidature as Pakistan’s next prime minister, are not vehemently and credibly quashed soon enough. However, if there is even a small suggestion of truth in such a possibility, it reveals the poverty of ideas and choices in Pakistan’s ruling political class, and undermines the process of democratisation which has made some inroads since 2008. Dr Shaikh as a possible unelected prime minister is an anti-democratic measure.

The media in Pakistan has become far more proactive and investigative over the last few years and continues to expose a number of aspects which undermine democracy. In recent articles by reliable and credible columnists and journalists, it has been argued that Dr Shaikh is “close to the military”, as well as to the US and the IMF, and in fact, there has been an assumption for some time, that Dr Shaikh is the “American’s man” in Pakistan. While we do not know to what extent these possibilities are true, if they are, they certainly reveal the continued presence and power of anti-democratic forces over the political class in Pakistan. If the military and the Americans have to determine who Pakistan’s prime minister will be, caretaker or not, that is a sad commentary on all the democrats elected in 2008, and those who hope to be elected in 2013. If there is any truth in such assertions, the political class needs to oppose the possible nomination of Dr Shaikh.

In the age of transition towards further democratisation in Pakistan, Dr Shaikh is a poor choice — lest one forget, he is a Musharraf-era minister as well — but he is also a very poor choice on the basis of performance criterion. There is much agreement amongst economists, that his tenure as Pakistan’s finance minister, has been marked by poor performance whenever any policy was followed through, and that didn’t happen all that much. The economy has not performed well at all on his watch and numerous articles in the press have revealed the inefficiency of his ministry over the last two years. And if the IMF want him as well, as some journalists have argued, one wonders why this would be the case. The IMF programme which he was responsible for undertaking, failed miserably, precisely because Dr Shaikh was not able to take the political elected class along with him. The failure to implement the RGST is the high mark of his career as Pakistan’s finance minister. Why should Pakistan have to suffer a failed technocrat as prime minister?

There must be better names for a caretaker prime minister than Dr Shaikh’s. With Pakistan’s numerous unresolved issues and problems, many of the names doing the rounds are far better suited to Pakistan’s current predicament than someone who has had a supporting role to play in creating many of the economic problems which face Pakistan today. Besides, the political parties in power — which are most of the parties, either at the centre or in the provinces — ought to make political choices to ensure that the correct signals are given about intent and purpose and about deepening the process of democratisation in Pakistan. The political class needs to show their independence, both from the military and from America, and appoint someone who has a better record at managing a government. Someone who has failed in one ministry is not suited to lead an entire cabinet. Some weeks ago, members of the National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Finance, which included at least one prominent PPP member, demanded the resignation of the finance minister. They stated that he “had no time to listen to parliamentarians’ proposals to put the economy on right [sic] track”. They were clearly outraged enough, according to the news report, to “force” the chairman of the Standing Committee to write a letter to the prime minister asking for the minister’s removal, and demanded that he be replaced by an ‘elected member’. One hopes, that not just these members of the Committee, but many others as well, will voice their dissent again.

It is probable that the caretaker prime minister and his (or her) cabinet will play a pivotal role in managing the electoral transition in this stage of democratisation. Individuals with ample democratic credentials ought to be better suited for such positions, not those who serve military dictators and switch loyalties given half a chance.

Published in The Express Tribune, February 21^st, 2013.

The constant intervention by the different arms of Pakistan’s judiciary in the public and economic matters and affairs of the state of Pakistan, seems to have moved it from its earlier manifestation of activist, to vigilante. It is playing a populist role by intervening in government decisions, often overturning and challenging them, which range from the price of sugar, to lowering the price of CNG, to overruling the government’s decisions about mobile phone closures during the eid holidays. It is irrelevant whether these interventions are considered to be correct, just, popular, or in the so-called wider ‘national interest’. The main concern here is whether the judiciary is trying to run the government, and if that is the case, what need of government?

The enthusiasm and respect for the judiciary in many of its path-breaking, but, one must add, overly delayed, decisions, is certainly justified, for the judiciary has tried to correct many of its own wrongs from the past, as well as those of an institution which it now eclipses in many important ways, that of the military and the ISI. The proactive stance of the judiciary has been celebrated and many who had lost hope in the process of justice in Pakistan, have found a new champion. The judiciary’s interventions in strengthening democracy will also be recognised as an important achievement for years to come. However, the questions which emerge are regarding the judiciary’s mandate, its boundaries, and whether it is interfering in areas where it may not have expertise or any business to interfere in the first place.

The judiciary responds to petitions put up to it, which means that it consider a very diverse set of issues. It also dismiss petitions, and some are delayed by years, or even decades, as we have seen. It is not clear what sort of expertise the judicial establishment has to decide issues of economic and fiscal matters. A cut in the price of CNG is a very popular decision, but it has major ramifications on a host of other factors, all of which are interlinked. For a start, government revenue will fall, and if the government raises the price of petrol or diesel to compensate for the fall in revenue, will the judiciary intervene again? Interventions of such sort have multiple repercussions and need to be thought through.

However, the issue here is not about the price of sugar or CNG, but about who decides, and about who is responsible for public policy. If the judiciary can lower the price of CNG, why should we complain when another unelected institution suggests that it will bring about enlightened moderation? What if the judiciary felt that the public mood was one of ‘liberalism’, or ‘enlightenment’, would it pass a judgment on how an elected government ought to devise its policies to follow the judiciary’s wishes? And what is wrong then, with the military taking over, lowering inflation and the price of CNG, bringing in lifestyle liberalism, and economic growth?

Public policy is the domain of government. Elected governments also know that they seek re-election, and the price of CNG matters to them perhaps even more than it does to the judiciary, as should the fiscal status of the state. If the government has been entrusted to undertake certain policies on behalf of the electorate, they ought to have the expertise and knowledge of what is better public policy. At times they will need to be populist, but at others they will make unpopular decisions. Governments do make wrong decisions and are often responsible for making a mess of their mandate, as the incumbent government has accomplished. In a few months one will have the opportunity to pass judgment on its performance. Of course the judiciary and media have a role to play in overseeing government activity, but the extent of vigilantism and intervention is what is in question here.

The same logic and enthusiasm which supports an activist judiciary makes the case for an activist military. Unelected civilians and unelected military personnel do, of course, differ in their demeanour, and at the moment most people prefer the former. But what if the military were to intervene and lower all prices, not just for CNG?

Published in The Express Tribune, October 27^th, 2012.

Since at least September 2001, if not earlier, along with some other Muslim countries, all located either on the arc of evil or somewhere on the terrorists’ map, it has become very difficult for Pakistanis to get visas to most countries. For Pakistanis, even those who are by all definitions bona fide citizens with no designs to disrupt air traffic or cause problems to their host country, including members of the Pakistani elite, getting a visa borders on the near impossible.

The wait to get a visa can be many weeks or even months, to most destinations, whether you are an academic, professional or business person. Last month, when members of the Pakistani elite were sending their children to the US and Canada to start their higher education, many fathers were not given visas in time to accompany their children. It is usually men, Pakistani men, who are subjected to additional processing and screening or extensive delays when they apply to visas to many countries. Since 9/11, these additional processing delays along with extensive application forms have become the bane of any Pakistani wanting to travel overseas. Until the Mumbai attacks of 2008, India was the exception.

Visas to India — after former General-president Pervez Musharraf’s volte-face following Kargil and Agra — were far easier for Pakistanis to acquire. For about three or four years, India was the preferred destination of many Pakistanis irrespective of class, gender or ethnicity. In the now-prehistoric good old days of cricket matches in the last decade, it almost seemed like Pakistan and India were neighbours, of course with differences and unresolved disputes of over six decades, but still willing to allow people to travel to each others’ countries. Visas were easily available, at least for Pakistanis, and the only hassle and obstacle one had to endure, were the Pakistani spooks outside the Indian High Commission in Islamabad asking irrelevant questions. Indians coming to Pakistan faced more difficult challenges.

In fact, any visa regime between India and Pakistan will benefit Pakistanis more than it will Indians. More Pakistanis will always want to visit India than the reverse traffic, with the possible exception of Indian Sikhs wanting to visit their holy places in Pakistan. With a very large Pakistani migrant population from undivided India which came in the period 1947-52, both Punjabi and Urdu-speaking, there are still ancestral ties and some sense of vague association to the lands which are in India. Apart from these connections, there are numerous other Pakistanis who would want to visit India like other normal visitors; as tourists, business people and for religious pilgrimages, and just to enjoy being in a different country where, at least in north India, language and culture are far more familiar than in other countries of the region or farther afield.

Understandably, since November 2008, and especially once David Headley had been identified as one of the key operatives in the Mumbai attacks, it has been near impossible for normal Pakistanis, even well-connected normal Pakistanis, to get a visa to visit India for a host of purposes, whether meetings, conferences or business purposes. Compared to the pre-2008 period of visitor exchanges and cricket matches, the last four years have been troubled, barren and disheartening for those who have worked for and believed in an India-Pakistan future which was friendly, open and allowed citizens to visit each others’ countries.

The initiatives announced last week at the India-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ meetings in Islamabad, are a bold and appropriate first step in moving to a visa regime which better reflects the wishes and aspirations of many people, particularly Pakistanis who are bound to benefit far more than Indians in a liberal visa regime between the two countries.

There is no denying the fact that the eight new categories of visas are indeed a big step forward, especially allowing concessions to Pakistani business people and those over 65, and all these measures have already been hailed by the Pakistani business community and by civil society. However, the question of processing time, scrutiny and general hassles will determine the efficacy of the new visa regime. While Pakistanis can apply for visas to any country in the world, it is what happens after they apply, which has been cause for concern. One hopes that while the initial sentiment between India and Pakistan is highly positive, the actual implementation of the new liberalised visa agreement will also be so.

Moreover, given the interest by many Pakistanis to visit India — and vice versa — any developments on the new visa regime will have to have substantial support structures to make the scheme workable. Just one Indian or Pakistani High Commission in the capital handling visa applications is inefficient and will give rise to bureaucratic delays. For a start, both countries need to open many more consulates in the cities from where they are expected to receive applications. More flights are also needed between Pakistan’s three main cities to at least Kolkata, Mumbai, New Delhi and Chennai, to make the visa regime more realistic. The announcement of the Islamabad-New Delhi flight is a beginning.

The problems with moving forward on visa regimes or trade or cricket between India and Pakistan are not the difficult and bureaucratic resistance to change and the implementation of new processes, but actors on the Pakistani side who have disrupted all peace (and visa) processes in the past: Kargil, the Indian parliament attack, Mumbai. The ability and freedom of Pakistanis wanting to visit India is inextricably determined by the political economy of Pakistan.

Published in The Express Tribune, September 13^th, 2012.

It has been suggested in the media and print public sphere that, perhaps, Pakistan’s superior judiciary may have emerged as Pakistan’s strongest and most influential institution. Arguments have been made which suggest, that by dismissing the previous Prime Minister of Pakistan and threatening the present one, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has been flexing its muscle and putting parliament in its place, brandishing its new found activism to make elbow room at the power table with parliament, the military and the media.

This argument suggests, that in the absence of an activist military, the judiciary has become the keeper of what it assumes are Pakistan’s morals. It has decided to make decisions, which will have a bearing on the political course of the country, as it has in the past, but with greater vigour and public support. It is being argued that the judiciary now moves with a ‘mind of its own’, perhaps, independent of pressure from the President as in the past, or providing justification for a military coup, part of the judiciary’s many accomplishments. While it is clearly noticeable that the judiciary is taking proactive decisions in the political — not just the public — life of the country, a challenge has been thrown, which says that until the military is also put into the dock for many of its well-documented misdemeanours, the judiciary will simply be perceived to be on a vengeful drive discriminating against a few chosen opponents. In other words, the question of whether the judiciary is the strongest institution in Pakistan, depends on its ability to take on the military, rather than the soft target of the Prime Minister.

These assertions and this line of thinking have been questioned and challenged by those who point to flaws in the original argument. In the vibrant public discourse on such matters, some interlocutors have questioned the basic premise of the argument that this judiciary was acting as an institution, and argued that this judicial activism is probably on account of the particular historical circumstances of the moment, and specifically due to the role of the incumbent Chief Justice of Pakistan. They see this as an individual’s particular penchant, not necessarily an institutional shift.

Some commentators make the very valid argument, that in discussions on the Supreme Court, it is essential to distinguish between the power of the existing crop of judges and the judiciary as an institution. One needs to avoid using the two interchangeably, and that the Supreme Court under its existing Chief Justice needs to be seen as an anomaly. Based on historical events, his authority flows not from the institution but from his self — what is seen to be his heroism (in saying no to a dictator), his exemplary character (to remain steadfast in his resolve while deposed) and his extraordinary accomplishment (to return twice in the face of resistance from first Musharraf and then Zardari). These comments imply that institutions are only as relevant as their leaders, and that it is from this that the Chief Justice’s authority and legitimacy flows, not from the Constitution and the Supreme Court.

Examples from recent history support such conclusions, where individuals have led revolutions or broad social movements and have influenced major events, yet after their passing or removal, their successors have not had the legitimacy, support or power they had. The same institutions (or outcomes) have lost their earlier power and substance. Examples can be found from scores of cases related to institutions, such as the military, political or social movements, and even the superior judiciary.

Individuals matter immensely and even if they are embedded in institutions, in numerous cases, have the ability to make the institution in their own, preferred, image. For good and for bad, many leaders fail to do so, not simply because they are caught in straitjacketed institutions, but on account of personal failure or excessive or non-existent vision or ambition. As world history shows, over and over again, leadership is crucial to outcomes and results, good and bad.

Clearly, one has to examine the cliché being posted as analysis, of the ‘clash of institutions’, between parliament and the superior judiciary. Are these institutions clashing, or is it a particular leadership using that institution to further a particular case or crusade? A more belligerent Pakistan Peoples Party leader could have taken on the Supreme Court, and the outcome (and analysis) would have been very different. A military coup in 1977 and another in 1999, with very different leaders of the same institution, has left very different legacies.

There are far too many examples to emphasise the point made by those who question the institution-strengthening arguments, and we know, ‘institutional change’ does come through the direction provided by its leader. Apple might not feel the same without Steve Jobs, but is still much the same company. However, it is impossible to predict what happens some months from now under a new Chief Justice, and what degree of independence and belligerence a new Supreme Court exhibits. Nevertheless, one ought to expect, as has been suggested in other contexts, that the bar for the future has been raised.

As has been argued before, Musharraf, despite the dislike many have of his military dictatorship, did raise the bar on the political front with regard to women, the media, and even relations with India. It is expected that the next Chief Justice will also have to deal with raised standards set by his predecessor, and whether the legacy of a strong institution prevails, will only be tested after a series of events which allow us to examine outcomes in a somewhat longer time-span. It is too soon to answer the question: which is Pakistan’s strongest institution?

Published in The Express Tribune, August 9^th, 2012.

Reading op-ed columns these days, including in The Express Tribune, is like examining the contributor’s curriculum vitae. Some contributors go to a lot of trouble to give, either themselves or with the help of eager and creative copywriters or editors, a twist to a simple university graduation degree, sexing it up into something well beyond what the university may have taught them.

This trend, which has now become almost a rule for all the English newspapers in Pakistan, including those which were considered more staid and ‘serious’ and didn’t subscribe to this policy earlier, reveals a great deal of the pomposity of the writer more than anything else. Why should one be impressed by a bad article which says little, or is a rehash of many other pieces, whether the contributor got a Master’s degree at Harvard or Karachi University? Of course it shouldn’t matter, but for our elite and its culture, the social location of an individual or the group they belong to, matters far more than what one says or does. Or, equivalently, always dress smart, and have nothing of any consequence to say.

Numerous contributors write about their academic achievements at the end of their column, and for the reader this is supposed to certify their qualifications or expertise to write on a subject. When lawyers write articles, perhaps it makes sense for them to state that they are advocates of the Supreme Court of Pakistan — although this might not always help their case — but it makes no sense to state that they studied at Harvard or that they were called to the Bar at Lincoln’s Inn. The reference to the Supreme Court only endorses their credentials to be able to speak on a subject on which they may have some authority, competence or comparative advantage, but university degrees are quite unimportant. Many of the readers of these columns themselves have children or may have themselves studied at many prestigious universities — or even less-prestigious ones — so may not be impressed by such credentials which may have been acquired some decades ago. For a fresh 21-year-old graduate it matters where she got her degree from, something that she might be proud of, but not for someone in his mid-40s who has been practising law for two decades or more.

Another serious ailment which some writers have, is to be obsessed with the title ‘Doctor’, or ‘Dr’. This is most pronounced amongst some economists who suffer from this problem and always introduce themselves as follows: “My name is Dr so-and-so” (first name only). This is also repeated in their columns and others also refer to them as “Dr so-and-so”, but first name only. Numerous economic publications produced by their own departments or institutes, especially in government, also carry their names as such. One can cite a number of examples, but the references should be fairly obvious to all. One is supposed to be impressed by the fact that they are PhDs, not by the arguments they make.

There are also at least two such individuals who are referred to, probably not by themselves, for sure, but by some overzealous copy editor trying to please, as “former finance ministers”. Some who are called “former finance ministers” have been advisers to the Ministry of Finance or advisers on finance to the Prime Minister or some other high office. While they probably themselves do not write that they are “former finance ministers” when they have not been that, the fact that this issue is repeated each time their name is mentioned, even at the end of the columns which they write regularly, suggests either complicity or incompetence on someone’s part. Once or twice, it could be a mistake, but every week? Moreover, these former non-finance ministers are not alone at fault in having their former positions incorrectly stated. There are a few others, usually based abroad, who clearly overstate their professional position and titles. An easy website check at the university where they supposedly ‘teach’ reveals that they are research assistants, or something less glamorous. Of course, this does not affect the arguments they are making, but this is precisely the point.

Clearly, we try to impress by who we are and where all we have studied or been, and by all that we think we have achieved, but not by the substance of what we are arguing. Often delusions of a past grandeur seep in to such self-characterisation. Perhaps, those who do this feel that their titles — real or false — make a difference to how the reader perceives their piece, and they are probably correct in assuming so. Ours is a society where such false credentials matter more than substance. It matters more who you know rather than what you do. Perhaps, it is time to look at substantive issues rather than at mere gloss.

Published in The Express Tribune, May 9^th, 2012.